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This thesis presents the results of an investigation into the failure detection problem.
We consider the specific case of the Quality of Service (QoS) of crash failure detection.
In contrast to previous work, we address the crash failure detection problem when the
monitored target is resilient and recovers after failure. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work to provide an analysis of crash-recovery failure detection from the
QoS perspective.
We develop a probabilistic model of the behavior of a crash-recovery target, i.e. one
which has the ability to recover from the crash state. We show that the fail-free run
and the crash-stop run are special cases of the crash-recovery run with mean time to
failure (MTTF) approaching to infinity and mean time to recovery (MTTR) approach-
ing to infinity, respectively. We extend the previously published QoS metrics to allow
the measurement of the recovery speed, and the definition of the completeness prop-
erty of a failure detector. Then, the impact of the dependability of the crash-recovery
target on the QoS bounds for such a crash-recovery failure detector is analyzed using
general dependability metrics, such as MTTF and MTTR, based on an approximate
probabilistic model of the two-process failure detection system. Then according to
our approximate model, we show how to estimate the failure detector’s parameters to
achieve a required QoS, based on Chen et al.’s NFD-S algorithm analytically, and how
to execute the configuration procedure of this crash-recovery failure detector.
In order to make the failure detector adaptive to the target’s crash-recovery behavior
and enable the autonomy of the monitoring procedure, we propose two types of re-
covery detection protocols. One is a reliable recovery detection protocol, which can
guarantee to detect each occurring failure and recovery by adopting persistent storage.
The other is a lightweight recovery detection protocol, which does not guarantee to de-
tect every failure and recovery but which reduces the system overhead. Both of these
recovery detection protocols improve the completeness without reducing the other QoS
aspects of a failure detector. In addition, we also demonstrate how to estimate the in-
puts, such as the dependability metrics, using the failure detector itself.
In order to evaluate our analytical work, we simulate the following failure detection al-
i
gorithms: the simple heartbeat timeout algorithm, the NFD-S algorithm and the NFD-
S algorithm with the lightweight recovery detection protocol, for various values of
MTTF and MTTR. The simulation results show that the dependability of a recoverable
monitored target could have significant impact on the QoS of such a failure detector.
This conforms well to our models and analysis. We show that in the case of reasonable
long MTTF, the NFD-S algorithm with the lightweight recovery detection protocol ex-
hibits better QoS than the NFD-S algorithm for the completeness of a crash-recovery
failure detector, and similarly for other QoS metrics.
Keywords: Failure Detector, Failure Detection, QoS, Crash-Recovery, Fault Toler-
ance, Dependability, Web Services, Grid Computing.
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Dependability is one of the most important issues for distributed systems. Since
world-wide distributed systems have become more and more complicated, many fault-
tolerance techniques have been adopted to improve system dependability. Dependable
Infrastructure Grid Service (DIGS)1 [4], one of the UK e-Science projects, aims to
investigate dependability approaches for the service-oriented architecture and build
strategies to enhance the service-oriented applications’ reliability and availability. One
of the key obstacles to achieving such a dependability goal is detecting occurred fail-
ures and handling faulty components promptly. The failure detection approach we
have investigated is a subtopic of the DIGS project which brings together ideas of fault
tolerance, reliability and dependability for the system infrastructures for large-scale
distributed systems. The final aim of this failure detection topic is to provide theoreti-
cal and practical solutions to detect various types of failure with a satisfactory Quality
of Service (QoS). In this thesis, we investigate the crash failure detection problem in
detail based on the crash-recovery model. In general, the crash-stop failure is used
to model a target that once it stops, it will never be repaired and become dead com-
pletely or when a problem occurred, it can be replaced by an another instance with
1This project is renamed as Dependable Service-Centric System (DCCS).
1
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a new identifier. For the crash-recovery failure, it is usually used to model the target
that after a failure occurs, it can be repaired, or has the ability of self-healing, then
back to the correct state again. In theory, the crash-recovery failure model is mainly
considered on the consensus and group membership problems [1, 34, 54, 69], in which
the monitored process will crash by stop working and rejoin the member group after
its recovery. In practice, in order to achieve high availability, self-repairing and self-
healing mechanisms are widely adopted in fault-tolerant systems to achieve automatic
recovery after the crash occurs. Particularly in middleware systems, there are many
techniques and algorithms are proposed to achieve the self-repairing or self-healing
goal, such as the connector-based self-healing system described in [32, 77] or the re-
flection technique adopted in [12] or the snapshot algorithms in [61, 65]. As we can
see that the crash-recovery failure is quite common in many fault-tolerant systems. It
needs to be considered as a frequently occurred failure type. However, compared with
the crash-stop target, due to the state space size increasing of the crash-recovery target,
QoS analysis of such a crash-recovery failure detector become more difficult in theory
and practice. In a fail-free or crash-stop run, the state space size of the failure detec-
tor is two, which contains the Trust-Alive state and the Suspect-Alive state2. But in a
crash-recovery run, the state space size is four, which contians the Trust-Alive state,
the Trust-Crash state, the Suspect-Alive state and the Suspect-Crash state (details in
Section 3.6.2 ). Therefore we focus on such a crash-recovery paradigm and study the
failure detector’s QoS based on a two-process failure detection pair system model.
1.2 Problem Statement
For global-scale distributed systems, various types of failure may occur during the ex-
ecution. In this thesis, we address the QoS of the crash failure detection oracles as the
first step. For crash failure detection, Fisher et al. in [38] show the impossibility of sep-
arating a crashed process and a very slow process in a pure asynchronous system, then
Chandra and Toueg in [22] introduce the concept of unreliable crash failure detectors to
2For a crash-stop run, the pre-crash duration is mainly considered and the pre-crash duration of the
crash-stop process is a long run.
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detect the eventual crash behavior of a process. Following the previous work done by
Chandra and Toueg in [22], Chen et al. in [24] give the definitions of the QoS metrics
of failure detectors in terms of the completeness and the accuracy properties intro-
duced in [22]. Furthermore, many researchers have drawn their attentions on the QoS
of crash failure detectors’ implementations and failure detection algorithms. However,
most previous work on the QoS of crash failure detection is based on the crash-stop
or the fail-free assumption and relies on predicting the liveness message transmission
behavior and estimating a suitable timeout threshold to achieve a better QoS of crash
failure detection. In contrast, we regard a crashed process or service as recoverable,
since many fault-tolerance techniques can be adopted to achieve such recovery. For
high-level applications, a more realistic crash failure model would be crash-recovery.
However, the previous QoS analysis work and algorithms cannot adapt to the recovery
of the monitored target. This is because the fail-free assumption assumes that fail-
ure does not occur. The crash-stop assumption assumes that there is only one failure
and the monitoring procedure terminates once the occurred crash failure is detected.
Furthermore, both of these two assumptions do not take the mistakes caused by the
crash or recovery of the monitored target into consideration. In addition, in large-scale
distributed systems, autonomic failure detection procedure is important. Crash-stop
failure detectors cannot adapt to the crash-recovery target with a consistent view of
the target’s liveness. Thus, in this thesis, we mainly focus on such a crash-recovery
paradigm. In a crash-recovery model, it is assumed that a system undergoes periodic
crashes. During a crash period, the system is unable to service any requests or send any
messages, which externally behaves like that the system is unreachable. The end of the
crash period is marked by a recovery, after which the system returns normal service
and its internal state is back to the same state before the crash failure occurs. In this
thesis, we are concerned with the QoS offered by a failure detector monitoring such a
system. We do this in the context of a two-process failure detection pair consisting of
a failure detector and a monitored target process.
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1.3 Thesis Contribution
In this thesis, we extend the previous study of crash-stop failure detection and consider
the monitored target as crash-recovery. We study and model a crash-recovery target
and its failure detector’s probabilistic behavior. We extend the QoS metrics proposed
in [24] to measure the recovery detection speed and the proportion of the detected
failures of a crash-recovery failure detector. Then the impact of the dependability of
the crash-recovery target on the QoS bounds for such a crash-recovery failure detector
is analyzed by adopting general dependability metrics such as mean time to failure
(MTTF) and mean time to recovery (MTTR). In addition, we analyze how to estimate
the failure detector’s parameters to achieve the QoS from a given set of requirements
based on the NFD-S algorithm proposed by Chen et al. [24]. We also demonstrate
how to estimate the inputs of a failure detector such as message delays, losses and the
dependability metrics of a crash-recovery target, using the failure detector itself and
demonstrate how to execute the configuration procedure of this crash-recovery failure
detector.
In order to adapt to the recovery of the monitored target, we propose two types of
recovery detection protocol, which can detect the occurrence of a recovery and estimate
the recovery time. The first is a reliable recovery detection protocol, which guarantees
to detect the occurrence of each failure and recovery by using persistent storage. The
second is a lightweight protocol, which does not guarantee to detect every failure and
recovery but which has a lower system overhead than our first protocol. Both of these
recovery detection protocols can improve the proportion of failures detected without
reducing other QoS aspects.
We simulate and evaluate the simple timeout algorithm, the NFD-S algorithm and the
NFD-S algorithm with the lightweight recovery protocol. The simulation results match
our analysis and show that the dependability of a crash-recovery monitored target will
influence the QoS of such a failure detector. We compare the simulation results with
the analytical results derived from our approximate model. The comparison shows
that our analysis is valid and the simulation results satisfy the analytical QoS bounds:
TD ≤ T UD , E(TMR)≥ T LMR, PA ≥ PLA , E(TM)≤ T UM , E(TDR)≤ TUDR and E(RDF)≥ RLDF,
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which match our modeling and analysis work in Chapters 3. Moreover, the proposed
recovery detection protocols can enable the FDS to operate autonomously and improve
the QoS of failure detectors in terms of the failure detection proportion for the highly
consistent monitored target.
1.4 Thesis Outline
This thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, first, we introduce some background
of distributed systems briefly. Second, a literature survey of the previous work on the
crash failure detection is presented. Third, we analyze and classify the possible types
of failure that might occur and their detection strategies. Finally, based on our survey,
we summarize various requirements for crash failure detectors and the previous work
on crash failure detection.
In Chapter 3, we model a crash-recovery service and its failure detector’s probabilistic
behavior. We refine the completeness of a crash-recovery failure detector and extend
the QoS metrics to measure the completeness and the recovery detection speed of such
a failure detector. Then we show how to involve the general dependability metrics
for an approximate analysis of the QoS of a failure detector and how to estimate the
parameters and configure a crash-recovery failure detector to satisfy a given set of
QoS requirements. Moreover, we discuss the impact of the dependability of the crash-
recovery service on the QoS of failure detectors in detail.
In Chapter 4, the estimation of the input parameters of a crash-recovery failure detector
is presented. We show how to estimate the message delay, message loss, MTTF and
MTTR etc. in a crash-recovery run. Then, we propose two types of recovery detection
protocol to improve the QoS and assist in the input parameter estimation of a failure
detector.
In Chapter 5, we introduce the design of a failure detection simulator called FD-
Simulator, which we adopt to evaluate our analysis work in Chapters 3 and 4. The
proposed simulator can simulate either flat or hierarchical distributed failure detection
frameworks and the crash-recovery behavior of the components within the simulated
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frameworks. Based on this simulator, a simulation plan is proposed and the simulation
cases are simulated. Then the simulation results are analyzed and we show that the
dependability of a crash-recovery service has an impact on the QoS of a failure detec-
tor. The simulation results also show that the NFD-S algorithm with the lightweight
recovery detection protocol performs better than the NFD-S algorithm in terms of the
proportion of the detected crash failures, which implies that the recovery detection
protocol can help a failure detector to adapt to the recovery behavior of the monitored
target and improve the QoS of failure detectors. These results also indicate that recov-
ery detection protocols can improve the adaptivity of crash-recovery failure detectors,
which are particularly useful for highly consistent recoverable monitored targets.
Finally in Chapter 6, a brief summary of the thesis work is presented and some possible
future directions are introduced.
Chapter 2
Failures and Mechanisms of Failure
Detection
2.1 Introduction
The purpose of failure detection is to discover abnormal software behaviors. Recog-
nizing the occurrence of failures is one of the most important steps towards achieving
fault-tolerance and dependability. In this chapter, we introduce some related back-
ground knowledge and review existing crash failure detectors. The structure of this
chapter is as follows: Section 2.2 and Section 2.3 contain the essential background re-
lated to this thesis. Section 2.2 introduces basic concepts of distributed systems, Web
Services, Grid Computing, dependability and fault tolerance. Section 2.3 introduces
the fundamental research work on unreliable failure detectors defined by Chandra and
Toueg in [23] and QoS metrics defined by Chen et al. in [24]. Section 2.4-2.7 contain
more details and discussions, which can be skipped for the first time reading. In Sec-
tion 2.4, an overview of the previous work on crash failure detection algorithms and
implementations is introduced. Section 2.5 introduces some failure detection service
frameworks and applications. Section 2.6 introduces the classification of various types
of failure. Finally, in Section 2.7, we discuss some desired features of failure detectors
from designers’ and users’ viewpoints and summarize a range of requirements for the
7
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design and implementation of failure detectors.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Traditional Distributed Communication Paradigms
During the past decades, scientists and standardization organizations have made many
efforts to enable geographically distributed applications to communicate with each
other over networks. For example, socket communications and network protocols (e.g.,
TCP/IP, UDP) or CORBA [45] and DCOM [76] at a higher-level, that adopt remote
procedure call (RPC) or remote method invocation (RMI). At the application-level,
CORBA, DCOM and RMI can serialize, encapsulate and transmit the remote proce-
dure call or invocation automatically to mask the lower level communication. All of
these middleware communication paradigms greatly enhance the interactive ability of
distributed applications developed in a mixture of languages based on different plat-
forms and significantly reduce complexity and costs of application development. How-
ever, the platform and language dependency problems still remain to be completely
solved.
2.2.2 Service-Oriented Architecture
Service-oriented architecture (SOA) has emerged over several years, and it has been
well-accepted in the world of system design and development. In particular, for dis-
tributed systems, SOA has been widely adopted for its simplicity, comprehensibility,
universality, effectiveness and integrity. Architectures such as DCOM and CORBA
are all service-oriented. In general, SOA is a relatively abstract concept, which ex-
presses an architectural style whose goal is to achieve loose coupling among interact-
ing software components [47]. A service-oriented implementation is a collection of
well-defined, self-contained software entities deployed by a service provider, which
are accessible by service consumers via existing protocols.
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2.2.3 Web Services
The Web Service architecture [14] is defined by the World Wide Web Consortium
(W3C), which adopts SOA to publish functions over a network. In order to solve
the interaction problem in traditional distributed systems, Web Services adopt XML-
based definition languages and communication protocols at the application-level to
ensure platform and language independence. The core standards of Web Services in-
clude Web Services Description Language (WSDL) [25] and Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP) [15], which are defined by W3C. WSDL is an XML format for de-
scribing network services as a set of endpoints operating on messages containing ei-
ther document-oriented or procedure-oriented information, as a machine-processable
format to describe the functions exposed by a Web Service [14]. The operation and
messages in WSDL are described abstractly, and then bound to a concrete network
protocol and message format to define an endpoint. SOAP is used to pass messages
and exchange of information in a decentralized environment, typically conveyed using
HTTP and XML to express the message payload. SOAP is an XML-based protocol
that consists of three parts: an envelope that defines a framework for describing what
is in a message and how to process it, a set of encoding rules for expressing instances
of application-defined data types, and a convention for representing remote procedure
calls and responses.
There are also many other standards such as Universal Description, Discovery and In-
tegration (UDDI) [28] for service registration and discovery, Web Services Inspection
Language (WS-Inspection) [7] which is another discovery specification and Web Ser-
vice Level Agreement (WSLA) [64] which addresses service level management in a
Web Services environment.
2.2.4 Grid Computing
Grid Computing has emerged as a brand-new research area in distributed computing.
The concept of the Grid was first expressed by Ian Foster and Carl Kesselman in [40] in
1998 and enriched in [41]. Generally speaking, the Grid can be regarded as a global-
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scale distributed system. The original purpose of Grid computing is to seamlessly
share heterogeneous computational resources such as CPU power and storage capacity
across dynamic virtual organizations, which can supply massive or even unlimited
computing and storage capability. In recent years, Grid and Web Services standards
have started to converge. The Grid community tried to merge Grid standards with
Web Services in order to make them fully compatible and benefit each other. Now
both adopt SOA as their foundation. The underlying heterogeneous infrastructures
are masked by the service-oriented environment and applications can be deployed and
made accessible in a distributed way as services.
2.2.5 Failures, Fault Tolerance and Dependability
Software and hardware may contain bugs and other internal or external errors that can
make the run-time services unstable. A number of research papers [44, 43, 70] based
on various types of computer system have shown that bugs are one of the most im-
portant reasons for system crashes. Thus faults are accepted as inevitable and may
lead to a system failure. In this situation, fault-tolerance mechanisms are introduced
for critical systems to improve the system survivability when failures occur. Roughly
speaking, fault tolerance is the ability or the property to enable a system to continu-
ously operate correctly when some abnormal internal or external events occur (e.g.,
failures). Many techniques have been proposed to achieve fault tolerance for vari-
ous systems, such as adopting replications [10, 11] to introduce redundancies into a
system, adopting checkpointing techniques [61, 65, 87] to snapshot the runtime in-
formation persistently, adopting rejuvenation [5, 60, 85] to achieve self-healing and
using recovery [61, 72], reboot [17] or micro-reboot [18] to achieve re-birth. All of
these techniques can enhance the system reliability, availability and consistency and
usability etc. to some extent.
Dependability is one of the most important issues for computer systems, which is a
complex attribute. Laprie et al. [63] define the concept of dependability as the prop-
erty of a computer system such that reliance can justifiably be placed on the service it
delivers. In addition, by recording the lifetime information of a system, the system’s
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dependability can be described quantitatively. Generally speaking, the dependability of
a system can be measured according to the reliability, availability, consistency, usabil-
ity and security etc. In order to simplify the measurements which are related to failure
detection, here we only introduce reliability, availability and consistency, which are
strongly related to the QoS of failure detectors (the relationships will be presented in
the following chapters).
In [26], Knight and Strunk give a definition of software reliability and availability. We
extend the definition of consistency as follows,
• Reliability: can be defined as the probability that the system will operate cor-
rectly in a specified operating environment up until time t (t > 0).
• Availability: can be defined as the probability that the system will be operational
at time t.
• Consistency: can be defined as the probability that the system will return to nor-
mal operation correctly after a failure has occurred within a specified operating
environment within time t.
These three metrics present different aspects of the system dependability. Generally,
reliability presents how long a system will operate correctly and can be captured by
mean time to failure (MTTF), which records the probability of a service to persist
without a failure. Availability presents the probability that a system is accessible or
reachable with correct operation at any time and can be captured by mean time to
failure divided by mean time between failure ( MTTFMTBF ). Consistency presents the ability
of a system to recover from a failure state to the correct operation state and can be
captured by meantime to recovery (MTTR), which records how fast a system recovers.
Furthermore, from the system design perspective, different systems might desire differ-
ent aspects of dependability features, such as the highly reliable system which requires
the system to be durable, the highly available system, which requires the system to
be accessible with correct operation most of the time or the highly consistent system,
which requires fast recovery of the system after failures occur. Thus the adoption of
fault-tolerance mechanisms should adapt to dependability requirements.
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2.2.6 Crash Failure
Crash failure is one of the most fundamental types of failure, which is traditionally
regarded as a faulty process stopping performing its specification permanently. A crash
failure happens when a correctly behaved service stops operating then remains inactive
or can be repaired after some repair time. Generally speaking, there are two paradigms
of the crash failure:
• Crash-stop: a correctly behaved service halts abnormally and stops forever after
crashing.
• Crash-recovery: a service stops operating for a while then recovers to the correct
state before it crashed.
In addition, the fail-free assumption is used quite often to simplify the study of the
crash failure detection problem. This is because most monitored targets will be in the
alive state for a long time before it crashes and such crash failures can be ignored as
rare events in theoretical analysis in some occasions. Since fail-free is not an actual
failure, we do not include fail-free as a failure type.
Basically, when we study crash failure, we assume that the crash failure is fail-fast [78],
which means the service reaches the inactive state quickly. Sometimes, a fail-silent
failure is regarded as similar to a crash failure, but more precisely, it is a muteness
failure [35]. Actually, the crash failure is a particular case of the muteness failure,
which will stop operating without generating any liveness messages when a failure
occurs.
Various detection strategies can be adopted in detecting crash failures: push-model (re-
ceiving “I am alive message”), pull-model (querying “Are you alive”) or hybrid-model
(combining pull and push). If a service is capable of providing heartbeats or answer-
ing queries, crash failure is detectable by regularly checking the receipt of liveness
messages. If the missing liveness messages are not received before the specified time
threshold, the failure detector will suspect the liveness of the monitored target.
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2.3 Crash Failure Detector Oracles
Detection of crash failure is crucial to many fundamental problems, such as solving
consensus or group membership problems. Fisher et al. in [38] show the impossibility
of solving distributed consensus problem in a pure asynchronous system, and Chandra
and Toueg in [22] show that the weakest class of failure detectors to solve distributed
consensus is♦S (see Section 2.3.1), both of which mean that it is impossible to imple-
ment a reliable crash-stop failure detector in a pure asynchronous system. Their results
show that even for the most fundamental crash-stop failure, detecting such a failure is
still a knotty problem. In the following parts, we will introduce previous efforts and
results in the context of crash failure detection.
2.3.1 Properties of Unreliable Failure Detectors
Chandra and Toueg in [22] first formally address the notion of failure detectors and
introduce the concept of unreliable failure detectors in terms of the completeness and
accuracy properties. The process failure type they considered is crash-stop failure
presented in 2.2.6 and the properties of unreliable failure detectors are classified as
follows:
• Completeness
– Strong completeness: eventually every process that crashes is permanently
suspected by every correct process.
– Weak completeness: eventually every process that crashes is permanently
suspected by some correct process.
• Accuracy
– Strong accuracy: correct processes are never suspected.
– Weak accuracy: some correct process is never suspected.
• Eventual accuracy
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– Eventual strong accuracy: there is a time after which no correct processes
is suspected by any correct process.
– Eventual weak accuracy: there is a time after which some correct process
is never suspected by any correct process.
With respect to the satisfaction of the above definitions, a failure detector can be cate-
gorized according to the following classes.
• P : the set of Perfect Failure Detectors that satisfy the strong completeness and
the strong accuracy properties
• S : the set of Strong Failure Detectors that satisfy the strong completeness and
the weak accuracy properties
• W : the set of Weak Failure Detectors that satisfy the weak completeness and the
weak accuracy properties
• Q : the set of Failure Detectors that satisfy the weak completeness and the strong
accuracy properties
• ♦P : the set of Eventually Perfect Failure Detectors that satisfy the strong com-
pleteness and the eventual strong accuracy properties
• ♦S : the set of Eventually Strong Failure Detectors that satisfy the strong com-
pleteness and the eventual weak accuracy properties
• ♦W : the set of Eventually Weak Failure Detectors that satisfy the weak com-
pleteness and the eventual weak accuracy properties
• ♦Q : the set of Eventually Failure Detectors that satisfy the weak completeness
and the eventual strong accuracy properties
From the above definitions, the properties of a failure detector can be captured by its
completeness and accuracy, which provides a precise way to measure the conditions
that are needed to solve consensus problems by using failure detectors and establish
the classification of crash failure detectors. Then the weakest failure detector to solve
a certain distributed agreement problem under a given system environment can be de-
duced accurately according to Chandra and Toueg’s classification. However, using
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Accuracy
Completeness Strong Weak Eventual Strong Eventual Weak
Strong Perfect Strong Eventually Perfect Eventually Strong
P S ♦P ♦S
Weak Weak Eventually Weak
Q W ♦Q ♦W
Table 2.1: Classes of Failure Detectors Defined in Terms of Accuracy and Complete-
ness
only completeness and accuracy properties are not enough to measure how well a fail-
ure detector can satisfy the performance requirements. Consequently, in order to mea-
sure the QoS of crash failure detectors, Chen et al. in [24] give a complex set of QoS
metrics to measure the performance of crash failure detectors. These are discussed in
the following section.
2.3.2 QoS Metrics of Crash Failure Detectors
In [24], Chen et al. propose a set of QoS metrics to measure the completeness, ac-
curacy and speed of unreliable failure detectors. In order to formally define the QoS
metrics, Chen et al. define state transitions of a failure detector: when a failure detector
monitors a monitored process, at any time, the failure detector’s state either trusts or
suspects the monitored process’s liveness. If a failure detector transfers from a Trust
state to a Suspect state, then a S-transition occurs; if a failure detector transfers from
a Suspect state to a Trust state then a T-transition occurs. Fig. 2.1 shows QoS metrics
and state transitions of the failure detector as in [24]. Here is a short introduction to
the main QoS metrics and formulas to compute the failure detector parameters.
QoS Metrics:
• Detection time (TD): the elapsed time from when the monitored process crashes
until the monitoring process suspects the monitored process permanently (the
final S-transition occurs).
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Figure 2.1: The QoS Metrics
• Mistake recurrence time (TMR): this is the time between the i and i+1 mistake
occurrences (S-transition i to S-transition i+1), where i≥ 1.
• Mistake duration (TM): the time to correct a mistake from the suspect state
(S-transition to T-transition).
• Average mistake rate (λM): the number of mistakes per unit time that a failure
detector makes (λM = 1E(TMR)).
• Good period duration (TG): the duration for which the failure detector main-
tains the correct state information. (T-transition to next S-transition, TG = TMR−
TM).
• Query accuracy probability (PA): the probability that the failure detector can





• Forward good period duration (TFG): the duration for which at a random time,






In the work of Chen et al., they are only interested in the system before a crash of the
monitored process. Moreover, it is assumed that this eventuality is as distant that the
system reaches an equilibrium behavior before the crash occurs. This has been clarified
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by the addition of an expanded explanation of the assumptions inherent in Chen et al’s
framework.
In addition, Chen et al. show that, the QoS of failure detectors can be captured by
TD, TM, TMR, which can be the primary QoS metrics. All of the other QoS metrics
can be derived from these three QoS metrics. Furthermore, Chen et al. also design
three push-style algorithms for systems with synchronized and unsynchronized clocks,
which will be introduced in Section 2.4.
2.4 Crash Failure Detection Algorithms
crash failure is one of the most important types of failure that need to be discovered.
Most crash failure detectors are based on detecting the liveness message sent by the
monitored target. In this section, we will survey the previous research work on the
crash failure detectors’ design and implementation.
Chen et al.’s Algorithms
In [24], Chen et al. consider the failure detection model which contains two processes—
the failure detector (q) and the monitored process (p). Chen et al. propose three push-
style algorithms as crash-stop failure detectors, one for systems with synchronized
clocks (NFD-S) and the other two for systems with unsynchronized clocks (NFD-U
and NFD-E). The authors show how to estimate the parameters of the failure detec-
tor (heartbeat interval (η) and shift of freshness point δ) for NFD-S, NFD-U and
NFD-E, respectively (see pseudocode Algorithm 3, Algorithm 4 and Algorithm 5
in Appendix A), when the QoS requirements—the upper bound detection time, the





MR)—are given. The authors consider the message transmission as prob-
abilistic, which can be captured by the probability of message loss (pL) and the prob-
ability of message delay within x time duration (Pr(D ≤ x)). The algorithm details
are introduced below: the monitored process p periodically sends heartbeat messages
m1, m2, m3, · · · to q every η time units. Every heartbeat message mi is tagged with its
sequence number i. Then, σi denotes the sending time of message mi. The monitoring
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process q shifts the σis forward by δ to obtain the sequence of times τ1 < τ2 < τ3 · · · ,
where τi = σi +δ. Process q uses the τis (the freshness points) and the times it receives
heartbeat messages to determine whether to trust or suspect p during the time period
[τi,τi+1). At time τi, q checks whether it has received some message m j with j ≥ i.
If so, q trusts p during the entire period [τi,τi+1). If not, q starts suspecting p. If, at
some time before τi+1, q receives some message m j with j ≥ 1, then q starts trusting
p from that time until τi+1. If, by time τi+1, q has not received any message m j with
j ≥ i, then q suspects p during the entire period [τi,τi+1). This procedure is repeated
for every time period. From time τi to τi+1, messages m j with j ≥ i are still fresh.
Therefore the NFD-S algorithm is characterized by the following property: q trusts p
at time t if and only if q receives a message that is still fresh at time t.
In order to formally analyze the QoS bounds of the NFD-S algorithm, the following
definitions and propositions are defined and proved as below:
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Definition:
1. k: for any i≥ 1, let k be the smallest integer such that, for all j≥ i+k, m j is sent
at or after time τi.
2. For any i≥ 1, let p j(x) be the probability that the failure detector does not receive
message mi+ j by time τi + x, for every j ≥ 0 and every x≥ 0; let p0= p0(0).
3. For any i≥ 2, let q0 be the probability that the failure detector receives message
mi−1 before time τi.
4. For any i ≥ 1, let u(x) be the probability that the failure detector suspects the
monitored process at time τi + x, for every x ∈ [0, η).
5. ps: for any i≥ 2, let ps be the probability that an S-transition occurs at time τi.
Proposition:
1. k = dtimeout/ηe.
2. For all j ≥ 0 and for all x≥ 0,
p j(x) = (pL +(1− pL)Pr(D > δ+ x− jη)).
3. q0 = (1− pL) ·Pr(D < δ+η).






5. ps = q0 ·u(0).
For NFD-S, the QoS metrics can be estimated as follows:
• The detection time: TD ≤ δ+η.
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MR), and the QoS of message
transmission (pL, Pr(D ≤ x)), the parameters of the failure detector can be estimated
by using the following inequalities: δ+η≤ TUD ,
η
ps





Figure 2.2: The NFD-S Algorithm Configuration
Fig. 2.2 shows the configuration procedure of the NFD-S algorithm. The calculation
procedure of η and δ can be performed by the following three steps:
Step 1: Compute q′0 = (1 − pL)Pr(D < TUD ) and let ηmax = q′0TUM .






j=1 [pL +(1− pL)Pr(D > TUD − jη)]
.
Find the largest η≤ ηmax, such that f (η)≥ T LMR, which can be done by adopting
binary search.
Step 3: Set δ = TUD −η then output η and δ.
In addition, the authors also show how to deal with unknown message transmission
behavior by using the average message delay E(D) and the variance of message delay
V (D). With E(D) and V(D), Pr(D > t) can be estimated by using the One-Sided
Inequality of probability theory as follows,
Pr(D > t)≤ V (D)
V (D)+(t−E(D))2
, for all t > E(D).
Then from the above inequality, the computation procedure of η and δ of the NFD-S
algorithm can be revised as follows,
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and let ηmax = min(γ ′TUM ,T
U
D − E(D)).
If ηmax = 0, then output “QoS cannot satisfied” and stop; else continue;
Step 2: Let








V (D)+(TUD −E(D)− jη)2
V (D)+ pL(TUD −E(D)− jη)2
and find the largest η≤ ηmax such that f (η)≥ T LMR;
Step 3: Set δ = TUD −η and output η and δ.
For NFD-U, the algorithm assumes that the expected arrival time of the ith heartbeat
message (EAi) is known. It differs from the NFD-S algorithm only in the way they
set the freshness points τis. In NFD-S, τi = σi + δ, but in NFD-U, τi = EAi + α =
σi +E(D)+α (δ = α+E(D)). Thus the absolute upper bound of detection speed TUD
is substituted by T uD + E(D), where T
u
D is the given required upper bound of detection
speed and E(D) is average message delay. Therefore, the parameters configuration
procedure of the NFD-U algorithm is shown in Fig. 2.3(a). and it can be done in the
(a) NFD-U (b) NFD-E
Figure 2.3: NFD-U and NFD-E Algorithms Configuration
following three steps:





and let ηmax = min(γ ′TUM ,T
u
D). If ηmax = 0, then
output “QoS cannot satisfied” and stop; else continue;
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Step 2: Let








V (D)+(T uD− jη)2
V (D)+ pL(T uD− jη)2
and find the largest η≤ ηmax such that f (η)≥ T LMR;
Step 3: Set α = T uD−η and output η and α.
The parameters computation and configuration procedure of the NFD-E algorithm are
very similar to the NFD-U algorithm (see Fig 2.3(b)). But the NFD-E algorithm re-
gards the ith expected arrival time of heartbeat message (EAi) as an unknown parameter









where s1, ....., sn are the sequence numbers of the heartbeat messages and A′1, ......, A
′
n
are the receiving times according to the monitor process’s local clock.
Jacobson’s Estimation
In [56], Jacobson studies the network communication delay problem and proposes an
estimation method to estimate such delay. In Jacobson’s model, the behavior of the
system is not constant. A safety margin is used to adapt the estimation bias, which
uses the error in the last estimation. Therefore, the expected delay of the next message
can be estimated by using the previous estimation and the weighted previous estimation
error.
Bertier et al.’s Algorithm
In [9], Bertier et al. propose a push-style Eventually Perfect (♦P ) failure detection
algorithm (see pseudocode Algorithm 8 in Appendix A) for partially synchronous sys-
tems. Bertier et al.’s failure detector requires the strong completeness and eventual
strong accuracy properties (see Section 2.3.1). In [9], every pair of the failure detector
and the monitored process is assumed to be connected by a channel, which provides
reliable communication. This failure detector’s parameter estimation method adopts
Chen et al. estimation of the message expected arrival time [24] and Jacboson’s esti-
mation of safety margin [56].
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Bertier’s failure detector has two layers: the first layer is the basic failure detection
service, which can estimate the parameters of the failure detector that compromise
between the number of false detections and the failure detection speed. The second
layer is designed for adapting the application specific needs according to the failure
detection service provided by the first layer.
Fetzer et al.’s Algorithm
In [37], Fetzer et al. propose a pull-style failure detection protocol (see pseudocode Al-
gorithm 6 in Appendix A) to detect crash-stop failure. The protocol allows processes
to monitor each other and assumes that every pair of processes is connected by a reli-
able communication channel. The failure detection messages (queries) are performed
in a lazy style to save the network load, which means only when these processes are
not communicating with each other, the failure detection protocol is used to verify the
liveness of monitored processes. The protocol provides the following primitives to
every process:
• sending a message to another process.
• receiving a message from another process.
• querying another process.
Each process pi manages two arrays: one array contains the sending times of the mes-
sages sent by pi to another process p j whose acknowledgement has not yet been re-
ceived by pi (initially empty); the other array contains the maximum round-trip time of
the messages that pi has sent to p j and that have been acknowledged (initially 0). When
the system is running, the process pi sends application messages attached with some
control information to another process p j. When p j receives an application message,
it will send an acknowledgement message back to pi. When an acknowledgement
message is received by pi, the round-trip delay will be computed and the maximum
round-trip time will be recorded. If an application message has already been sent to
p j but the acknowledgement message has not been received by pi yet, the failure de-
tector’s output is still no suspect. But pi will send a query message to p j and whether
the failure detector will output a suspect will depend on the maximum round-trip delay
which has been recorded. This lazy style failure detection protocol minimizes the cost
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of message communication. However the detection speed aspect was not taken into
consideration in the original paper.
Overall, when this failure detection protocol is used in a partial synchronous system,
the eventual completeness and the eventual accuracy properties defined in [22] can be
satisfied, which means it can be regarded as a ♦P failure detector.
Nunes and Jansch-Pôrto’s Algorithms
In [68], Nunes and Jansch-Pôrto propose a pull-style crash-stop failure detector and
evaluate the QoS of this pull-style failure detector with different combinations of three
round-trip communication delay (rtt) predictors and two timeout safety margins. The
adopted predictors are:
• MEAN: the next rtt is based on the population average.
• WINMEAN: the next rtt follows the average of the last n samples.
• ARIMA: the Auto-Regressive Intergrade Moving Average, which is based on
non-stationary time series modeling.
The two adopted safety margins are the prediction error-based margin (peb) that adapts
its value each time when a message is received and the network load has varied (the
same as the Jacobson’s estimation in [56]); the confidence interval-based margin (cib)
assumes that the predictor appropriately models the round-trip communication delay
and the prediction error is considered as a white noise.
The evaluation results of the above predictors and safety margins show that the combi-
nation of predictor-margin is important to achieve a good QoS, but there is no universal
best solution to achieve best detection speed and best accuracy of the failure detector.
Different combinations could achieve best QoS in some aspects but not all aspects. The
choice of combination will depend on the user’s QoS requirements. If detection speed
is more important, a margin-based on the prediction error (peb) should be combined
with an accurate predictor, but a conservative margin (cib) or a constant margin is bet-
ter combined with the average-based predictor; if accuracy is more important, the use
of an inaccurate predictor (e.g., MEAN) should combine with a prediction error-based
margin, an accurate predictor should combine with a small conservative or constant
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margin. The evaluation results also show that the combination of MEAN-peb exhibits
more accuracy but ARIMA-cib exhibits a better balance between accuracy and speed.
Falai and Bondavalli’s Experimental Evaluation
Similar to Nunes and Jansch-Pôrto’s work in [68], Falai and Bondavalli in [36] de-
scribe and interpret some experiments based on a push-style crash-stop failure detec-
tor , which combine several heartbeat messages delay predictors and timeout safety
margins. Furthermore they evaluate the QoS for the different alternatives. The experi-
mental system contains one failure detector and one monitored process. The communi-
cation between the failure detection pair is through a wide-area network. The adopted
predictors are LAST, MEAN, WINMEAN(N), ARIMA, LPF (the predicted value is the
exponential smoothing of the observations, which is a special case of ARIMA). Falai
and Bondavalli adopt two safety margins—confidence interval-based margin (SMCI)
and the previous error-based margin (SMJAC) — proposed by Nunes and Jansch-Pôrto
in [68] with three different values (high, middle, low) for each safety margin respec-
tively.
The evaluation results show that the MEAN predictor exhibits the slowest detection
speed with all of the safety margins. LPF combined with SMCI obtains best detection
speed. LAST combined with SMJAC obtains the best accuracy. Their evaluation results
also draw the following conclusions:
• First, adopting an accurate predictor does not imply better accuracy of the failure
detector. The combination of a predictor and a safety margin is the key to achieve
accuracy.
• Second, fast detection implies lower mistake reoccurrence time. If mistake re-
occurrence time is more important, then the safety margin should be increased,
which implies that the detection speed will slow down as well.
• Third, an accurate predictor with a constant safety margin, or a less accurate
predictor assisted by an adaptable safety margin, can achieve better accuracy of
the failure detector.
• Fourth, LAST+SMJAC achieves the lowest complexity and system overhead ac-
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cording to the calculation costs. But it offers a quite good detection speed and
accuracy property of the failure detector.
• Finally, a trade-off certainly exists between the failure detector’s accuracy and
speed. There is no universal solution to achieve the best speed and accuracy at
the same time.
Sotoma and Madeira’s Algorithm
In [81], Sotoma and Madeira extend Chen et al.’s failure detector in the presence of
heartbeat message loss bursts. In [81], the independence property of each heartbeat
message transmission (used in [24]) is assumed not to hold any more. The authors
adopt and extend Sanneck’s message loss-length model [53], which defines a finite
Markov chain model for message loss length with m + 1 states (see Fig. 2.4). The
model contains a random variable X , which presents the number of consecutive mes-
sage losses. If X = 0, it means there is no message lost; if X = k (0 < k < m) it means
exactly k messages have been lost.
Figure 2.4: The Sotoma and Madeira’s Message Loss Model Base on the Sanneck’s
Model with Limited State Space
When the parameters of the failure detector are computed, the dependencies between
the consecutive liveness messages are taken into consideration and the relevant proba-
bility calculation follows Table 1 in [81].
The simulation and evaluation of Sotoma and Madeira’s failure detector are based on
Chen et al.’s NFD-S algorithm with the same system conditions as in [24]. Their
simulation results show that by adopting this Markov model and revised calculation
steps, the failure detector can adapt better to the occurrence of heartbeat message loss
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bursts and achieve a better QoS of failure detectors.
Hayashibara et al.’s Algorithms
In [51], Hayashibara et al. propose an accrual failure detector and describe an adaptive
push-style failure detection implementation called ϕ failure detector (see pseudocode
Algorithm 7 in Appendix A). Instead of outputting a binary state decision value (Trust
or Suspect) for the monitored process, accrual failure detectors output suspicion level
(susp levelp(t) ≥ 0) information on a continuous scale and the higher the value, the
higher the chance that the monitored process has crashed. The accrual failure detector
can sample the arrival time of heartbeats and maintain a sliding window of the most
recent samples. The sliding window is used to estimate the arrival time of the next
heartbeat. The probabilistic distribution of future heartbeat messages is estimated by
using the distribution of history samples. Then a value ϕ, with a scale that changes
dynamically to match recent network conditions, is computed by learning from the
distribution information. Fig. 2.5 shows the architecture of accrual failure detectors.
Instead of making decisions in the failure detector, accrual failure detectors leave the
liveness interpretation of the monitored process to higher level applications, which
brings more flexibility to the failure detector and associated applications (see Fig.2.5).
Figure 2.5: The Structure of Accrual Failure Detectors
In addition to strong completeness and eventual strong accuracy, the authors also con-
strain the susp levelp(t) to the following properties:
• Asymptotic completeness: if the monitored process is faulty, the suspicion level
susp levelp(t) tends to infinity as time goes to infinity.
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• Eventual monotony: if the monitored process is faulty, there is a time after which
susp levelp(t) is monotonically increasing.
• Upper bound: the monitored process is correct if and only if susp levelp(t) has
an upper bound over an infinite execution.
• Reset: if the monitored process is correct, then for any time t0, susp levelp(t) =
0, for some time t > 0.
Instead of using S-transition and T-transition as in [24], two dynamic thresholds Thigh
and Tlow are proposed, which are both initialized greater than 0. Then the transitions
are defined as:
• S-transition: whenever the value of susp levelp(t) crosses the upper threshold
Thigh upward, q updates the value of Thigh to Thigh + 1, and begins to suspect p
(or continues to suspect p if it does so already).
• T-transition: whenever the value of susp levelp(t) crosses the lower threshold
Tlow downward, q updates the value of Tlow to that of Thigh, and stops suspect-
ing p.
The proposed algorithm for an accurate failure detector is similar to that of Fetzer
et al.’s failure detection protocol in [37] and the ϕ failure detector is proposed as an
implementation of the abstraction of an accrual failure detector, where ϕ represents the
suspicion level of the accrual failure detector. ϕ can be scaled dynamically according
to the message transmission condition.
In addition to the ϕ failure detector, a κ failure detector [49] is proposed to solve the
consecutive message loss problem. The κ failure detector uses a function named con-
tribution function c(t) to determine the evolution of the confidence of each heartbeat
message. Each missed heartbeat contributes to raising the level of suspicion of the
failure detector.
Finally, the experimental results show that the ϕ failure detector performs equally well
as other adaptive failure detectors with an improved flexibility and the κ failure detector
can be more adaptive to consecutive liveness message loss behavior.
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2.5 Failure Detection Service Implementations
In addition to the theoretical algorithms presented in the previous section, there are
some failure detection applications designed from an engineering and implementation
perspective, which focus more on the adaptation, scalability and efficiency aspects.
Renesse et al.’s Failure Detector
In [71], Renesse et al. propose a push-style crash-stop failure detection service based
on the random gossip protocol (many-to-many), which provides probabilistic accuracy
of the detected failure. The main purpose of this gossip protocol is to guarantee the
high probability of accuracy as well as to balance the network bandwidth consumption.
But as a trade-off, the detection speed is sacrificed. The detection time increases as
O(n logn), where n is the number of member processes. Moreover, this gossip protocol
is resilient against both transient message loss, permanent network partitions, and host
failures. The authors introduce two protocols as follows:
• Basic protocol: a member forwards network information to randomly chosen
members. Each member maintains a list for each known member’s address and
an integer which is going to be used for failure detection; each member occa-
sionally broadcasts its list in order to be located initially and also to recover
from network partitions; each member also maintains, for each other member in
the list, the last time that its corresponding heartbeat counter has increased. If
the heartbeat counter has not increased for more than a threshold time, then the
member is considered failed. After a member is considered failed, it will not be
removed until another threshold time, which is larger than the threshold of the
faulty judgment time, to ensure the accuracy.
• Multilevel Gossiping: the multilevel gossiping protocol is proposed to cope with
the efficiency and scalability problems of the basic protocol in a large-scale sys-
tem. In this protocol, the lengths of subnetworks and host numbers for each
domain are attached to each gossip message so that the connectivity between the
subnetworks is discovered by the higher-level gossip messages. This means that
few messages will cross subnetworks and even fewer will cross domains. With
Chapter 2. Failures and Mechanisms of Failure Detection 30
concern to the topology of the network, the multilevel protocol can reduce the
number of messages that flood through routers, which connect different subnet-
works.
Stelling et al.’s Failure Detector
In [82], Stelling et al. propose a hybrid-style crash-stop hierarchical failure detection
framework called the Globus Heartbeat Monitor (HBM), which can be deployed within
asynchronous distributed systems as multilevel failure detection services (see Fig. 2.6)
to detect a Grid Service’s crash. The framework adopts two-layer monitoring. For
the lower-layer, the authors use local monitors to detect service failures within sub-
domains to avoid cross-network communication messages. The framework provides
local monitors which adopt a simple pull-style algorithm (inquiry) to monitor the ser-
vices within the local domain. It provides higher-level data collectors which can gather
and maintain a global view of the failure information from local monitors’ heartbeat
messages.
Figure 2.6: The Architecture of The Globus Fault Detection Service
The framework provides three basic components. The first one is called the local mon-
itor, which is responsible for monitoring the computer on which it runs, as well as
the selected processes on that computer. The second one is the client registration API,
which can be adopted by each monitored application to inject the ability of registering
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itself with the local monitor and sending heartbeats. The client registration API also
provides the local monitor with the ability to send heartbeat and local monitoring in-
formation messages to data collectors. The last component is the callback-based data
collection API, which allows applications to register a function to be called when a
failure event occurs. The data collectors can keep track of all registered processes and
record whenever a heartbeat arrives. When an expected heartbeat is missing, the data
collectors can generate callbacks for the missing heartbeat for the individual process.
In addition, the callbacks can also be issued when some interesting events occur.
Overall, the whole framework is trying to achieve QoS of crash failure detection as
well as to balance the system overhead. The framework also separates the semantics
of failure detection from higher level reactions according to the occurred failures, all
of which provides more scalability and flexibility for the failure detection framework.
Sotoma and Madeira’s CORBA Failure Detectors
In [80], Sotoma and Madeira propose a CORBA implementation of adaptive crash-stop
failure detectors. Their algorithms are designed for asynchronous distributed systems
with reliable communication in both a pull model and a push model to achieve a bet-
ter failure detection speed and minimize the discrepancy of erroneous suspicion. The
adaptation algorithms are based on adjusting the monitoring interval and timeout ac-
cording to the history—the average of message inter-arrival time and the average ratio
of current inter-arrival over the average of the historical inter-arrival times, which are
used to estimate the future message’s inter-arrival time and the future system workload
oscillation, respectively. Fig. 2.7 shows the sequence diagrams of the pull-style adap-
tive failure detector. Fig. 2.8 shows the sequence diagrams of the push-style adaptive
failure detector.
The experimental results show that the push-style and the pull-style adaptive CORBA
implementations exhibit some good features. First, in both of the proposed push-style
and pull-style adaptation algorithms, it is not necessary to specify an initial timeout
or a monitoring interval. Second, in terms of the proposed adaptation algorithms, the
push-style implementation is better than the pull-style implementation when the system
workload variation is fast. Third, the pull-style algorithm is almost free of influences by
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(a) When a timeout event occurs (b) When a timeout event does not occurs
Figure 2.7: The Sequence Diagrams of the Pull Adaptation Algorithm
(a) When a timeout event occurs (b) When a timeout event does not occurs
Figure 2.8: The Sequence Diagram of the Push Adaptation Algorithm
the monitoring interval, but push-style algorithm is largely affected by the monitoring
interval. Finally, both algorithms can adapt to changing system conditions and push-
style algorithm works better because of the smaller monitoring interval value.
Das et al.’s Failure Detector
In [31], Das et al. propose a pull-style failure detector named scalable weakly-consistent
infection-style process group membership protocol (SWIM) for crash-stop failure de-
tection. The protocol is asynchronous-based and the communication is unreliable.
The SWIM failure detector has two components: a failure detector component, which
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detects failures of members and a dissemination component, which propagates infor-
mation about the state changes of members. SWIM works in a peer-to-peer way. Each
group member (Mi) periodically chooses some random members (e.g., M j) in its mem-
bership list and sends ping messages to probe the liveness of these other members. If
the monitored member receives a ping message, then it will send an acknowledge-
ment message back. If the acknowledgement message has not been received within a
given timeout duration, then Mi will send a ping request message to some non-faulty
group members to ping the M j as well. (see Fig. 2.9) If none of the direct or indirect
acknowledgement messages of M j are received by Mi then a failure of M j is declared.
Figure 2.9: The SWIM Failure Detector
The SWIM failure detector exhibits some good characteristics. First, SWIM can pro-
vide deterministic failure detection speed, which is unlike some other gossip style
failure detectors such as [71]. Second, the expected message load of a SWIM member
does not vary with group size. Third, membership joins, drop outs and failures are
propagated via piggybacks on ping or acknowledgement messages, which leads to fast
dissemination.
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2.6 Classification of Failure types
In order to detect occurred failures, having knowledge of failure types and their behav-
iors is an important issue. Laprie et al. in [63] define the fundamental concept of a
failure as: a failure occurs when an actual running system deviates from its specified
behavior. Several proposals for failure classification are presented from different per-
spectives, such as [13, 63]. But none of them introduce the failures as a hierarchical
classification with chained behavior. Therefore in addition to the crash failure men-
tioned in Section 2.2.6, we also introduce the following possible failures that might
occur within the software system and their relationships to help the readers have a
further understanding about failures.
2.6.1 Muteness Failure
Muteness failures are malicious failures in which a process stops sending algorithm
messages, but might continue to send other messages [35]. When a muteness failure
occurs, the service will stop executing its designed features but might still be able to
generate liveness messages. Thus such failures cannot be detected by crash failure
detectors. Muteness failure is a particular case of omission failure, which fails to send
some messages but not all messages.
Detecting muteness failure could be application-specific. Generally, message timeout-
based detection strategies can be adopted. For example, adopting the muteness failure
detection algorithm in [35], which proposes a protocol that forces the monitored ser-
vice to send “I-am-not-mute” messages to the muteness failure detector periodically
when the service is not mute, but stop sending such messages when a muteness failure
occurs. Then if the muteness failure detector does not receive such a message within
the given timeout threshold, the failure detector will assume that a muteness failure has
occurred.
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2.6.2 Timing Failure
Timing failure occurs when a service’s response lies outside the specified time interval
[63]. For example, if the service-hosting machine or network is overloaded, or some
other resources on which the service depends are overloaded, then the service response
might be delayed and a timing failure might occur.
The detection of timing failure should be based on the specified deadline or time con-
straints. In order to detect a timing failure, recording the time when the conversation
between a service pair starts can be adopted. If the service instance cannot return
the answer before the specified deadline, it is regarded as a timing failure. Moreover,
there are more sophisticated timing failure detectors such as the one reported in [3]
which uses group communication to detect timing failure in a quasi-synchronous (in-
completely synchronous) system; or the Timely Computing Base (TCB) model in [20],
which can deal with timeliness requirements without synchronized clocks.
2.6.3 Omission Failure
When a service fails to send a response or receive a message, an omission failure
occurs. Omission failure externally behaves as a communication failure, which will
cause message transmission to fail.
The simplest way to detect omission failures is to enable the service to provide failure
information. If the service can throw a fail-to-send-response or fail-to-receive-message
-exception or send this information to the failure detector then the failure is regarded
as an omission failure. Otherwise, it might be considered as a timing failure or a
false crash failure. Dolev et al. [34] adopt Chandra and Toueg’s definitions of failure
detectors [22] (see Section 2.3.1) and design a protocol to detect omission failure by
adopting consensus. Their results show that the failure detector they designed can
solve [n−12 ] consensus problems within asynchronous systems.
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2.6.4 QoS Failure
The QoS delivered by a service is an important concern. A service, even if it provides
a correct result, might still fail to meet the consumers’ desired level of service. A
service exhibits a QoS failure when some observable behavior of the service fails to
satisfy a specified property by the service consumer. This property may be specified
by a certain level of QoS constraints. For example, 95% confidence that the mean time
to get results is smaller than 10 seconds, assuming that initially we are 99% confident
of this property.
QoS failure can be tracked by matching the given QoS specification with the QoS
delivered by the service. If the QoS of the service cannot satisfy the given specification,
then it is regarded as a QoS failure.
2.6.5 Response Failure
Response failure occurs when a service response is incorrect. In general, response
failures can be separated into two types. The first type is value failure: the response
value is wrong; the second type is state transition failure: the service deviates from the
correct flow of control [63].
To detect value failure, voting algorithms can be adopted if multiple service replication
is deployed. To detect state transition failure, the service design specification should
be available to check whether a service has deviated from its expected state or not.
2.6.6 Partial Failure
For a composed application, a component failure may result in a partial failure of the
composed service. Identifying such a partial service failure still remains challenging.
Here we regard a component of a service as atomic and consider dependencies among
these components. Failure of a component might potentially cause other failures of the
composed service or the failure of the composing procedure.
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For a composed service, due to service internal fault-tolerance policies, partial failure
might not be visible externally by a failure detector, which only observes the composed
service. In order to discover such partial failures, sensors must be implemented at the
atomic component level to track the status information of each atomic component of a
composed service. The implementation of the sensor for a component should be based
on the failure mode that the sensor is concerned with. (For example, a sensor designed
for tracking crash failure can adopt heartbeat detection.)
2.6.7 Composition Failure
Service composition is an important characteristic of Web Services. Any service partial
failure or unmatched composition requirements would result in a service composition
failure.
To detect such failures in a composing service, each composition step should be checked
and tested. If the current composition procedure is verified without any mistake having
occurred and the composition conditions are satisfied, then proceed to the next step;
otherwise a composition failure might have occurred.
2.6.8 Byzantine Failure
The Byzantine failure is also sometimes called the arbitrary failure. It means a service
may behave in an arbitrary manner, produce arbitrary responses at arbitrary time [63].
It is the most complicated failure to detect. According to the detection, Byzantine
failures can be separated into undetectable and detectable failures [59]. Undetectable
Byzantine failures refer to failures that are unobservable by other processes based on
the messages they receive or failures that are undiagnosable. Detectable Byzantine
failures have two categories:
1. Commission (Response) failures: the service does not behave correctly accord-
ing to its semantics.
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2. Omission failure: the service behaves correctly but fails to send or receive mes-
sages.
One possible solution of Byzantine failure detection is adopting consensus algorithms.
For example, several redundant service replications may run simultaneously. After all
of them have finished their work, then they start to form a consensus. If a majority of
them return the same result, then send the answer to the customer. To achieve K fault
tolerance, 3K + 1 service replications are needed [62]. In the worst case, the K faulty
services may send incorrect values, or incorrectly represent the values of others, but
the remaining 2K +1 services can still return the same correct answer. Therefore, the
customer can still get the right result. Obviously, Byzantine failure detection is costly
and consensus might potentially cause timing failures. Whether to adopt consensus
or not should depend on the desired service QoS from the consumers’ viewpoint. For
example, in certain environments, such as aero control systems or medical diagnosis
systems, any mistake is unacceptable. In such situations, consensus voting should
be adopted. But for some other applications, such as an online video service, or a
file transfer service, some mistakes can be tolerated within the application, and time
is more important. It is not necessary to adopt expensive voting algorithms in these
cases.
2.6.9 The Relationship Analysis of Various Types of Failure
In previous sections, we descried various possible types of failure. Actually, they are
not isolated. Most of them are associated with each other. Clarifying their relationships
will improve our understanding of service failure behaviors as well as optimize failure
detector design and implementation. According to the classification of Byzantine fail-
ure given in [35], we extend the model and summarize the relationship of various types
of failure (see Fig. 2.10), which might be exhibited by the composed service externally
as certain failures. The design of a failure detector for a particular type of failure will
completely depend on the failure type concerned. Moreover, the distributed commu-
nication environment will also have impact on the algorithm to adopt. In Fig. 2.10,
the difficulty, complexity and costs to detect the possible types of failure from bottom
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Figure 2.10: A Classification of Failure Types
to top will dramatically increase and become even worse when the communication of
the distributed network is unreliable. Therefore to deliver a satisfactory QoS of an af-
fordable failure detection service will be a great challenge. Within the partial failure
frame, the failure types in the bottom layer, will affect the service availability or live-
ness. The relationship between the failure types is inclusion (e.g., crash-stop failure is
a particular type of crash-recovery failure with the recovery time approaching infinity
or the recovery rate approaching zero); the failure types in the middle layer will af-
fect the validity of the service, which means a live service might not be valid in terms
of the service semantics; the failure types in the top layer will affect the acceptabil-
ity from service consumers’ perspective, which means a valid service might not be a
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satisfactory service in terms of QoS requirements.
According to the presented failures’ classification, we separate the failure detection
into three aspects, the first and basic aspect is to detect the liveness or availability of
a service; the second aspect is to check the validity of a service; the third aspect is to
verify the satisfactory behavior of a service. In addition, the failures within the first and
the second layers in Fig. 2.10 can be regarded as functional failures, which will cause
an application to behave improperly. From Fig. 2.10 we can see that the complex
failure semantic and their chained relationship make failure detection never a trivial
work. Exactly detecting the type and the location of an occurred failure quickly and
accurately is difficult. In this thesis, we will mainly focus on crash failure detection
problems at the bottom of in Fig. 2.10. In the following sections, we will introduce
crash failure detector oracles and the related research work in detail.
2.7 Summary of Failure Detectors
In this chapter, various types of failure and their detection mechanisms have been clas-
sified and studied. The most fundamental failure—crash failure—has been surveyed
in detail. Crash failure detection problems have been extensively investigated over the
past decades. Some theoretical failure detectors, such as [1, 2, 22, 21] focus on the clas-
sification and design of crash failure detectors to solve certain distributed agreement
problems. Some failure detection algorithms are designed with more accurate liveness
message delay prediction, more suitable timeout duration or more proper combina-
tion of them to achieve a better QoS, such as [9, 24, 36, 37, 68, 81]. Others, such as
[31, 33, 46, 48, 51, 71, 82], also make efforts to improve the scalability, adaptivity or
efficiency, or to balance the system overhead aspects or to deal with network partition
problems.
Overall, based on the surveyed literature, we summarize the requirements of designing
and implementing crash failure detectors from various perspectives as follows:
• The Quality of Service: for any failure detector or failure detection framework,
the expected QoS requirements should be satisfied, such as completeness, accu-
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racy or failure detection speed requirements.
• Adaptivity: a failure detector or failure detection framework should quickly
adapt (reconfigure) to the changing conditions of its runtime environment, such
as network condition, or QoS requirements.
• Scalability: a failure detector or failure detection framework should scale well
when the complexity of the monitoring environment changes. (e.g., monitoring
group size varies, system size scales up or down)
• Efficiency: according to the achieved QoS, the complexity of running a failure
detector or failure detection framework should be relatively low.
• Flexibility: a failure detector or failure detection framework should be easily
adopted by various types of application.
• Low system overhead: a failure detection framework should not consume too
many CPU cycles, disk IO or network bandwidth.
• Autonomous: once a failure detector or failure detection framework are de-
ployed, they should run automatically to adapt to the failure and the recovery
behaviors of monitored member targets. When a service is created, the monitor-
ing should start automatically. When a service is terminated, the failure detector
should discover this termination rather than regard it as a crash failure. For a
flat or hierarchical failure detection framework, failure detectors should also be
discoverable by other failure detectors as monitored targets.
• Dependability: a failure detector or failure detection framework should be highly
reliable, available and consistent. Failure might happen within a failure detector.
Single point of failure should be avoided within a failure detection framework.
A failure detector or failure detection framework should be highly consistent to
cope with the crash and recovery behavior of any components within the frame-
work.
• Heterogeneity: it should be possible to deploy a failure detector or failure de-
tection framework on heterogeneous platforms. This is because failure detectors
might be deployed in different locations within one global distributed system
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and might have to work on various types of platform.
• Information Propagation: the monitoring or failure detection information should
be easily accessible and highly consistent.
Overall, from the survey studies and the requirements analysis in this chapter, we can
see that failure detectors can be designed from various perspectives. There are no
universal solutions to solve all failure detection problems. Thus designing or imple-
menting a failure detector or a failure detection framework must associate with some
requirements for an application-specific implementation within a particular environ-
ment. For crash failure detectors’ design, many efforts have been made to address dif-
ferent failure detection issues. The unreliable failure detectors proposed by Chandra
and Toueg [22] show the class of failure detectors to solve a certain set of agreement
problems. But these failure detectors are abstract modules and cannot indicate how
well the problem can be solved quantitatively. Chen et al. [24] address this problem
and extend the concept of the unreliable failure detectors with a set of QoS metrics.
In addition, the failure detectors proposed by Chen et al. [24] provide the QoS guar-
antee feature in terms of the given QoS requirements. However, the failure detectors
proposed by Chen et al. are based on some strong assumptions, that are not very
adaptive and scalable. For example, the monitored target is assumed to be crash-stop
or fail-free, each message transmission is independent without any dependency; the
failure detector parameters are estimated without considering the dynamic change of
message delays and losses. The failure detectors proposed by Nunes and Jansch-Pôrto
[68] address the dynamic message behavior problem and give some more complex
message delay and loss estimation methods. Such failure detectors can be more adap-
tive in terms of the network condition. Falai and Bondavalli in [36] extend Nunes
and Jansch-Pôrto’s estimation methods and evaluate them in more detail. Their re-
sults clearly show that the trade-off exists between QoS metrics. The failure detector
designer should be aware which QoS aspect is most important and then select the mes-
sage delay and timeout estimation methods appropriately. Sotoma and Madeira [81]
extend Chen et al.’s NFD-S algorithm without the independent message transmission
assumption, but for other aspects the problems remains the same.
Nevertheless, all of the above failure detectors only can give a binary decision of the
Chapter 2. Failures and Mechanisms of Failure Detection 43
monitored target’s liveness. This results in a inflexible drawback for the failure de-
tectors used by multiple applications. The failure detectors proposed by [51] address
this flexibility problem. The accurate failure detectors Hayashibara et al designed can
give a probabilistic confidence of the monitored target’s liveness and let the applica-
tion decide whether to trust the liveness of the monitored target or suspect. But the
authors regard the crashes as rare events and the calculation of the failure detector’s
suspicion level is heavily based on a normal distribution. Such an assumption is also
strong. In addition, the above introduced failure detectors only contain one failure
detection pair. They are not scalable and flexible for large-scale distributed systems.
Failure detectors such as [31, 71, 82] are proposed to solve the scalability and flexibil-
ity problems by adopting gossip protocols, group membership algorithms, or designing
hierarchical frameworks. But in order to achieve the scalability or flexibility require-
ment, some other aspects are sacrificed. For example, most gossip failure detectors
cannot deliver the fast detection speed property; the failure detectors adopting group
membership protocols will generate more messages, which are more complex and less
efficient compared to the paired failure detectors.
Furthermore, most existing crash failure detectors are based on the crash-stop or even
fail-free assumption and the autonomous aspect is still untreated. These crash-stop
or even fail-free failure detectors cannot adapt to the highly consistent crash-recovery
monitored targets. But as we discussed in Section 1.1, in reality, such crash-recovery
of monitored targets naturally exists within highly dynamic distributed systems. Thus
we target this issue and try to fill in this gap in theory and practice in Chapters 3 and 4.
Chapter 3
Stochastic Modeling of A
Crash-Recovery Service and Its FDS
3.1 Introduction
The Quality of Service (QoS) of crash failure detection is a widely studied topic
[24, 36, 50, 51, 68, 81]. Most of the previous work, such as the papers we men-
tioned above, on this topic is based on the crash-stop or fail-free assumption. In this
chapter, we investigate and model a crash-recovery target service (CR-TS), which has
the ability to recover from the crash state. We analyze the QoS bounds for such a
crash-recovery Failure Detection Service (FDS). Our results show that the depend-
ability metrics of the CR-TS will have an impact on the QoS of the FDS. First, we
introduce some background stochastic theory in Section 3.2, which will be used in
this chapter. Then a brief survey of the related work is presented in Section 3.3. In
Section 3.4, we model a repairable service as an alternating renewal process and the
general dependability metrics such as reliability and availability are adopted for further
analysis. In Section 3.5, we model the message transmission as channel-based message
communication. In Section 3.6, we approximately model a crash-recovery FDS and
analyze the possible mistakes in a crash-recovery run. We extend the QoS model of a
crash-stop failure detector proposed by Chen et al. [24] to adapt to a crash-recovery
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FDS. In addition to considering the QoS of liveness message transmission, we involve
more factors in terms of the CR-TS dependability characteristics, which could affect
the QoS of the FDS as well. We adopt the NFD-S algorithm proposed in [24], and
analyze how to estimate the QoS bounds of a FDS based on the NFD-S algorithm in
a crash-recovery run. In Section 3.7, we show how to configure the FDS to satisfy
the required QoS in a crash-recovery run. Furthermore, in Section 3.8, we discuss a
possible optimization of the QoS bounds estimation. In addition, the impact of the
dependability of a crash-recovery service on the QoS of failure detectors is analyzed
in Section 3.9. Finally, in Section 3.10, a brief summary of this chapter is presented.
3.2 Stochastic Theory Background
The purpose of this section is to present some general background and briefly sum-
marize some results from the theory of stochastic processes which we will need in the
following sections. Such theory is much more extensive than what we present here and
can be found in many textbooks. For example we refer the reader to [57, 58, 67]. Most
definitions and results in this part are due to [29, 58, 67]. Readers who are familiar with
stochastic theory can skip this part and continue with the following sections without
any difficulty.
Stochastic processes play an important role in various fields (economics, biology, re-
liability, etc.). In the mathematics of probability, a stochastic process is a random
function, whose parameter t is often time.
Definition 3.2.1. Let (Ω, F , P) denote a probability space, where Ω is the sample
space, F is a σ-algebra of subsets of Ω and P is a probability measure on F . A
stochastic process X := {Xt : t ∈ T} is a parameterized collection of random variables
with index set T. For each fixed ω ∈Ω, the function
t→ Xt(ω); t ∈ T
is called a trajectory. When T is discrete, then X is called stochastic process in discrete
time; when T is an interval or half line of the real line, or the whole real line, then X
is called stochastic process in continuous time.
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In our work, we will analyse a stochastic process termed a renewal process, which is
used to model independent identically distributed occurrences. A renewal process is
a generalization of the Poisson process. Generally speaking, the Poisson process is
a continuous-time process on the positive integers which has independent identically
distributed holding times at each integer i (exponentially distributed) before advancing
(with probability 1) to the next integer i + 1. We may define a renewal process to
be the same thing, except that the holding times take on a more general distribution.
Mathematically, a renewal process is a sequence of independent identically distributed
positive random variables, which are not all zero, with probability 1.
Definition 3.2.2. Let X1, X2, · · · be independent identically distributed positive and
real-valued random variables and define the partial sum
Zn = X1 +X2 + · · ·+Xn.
Then the stochastic processes {Z1, Z2, · · ·Zn} is said to be a renewal denoted by
M(t) = max{n : Zn ≤ t}, t > 0.
Renewal processes have been widely used in solving problems in reliability theory.
The following developments are made in the framework of reliability. When a failure
occurs, let us assume that:
• the failed item is replaced or repaired, in such a way that it will be as good as
new;
• the successive lifetimes are independent random variables distributed according
to the probability density function f (t).
The simple definition of a renewal process indicates that many types of stochastic pro-
cess can be described as renewal. It is often the case that a complex stochastic model
has one or more embedded renewal processes. This fact is basic to the idea of re-
generation. The time instant at which the system is renewed is called a regeneration
point. If we consider a non-exponential failure distribution F(t) as a renewal process,
then not every time instant is a regeneration point; only those time instants where re-
newals take place are regeneration points. For example, if the renewals take place at
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time ti, i = 1, 2, · · · , then the points {t1, t2, · · ·} are regeneration points whereas any
point x ∈ (ti−1, ti) for all i is a non-regeneration point. Alternating renewal processes
are special types of renewal processes, which the renewal interval has two alternat-
ing “up” and “down” states. It will be seen that formulating problems in terms of
alternating renewal processes provides a powerful conceptual framework for dealing
with important aspects of the behavior of complicated stochastic processes. A formal
definition of an alternating renewal process is presented below.
Definition 3.2.3. Let {xi, i ≥ 1} and {yi, i ≥ 1} denote sequences of independent
and identically distributed non-negative random variables, but with xi and yi not nec-
essarily independent. Let x and y denote generic random variables for xi and yi re-
spectively; and let P{x > 0} > 0 and P{y > 0} > 0, so that E|x| > 0 and E|y| > 0.
Define zi = xi +yi and let z denote a generic zi. Further, define sn = ∑ni=1 zi and s0 = 0
with probability 1, and let {n(t), t > 0} = sup{n|sn ≤ t}. Then the counting process
{n(t), t ≥ 0} is called an alternating renewal process, z is called the renewal interval,
and sn is called the time of the nth renewal.
In the later part of this chapter, we adopt stochastic modeling and renewal theory to
model a monitored service within a distributed system as an alternating renewal pro-
cess (details in Section 3.4). The general dependability metrics, mean time to failure
(MTTF) and mean time to repair (MTTR) are used as the basis for an alternating re-
newal process. MTTF is regarded as the mean of random variables, which presents
the “up” time of the service; MTTR is regarded as the mean of random variables,
which presents the “down” time of the service. Together they form one period of a
“up−down” alternating renewal process and the mean of a period is called mean time
between failures (MTBF).
3.3 Related Work
In [24], Chen et al. propose a set of QoS metrics to measure the accuracy and speed of
a failure detector. Their model contains a pair of processes: one is the monitor process,
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Figure 3.1: The QoS Metrics without Considering False Positive Mistakes
the other is the monitored process and there is only one crash during the monitoring
duration. The analysis is based on two separate stages of failure detection: the pre-
crash stage, which is a fail-free run; the post-crash stage, which is a crash-stop run
when the monitoring procedure will be terminated. In order formally to define the
QoS metrics, [24] defines state transitions of a failure detector monitoring a target
process under the fail-free assumption. At any time, the failure detector’s state is either
Trust or Suspect with respect to the monitored process’s liveness. If a failure detector
moves from a Trust state to a Suspect state then an S-transition occurs; if the failure
detector moves from a Suspect state to a Trust state then a T-transition occurs. Fig. 3.1
shows the state transitions of the failure detector and the QoS metrics. In terms of the
transitions defined above and the fail-free assumption, Chen et al. define the following
QoS metrics for a failure detector: failure detection time (TD), mistake recurrence
time (TMR), mistake duration (TM), average mistake rate (λM), good period duration
(TG), query accuracy probability (PA) and forward good period duration (TFG) (a more
detailed introduction is given in Section 2.3.2).
Additionally in [24], they present three push-style algorithms, one for clock synchro-
nized systems (NFD-S) and the other two for clock unsynchronized systems (NFD-U
and NFD-E). They also show how to estimate the failure detector parameters (heart-
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beat interval η and shift of freshness point δ1) according to a given QoS specification
for each of the above algorithms (details in Section 2.4).
One limitation of the framework of [24] is that they disregard false positive mistakes.
For example, they assume that after the i + 1 heartbeat is sent, the monitored process
crashes. Fig. 3.1 shows the false positive mistake in the state transition diagram, which
has duration TF .
Some recent research has extended the QoS work of [24] in a number of ways. For
example, [9, 36, 68, 81] refine the model with different probabilistic message delay
and loss estimation methods. Meanwhile, others, such as [46, 50, 51, 71, 82] focus
on the scalability and adaptivity of crash failure detection. But all of these papers are
based on eventual crash-stop behavior of the monitored process or the fail-free as-
sumption. Crash-recovery failure detectors have been considered by several groups,
e.g., [1, 34, 54, 69]. However, each of these papers proposes failure detectors to solve
consensus problems rather than focusing on the QoS of the failure detector itself. In
[1], the monitored process is characterized as always-up, eventually-up, eventually-
down or unstable. A process which crashes and recovers infinitely many times is
regarded as unstable. But crash-recovery looping behavior exists for most systems.
From the perspective of stochastic theory, crash-recovery behavior can be regarded as
a regenerative process, in which the probabilistic live and recovery time are not zero. In
the following sections, we will analyze such a crash-recovery paradigm and its failure
detector from a QoS perspective.
3.4 Crash-Recovery Service
3.4.1 The Crash-Recovery Service Modeling
For a crash-recovery target service (CR-TS), we consider the service might crash at
arbitrary time and take some time to be repaired and restart again after it fails. Let us
take S be the state space of a stochastic process Z := {Z(t), t ≥ 0}, where Z is a CR-
1In order to simplify the expression, δ is replaced by timeout in this chapter.
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TS’s lifetime then S can be regarded as a set which has two states: Alive and Crash.
Thus the state space of the CR-TS is defined as S :={Alive, Crash} and the CR-TS can
periodically switch between these two states. A transition occurs when the state of the
CR-TS changes. Fig.3.2 shows the state transitions of a CR-TS, where a C-transition
occurs when the state of the CR-TS switches from the Alive state to the Crash state;
an R-transition occurs when the state of the CR-TS switch from the Crash state to the
Alive state. (see Fig. 3.2)
Figure 3.2: Crash-Recovery Service Modeling
Assumption 3.4.1. If the service’s recovery is treated as a restart, then the CR-TS’s
lifetime Z is a regenerative process.
Assumption 3.4.1 will be used in the following parts. This is because obviously for
the CR-TS, which will periodically crash and recover, there must exist a time-point
sequence, S1, S2, · · ·Sn, · · · (n≥ 0), which represents the times of CR-TS’s recovery.
From each of these points, for any Sn, service can be taken as a restart. In other words,
the probability of Sn occurring is 1. According to the regenerative process theory, we
call time points S1, S2, · · ·Sn regeneration points (see Section 3.2). Since the CR-TS’s
lifetime Z is a regenerative process and the sequence {S1, S2, · · ·Sn} constructs the
lifetime of the service, each point has no effect on the following one.
In order to describe the lifetime of the CR-TS more precisely, the following random
variables are defined. A stochastic process Z is a set of random variables {X(n), n ∈N }.
Let X(n) be the random variable representing the time which elapses from the time of
the nth regeneration point to the (n + 1)th one. For the simplicity of presentation, we
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use X instead of X(n) in the following parts. In our case Xa is the random variable
representing the time which elapses from the time that the CR-TS starts at one regen-
eration point to the time the CR-TS fails and Xc is the random variable representing the
time which elapses from the time that the CR-TS fails to the time of the next regener-
ation point. Xa and Xc are independent of each other.
Lemma 3.4.1. In steady state, the time between each two consecutive CR-TS’s recov-
ery time points is one period of the crash-recovery service’s lifetime and the CR-TS is
also an alternating renewal process.
Proof. Clearly, from Assumption 3.4.1, the recovery times can be regarded as regen-
eration points. In steady state, the regeneration point can be regarded as restart, i.e.
the behavior of the CR-TS between two consecutive regeneration points is exactly the
same. Thus the time between each two consecutive regeneration points is one period
of CR-TS’s lifetime.
From the above definitions and the definition of an alternating renewal process, we
can easily get X = Xa +Xc, and {(Xa, Xc)} is an alternating renewal process. Hence a
CR-TS is an alternating renewal process.
Now, we can conclude that in order to design a failure detector for the CR-TS, which
depends on CR-TS’s behavior, we only need to observe one period of this CR-TS since
all of the other periods are the same as this one.
3.4.2 Dependability of a Crash-Recovery Service
In order to characterize the steady state behaviors of the CR-TS, general dependability
measure metrics are adopted, such as reliability, availability and consistency intro-
duced in Section 2.2.5, captured by MTTF, MTTFMTBF and MTTR, respectively. In this
section we will show how these three service dependability metrics apply to a CR-TS.
Definition 3.4.1. Let Za be a sequence of {X1a , X2a , . . . , X ia, . . .}, where X ia represents
the length of time that Z is in the Alive state; let Zc be a sequence of {X1c , X2c , . . . , X ic, . . .},
where X ic represents the length of time that Z is in the Crash state, i = 1, 2, . . ..
Chapter 3. Stochastic Modeling of A Crash-Recovery Service and Its FDS 52







Proof. This is immediate from the definitions of MTTF, MTTR and MTBF in Sec-
tion 2.2.5.
Definition 3.4.2. Let F(x) be the probability distribution of X, f (x) the probability
density function of F(x). Let Fa(x) be the probability distribution of Xa, fa(x) the
probability density function of Fa(x). Let Fc(x) be the probability distribution of Xc,
fc(x) the probability density function of Fc(x).





















Definition 3.4.3. Let Pa be the probability that a CR-TS is in the Alive state at time t
(t ≥ 0). Let Pc be the probability that a CR-TS is in the Crash state at time t (t ≥ 0).



















































Hence the proof is completed.
From the above parts, we can see that the dependability of a CR-TS can be quantita-
tively measured by MTTF, MTTR and MTBF. The reliability property of the CR-TS,
which captures how long a CR-TS can persist without a failure, can be measured by
MTTF. The availability of the CR-TS, which captures the probability that a CR-TS
is alive at an arbitrary time, can be measured by Pa = MTTFMTBF . The consistency of the
CR-TS, which captures the speed of a CR-TS’s recovery, can be measured by MTTR.
We will analyze the relationship between the CR-TS’s dependability and the QoS of
the FDS later in this chapter.
3.5 Probabilistic Message behaviors and QoS of Com-
munication
3.5.1 Failure Detection Communication Channels
In order to measure the communication between the FDS and the target service (TS)
quantitatively, we define the communication path between the FDS and the TS as a
channel. Each communication component pair holds one or more virtual one-way
message source-to-destination channels. The messages can only flow from the source
component to the destination component. Fig. 3.3 shows the channel communication
between a failure detection pair in push and pull mode.
From Fig. 3.3, we can easily see that: for push-style failure detection, the communi-
cation channel is a one-way channel; for pull-style, there will be two communication
channels, which forms a return route. We also associate some properties with each
channel assigned with a message type (e.g., heartbeat messages through a channel
from a TS to a FDS) :
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(a) Push (b) Pull
Figure 3.3: Push Mode and Pull Mode
• QoS of the communication: this is a measurement of how good the commu-
nication is and the main communication QoS metrics can be captured by the
following properties:
– Message delay (D): the time interval from the message sending time to the
message arrival time.
– Message loss rate (XR): the number of lost messages per time unit.
– Message loss proportion (XP): the number of lost messages out of the total
number of sent messages during some time duration.
– Message loss-length (the number of loss XL): the consecutive message loss
number. (We will define these properties as random variables shortly.)
• Algorithm: the failure detection algorithm adopted for this monitoring channel,
which will indicate how the liveness messages communicate (e.g., push: heart-
beat, pull: query, pull: reply). The algorithm has the following properties:
– Interval: the time duration between two consecutive liveness messages’
generation. This is a measurement of how frequently the communication
pair talk with each other.
– Timeout: how long the algorithm needs to wait for the arrival of the liveness
message.
– Protocol: transmission protocol to carry the message (e.g., TCP, UDP).
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3.5.2 Probabilistic Measurements of Message Transmission
In addition to the channels defined above, we take the message transmission behavior
as probabilistic. We describe the message delay or loss as probabilistic message-based
behaviors associated with the communication channel.
Definition 3.5.1. Let D be a random variable representing the time which elapses from
the time a message is sent until the time it arrives the destination; let XR be a random
variable representing the number of message losses per unit time; let XP be a random
variable representing the proportion of the lost messages; let XL be a random variable
representing the number of consecutive messages lost.
For push-style monitoring, let us assume that each heartbeat message’s transmission is
independent, thus each heartbeat message transmission can be regarded as a Bernoulli
trial. So D in Definition 3.5.1 represents the message delay of communication chan-
nel’s QoS properties; XR represents the message loss rate; XP represents the message
loss proportion of a communication channel and E(XP) approximates pL; XL represents
the consecutive message loss number of a communication channel.
For the above quantities, there are some internal connections between them. For D and
pL, it is easy to understand that the probability of a message loss can be regarded as
the probability that a message is delayed infinitely. Thus pL = Pr(D = +∞).
For XP and XR, assume that within time duration T (T >> 0), on average, NL liveness
messages are lost during the transmission and the inter-sending time between liveness
messages is η. Therefore E(XP) =
NL
T/η












For pL and XL, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 3.5.1. If each heartbeat message’s transmission and loss behavior is indepen-
dent, then the probability that x (x≥ 1) consecutive messages are lost is
Pr(XL = x) = pxL · (1− pL).
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Proof. For x consecutive messages mi, mi+1, · · · , mi+x−1, suppose the event of mes-
sage mi being lost is Mi and the event of the message being not lost is Mi. Then the
probability that x of them are lost is







Since each messages transmission is independent, then the message loss of each mes-
sage can be regarded as a Bernoulli trial. Thus
Pr(XL = x) = Pr(Mi) ·Pr(Mi+1) · · · Pr(Mi+x−1) · (1−Pr(Mi+x)),
since the probability of message mi loss Pr(Mi) = pL, therefore
Pr(XL = x) = pxL · (1− pL).
Hence the proof is completed.
From the descriptions in this section, we have shown that the interaction between the
FDS and the CR-TS can be regarded as channel-based communication. This channel-
based communication can be described by the QoS of the communication, the adopted
failure detection algorithm and the adopted communication protocol, each of which
has some associated properties. In the following sections we analyze how the FDS
monitors the CR-TS and how the FDS can be configured based on this channel-based
communication.
3.6 QoS of the Crash-Recovery FDS
3.6.1 System Model
We consider a distributed system model with two services: one FDS and one CR-TS,
distributed over a wide-area network. The FDS and the CR-TS are connected by an
unreliable communication channel (see Section 3.5.1). Liveness messages are trans-
mitted through the channel. The communication channel does not create or duplicate
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liveness messages, but the messages might be lost or delayed indefinitely during trans-
mission2. The CR-TS can fail by crashing but can be repaired and restart to run again
after some repair time, which behaves as a crash-recovery model. The drift of the local
clocks of the FDS and the CR-TS are small enough to be ignored and their local clocks
are synchronized (this can be guaranteed by some time synchronization service such
as the Network Time Protocol used in [36]) to be regarded as a clock synchronized
system3. The failure detection algorithm we adopted is the NFD-S algorithm proposed
in [24]. (A brief introduction of NFD-S algorithm is available in Section 2.4 and the
algorithm pseudo-code is available in Appendix A.)
3.6.2 Modeling a Push-Style Crash-Recovery FDS
Previous work on the QoS of failure detection, such as [24, 51, 68, 81], is based on
a fail-free or crash-stop assumption. The failure detector (FDS) in [24] has a set of
suspicion levels Ss := {Trust,Suspect}. The FDS can either trust or suspect a CR-
TS’s liveness. Thus for a fail-free run, a service only has one state: Alive. The state
space of a FDS is S f := {Trust-Alive,Suspect-Alive}, and the event space of a FDS
F := {S-transition,T-transition} (Fig. 3.4(a)). For a fail-free run, the QoS metrics of
a FDS can be measured quite straightforwardly. The average time spent in the Trust
state, is the mean length of the good period E(TG); the average time spent in the Suspect
state, is the mean time of the mistake duration E(TM); the average time between two
consecutive transfers to the Suspect state (two consecutive S-transitions) is the mean
time of the mistake recurrence E(TMR).
However, precisely speaking, the state space of a FDS Sc := S ×Ss. Therefore, for a
CR-TS with failures, the state space of its FDS increases because the service has more
than one state (see Fig 3.4(b)). If the suspicion level is more than two, then Sc will
increase as well. The QoS metrics of a FDS are no longer as simple as for fail-free
runs.
2This channel-based message transmission is the same as the probabilistic network model in [24].
3We also consider the message delay estimation for the system with unsynchronized clocks in Chap-
ter 4.
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(a) Fail-Free Transition (b) Crash-Recovery Transition
Figure 3.4: Crash-Recovery State Space
In order precisely to present the accuracy of the FDS, let SA ∈ Sa represent the ac-
curacy of the FDS’s current output value, where Sa := {Accurate, Mistake}. Here
Accurate means the current FDS’s output value presents the CR-TS’s current state ac-
curately. Mistake means the FDS’s output value presents the CR-TS’s current state in-
accurately. Let SCR-TS ∈ S represent the current state of the CR-TS, where S :={Alive,
Crash}. SFDS-O ∈ Ss represents the current output value of the FDS, where Ss :=
{Trust, Suspect} is the state space of the suspicion levels of the FDS. Then the logi-
cal relationship between the FDS’s output, accuracy and the CR-TS’s current state is






Table 3.1: The FDS’s Accuracy Expression
In Table 3.1, if each of Trust, Alive and Accurate is regarded as True and each of
Suspect, Crash, and Mistake as False, the FDS’s current accuracy can be derived from
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the following deduction:
SFDS-O (XNOR) SCR-TS⇒ SA.
The above deduction can be simply reasoned from the fact that if the value of SFDS-O
and SCR-TS are the same then the value of SA is True, because the FDS’s output value
presents the CR-TS’s state accurately. If the value of SFDS-O and SCR-TS are different
then the value of SA will be False. Thus the value of SA is the result of an Exclusive-
NOR operation between the value of SFDS-O and SCR-TS.
For a fail-free run (MTTF→ +∞) or a crash-stop run (MTTR→ +∞), the CR-TS’s
current state SCR-TS will always be Alive (for the time up to the crash) and it is easy to
deduce the FDS’s accuracy SA directly from the FDS’s current state SFDS-O. However,
for a crash-recovery run, since the CR-TS could fail or recover at arbitrary time, SA
cannot be deduced solely by using SFDS-O. Therefore, measuring the accuracy of a
FDS for a CR-TS is more complex.
Compared with a fail-free or crash-stop run, there are more mistake types in a crash-
recovery run. In previous work, such as [24, 9, 36, 51, 68, 71, 81], only the mistakes
caused by the message transmission behaviors (message delay and loss) are consid-
ered. But in a crash-recovery run, a mistake starts when the CR-TS’s and FDS’s states
become different. Thus there are also mistakes caused by the CR-TS’s crash (see TF
in Fig. 3.1 or T 3M in Fig. 3.5(c)) and recovery (see Fig. 3.5(d)) due to the delayed
detection of such occurred events. Therefore, there are more types of mistake in a
crash-recovery run. Fig. 3.5 shows the four types of mistake which could occur within
a crash-recovery run. T 1M in Fig 3.5(a) represents the type of mistake caused by a mes-
sage delay. T 2M in Fig 3.5(b) represents the type of mistake caused by a message loss.
T 3M in Fig 3.5(c) represents the type of mistake caused by CR-TS’s crash, while the
FDS still trusts the CR-TS. T 4M in Fig 3.5(d) represents the type of mistake caused by
CR-TS’s recovery, while the FDS still suspects the CR-TS. From Fig. 3.5 we can see
that a mistake can be caused by different reasons. A message loss or delay will result
in a Suspect-Alive mistake of the FDS (see Fig. 3.4(b)). A crash failure will result in a
Trust-Crash mistake. Therefore the state of the FDS will vary due to a mistake caused
by different reasons. In addition, a recovery event will result in a Suspect-Alive mistake
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Figure 3.5: The Analysis of Possible TM in a Crash-Recovery Run
as well, however compared with the mistake caused by the message loss or delay, the
FDS is forced to a mistaken state from a different correct state. From Fig. 3.4(b), we
can see that a recovery event will trigger a state transition of the FDS from the Suspect-
Crash state to the Suspect-Alive State, but a message delay or loss will trigger a state
transition of the FDS from the Trust-Alive state to the Suspect-Alive State. Moreover, a
mistake caused by different reasons will result in a different FDS parameters reconfig-
uration plan. For instance, the best way for the FDS to tolerate more message losses or
a longer message delay is to increase the timeout duration; the best way for the FDS to
minimize the mistake duration caused by a crash event is to decrease the timeout dura-
tion and the best way to minimize the mistake duration caused by a recovery event is to
increase the liveness message sending frequency. Thus we can see that an inaccurate
mistake type identification might reduce the QoS of a FDS and should be avoided.
From the above analysis, we can see that due to the increasing mistake types in a crash-
recovery run, the definition of the QoS metrics in [24] using transitions are not valid in
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a crash-recovery run. Thus we redefine them as below:
• Detection time (TD): the elapsed time from when the monitored target crashes
until the failure detector correctly suspects the monitored target.
• Mistake recurrence time (TMR): the time between the occurrence of two con-
secutive mistakes.
• Mistake duration (TM): the time to correct a mistaken suspect or trust.
• Average mistake rate (λM): the average number of mistakes per unit time.
• Good period duration (TG): the duration for which the failure detector main-
tains the correct state information.
• Query accuracy probability (PA): the probability that the state information
from the failure detector is correct at an arbitrary time.
• Forward good period duration (TFG): the duration for which at a random time,
the failure detector has the correct information of the monitored target to the next
mistake occurs.
The above QoS metrics can measure some QoS aspects of a failure detector in a crash-
recovery run. However, they still cannot measure how fast a recovery can be detected,
the proportion of the detected failures over the occurred failures (completeness), etc.
In the following section, we will extend some QoS metrics to measure the recovery
detection speed and the completeness of a failure detector.
3.6.3 QoS Metrics Extension for the Crash-Recovery FDS
For a crash-recovery FDS, in addition to the QoS metrics introduced in [24] (TD, TM,
TMR, PA, etc, which will be represented as the basic QoS metrics in later parts), we
propose some additional QoS metrics as follows:
First, in order to measure the speed that a FDS can discover a recovery of the CR-TS, a
new measurement: the recovery detection time (TDR), which represents the time that
elapses from the CR-TS’s recovery time (a R-transition occurs) to the time when the
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FDS discovers the recovery of the CR-TS, is adopted. More precisely, TDR is a random
variable representing the time that elapses from the time that the CR-TS recovers to
the time when the FDS detects the CR-TS’s recovery. If there is no recovery detected
then TDR = +∞.
Then, as in a crash-recovery run there is no eventual behavior of a CR-TS, a fast re-
covery could make a failure remain undetectable by a FDS. Under such circumstance,
the completeness property of a failure detector defined in [22] cannot be satisfied any
more (see Section 2.3.1). In order to reflect this situation, we refine the definition of
the completeness as follows:
• Strong completeness: every crash failure of a recoverable process will be de-
tected.
• Weak completeness: a proportion of crash failures of a recoverable process will
be detected, satisfying a specified requirement.
Therefore, in order to measure the completeness property of a crash-recovery failure
detector, we propose some new QoS metrics:
• The detected failure proportion (RDF): the ratio of the detected crashes over
the occurred crashes (0 ≤ RDF ≤ 1). More precisely RDF is a random variable
representing a number between zero and one. When no crash failure is detected,
RDF = 0. When all of the occurred crashes are detected, RDF = 1. The strong
completeness property of a FDS’s requires that E(RDF) = 1. The weak complete-
ness property requires E(RDF) ≥ RLDF (RLDF is the required lower bound of the
detected failure proportion and 0≤ RLDF ≤ 1).
• The detected recovery proportion (RDR): the ratio between the detected re-
coveries over the occurred recoveries (0 ≤ RDR ≤ 1). More precisely RDF is
a random variable. When no recovery is detected, RDR = 0. When all of the
occurred recoveries are detected, RDR = 1.
• The detected failures recurrence time (TDFR): the time duration between two
detected failures ( X ≤ TDFR ≤+∞). More precisely, TDFR is a random variable.
When no crash is detected, E(TDFR) = +∞. When all of the occurred failures
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are detected E(TDFR) = E(X) = MTBF (see Fig. 3.6).
• The detected recoveries recurrence time (TDRR): the time duration between
two detected recoveries ( X ≤ TDRR ≤ +∞). More precisely, TDRR is a random
variable. When no recovery is detected, E(TDRR) = +∞. When all of the oc-
curred recoveries are detected, E(TDRR) = E(X) = MTBF (see Fig. 3.6).
Figure 3.6: Extended QoS Metrics
3.6.4 Relations between the Extended QoS Metrics
From the definition of the extended QoS metrics presented in Section 3.6.3, we can
easily find that there are some internal connections between the extended QoS metrics.
In Theorem 3.6.1 below, we state the relationships between the RDF, RDR, TDFR, TDRR.4
Theorem 3.6.1. For a crash-recovery FDS, the following results hold:








E(TDFR) = E(TDRR). (3.6.5)
4We only consider steady state behavior of the FDS and CR-TS pair in a long-run, which can be
assumed as an infinite observation duration.
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Proof. The equation (3.6.3) can be easily derived from the fact that if a crash is de-
tected, even if the recovery next to the occurred crash is not detected, for a crash-
recovery CR-TS, eventually, there will be a detected recovery. Thus, E(RDF)= E(RDR).
For the equation (3.6.4), let us assume T (T MTBF) to be an observation duration of
the crash-recovery failure detection pair. Thus, within time duration T , the number of
the occurred crashes and recoveries approaches to b TMTBFc; the number of the detected








easily obtained. Then, the equation (3.6.5) can be obtained directly from (3.6.3) and
(3.6.4). Hence, the proof is completed.
From Theorem 3.6.1, we can conclude that using only one of RDF, RDR, TDFR and
TDRR is enough to measure the completeness property of a crash-recovery FDS. For
simplicity, we choose RDF as the primary metric, since it is straightforward. Overall,
the QoS for a crash-recovery FDS can be captured by PA, TM, TMR, TD, TDR, RDF.
In next section, we will analyze the QoS bounds of the NFD-S algorithm in a crash-
recovery run by adopting the proposed basic and extended QoS metrics.
3.6.5 An QoS Estimate of the NFD-S Algorithm in a Crash-Recovery
Run
In a crash-recovery run, the state of a CR-TS can switch between Alive and Crash. As
we discussed in Section 3.4.1, there is a sequence of regeneration points for the CR-
TS, each of which is the recovery time of the CR-TS. In the following we will treat
these as also regeneration points of the system consisting of the failure detection pair.
This is an approximation made for pragmatic reasons but it can be justified as follows.
In order to study the steady state behavior of a CR-TS throughout its lifetime, we only
need to observe the time period between two consecutive recovery time of the CR-TS.
Fig. 3.7 shows the relationship between a FDS and a CR-TS on the interval t ∈ [t0, t3),
where both t0 and t3 are regeneration points. Obviously, the mean time between t0 and
t3 is the MTBF. We split [t0, t3) into [t0, t1), [t1, t2), [t2, t3),
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- t1 is the time when the FDS detects the recovery of the CR-TS from the Crash state
to the Alive state;
- t2 is the time when the service crashes;
- σs is the first liveness message sending time after a recovery;
- σ f is the sending time of the last liveness message before a crash;
- σi is the sending time of a liveness message between σs and σ f ;
- η is the liveness sending interval; τs is the first decision time after recovery5;
- τb is the last decision time before crash;
- τ f is the freshness point according to σ f ;
- TDR is the time to detect a recovery.
Figure 3.7: The Analysis of the Crash-Recovery NFD-S Algorithm
Let tr be a recovery time of the current MTBF period (the recovery time is t0 and t3 in
Fig. 3.7). The following definitions are based on the NFD-S algorithm as extensions
of the Definition 1 in [24], both of which are introduced briefly in Section 2.4.
Definition 3.6.1. For the fail-free duration [t1, t2) within each MTBF period:
1. k: for any i ≥ 1, let k be the smallest integer such that, for all j ≥ i + k, m j is
sent at or after time τi.6
5The first liveness message receiving time.
6k is assumed to be independent of i approximately. In fact, in a crash-recovery run, k is not com-
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2. For any i ≥ 1, let pij(x) be the probability that the FDS does not receive just




3. For any i≥ 2, let qi0 be the probability that the FDS receives message mi−1 before
time τi.
4. For any i ≥ 1, let ui(x) be the probability that the FDS suspects the CR-TS at
time τi + x, for every x ∈ [0, η).
5. pis: for any i≥ 2, let pis be the probability that an S-transition occurs at time τi.
According to the QoS analysis of the NFD-S algorithm in Proposition 3 in [24], we
now analyze the basic QoS metrics of the NFD-S algorithm in a crash-recovery run
and show the following relations hold:
Proposition 3.6.1.
1. k = dtimeout/ηe.
2. for all j ≥ 0 and for all x≥ 0,
pij(x) = (pL +(1− pL) ·Pr(D > timeout + x− jη)) ·Pr(Xa > τi− tr + x).
3. qi0 = (1− pL) ·Pr(D < timeout +η) ·Pr(Xa > τi− tr).






5. pis = q
i
0 ·ui(0).
Proof. 1. Since the message sending time of mi is τi− timeout, we know that the
sending time of m j is τi− timeout +( j− i)η. As the message j is sent after i,
then we know that τi− timeout +( j− i)η ≥ τi. Therefore, from the definition
of k, we can conclude that timeout ≤ k ·η⇒ k ≥ timeout
η
. Since k is the smallest
integer number, thus k = d timeout
η
e.
pletely independent of i. However, due to the fact that if the CR-TS will have a reasonable alive duration,
k will be almost independent of i except the last a few messages before the CR-TS crashes.
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2. Within [t1, t2), pij(x) is the probability that the CR-TS has not crashed before
τi +x since the last recovery (Pr(Xa > τi−tr +x)) but the message mi+ j might be
either lost (pL) or delayed more than τi +x−σ j = timeout +x− jη (represented
by Pr(D > timeout + x− jη)). Thus
pij(x) = (pL +(1− pL) ·Pr(D > timeout + x− jη)) ·Pr(Xa > τi− tr + x).
3. Within [t1, t2), qi0 is the probability that the CR-TS has not crashed before τi + x
since the last recovery (Pr(Xa > τi−tr +x)), and that the message mi−1 is not lost
and delayed less than timeout + η, which can be represented as
(1− pL) ·Pr(D < timeout +η). Thus
qi0 = (1− pL) ·Pr(D < timeout +η) ·Pr(Xa > τi− tr).
4. Within [t1, t2), ui(x) is the probability that the CR-TS has not crashed before
τi + x since the last recovery (Pr(Xa > τi− tr + x)) and that the FDS does not
receive any message m j within i ≤ j ≤ i + k by time τi + x. Since we assume
that each message’s transmission is independent, then ui(x) can be represented







5. Within [t1, t2), pis is the probability that a mistaken suspect happens when the
CR-TS has not crashed. Then pis is the probability that the message mi−1 is
received by the FDS before time τi (the FDS is in the Trust-Alive state before
time τi), and that no message m j, with j≥ i, is received by the FDS by time τi (a
Suspect transition will occur by time τi) while the CR-TS has not crashed before




Hence the proof is completed.
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In the following lemma, we are trying to estimate the upper bound of E(N) in a given
fail-free duration. Let N be a random variable that represents the number of mistakes
within a fail-free duration t− ts, where ts ∈ [0, t) and t < +∞. Then we can estimate
E(N) as below:
Lemma 3.6.1. For a FDS in a fail-free run, the mean number of mistakes of the FDS,




Proof. Obviously, in a fail-free run, a mistake can only happen at the freshness point
(when an expected message does not arrive). Thus, from Table 3.1, we can conclude
that the probability of the mistake occurring when the CR-TS is not crashed, is equal
to the probability that an S-transition happens. Up to the time t, there will be no more
than b t−ts
η







s, where i is the sequence number of the freshness point, i ≥ 1.












In the following lemma, the upper and the lower bounds of the average mistake num-
bers within a crash-recovery duration are to be estimated. Let N∗ be a random variable
that represents the number of mistakes within a crash-recovery duration. Then E(N∗)
can be estimated as below:
Lemma 3.6.2. For a crash-recovery FDS, the mean number of mistakes within one
crash-recovery period, E(N∗), is given by:
E(N∗)≥ (bMTTF−E(TDR)
η
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Proof. Within the interval [t0, t3), we can distinguish three distinct phases (see Fig. 3.7).
While the mean duration of [t0, t3) is MTBF; the mean duration of t0, t1) is E(TDR); the
mean duration of [t1, t2) is MTTF−E(TDR) and the mean duration of [t2, t3) is MTTR.
The mistakes occur in different ways in each of these phases. Therefore in order to es-
timate the total expected number of mistakes throughout [t0, t3), we estimate the upper
and lower bounds of expected number of mistakes in each of the phases respectively,
then we can estimate E(N∗) in the following four steps:
Step I: [t0, t1) starts from the time of the CR-TS’s recovery to the time when the FDS
detects the CR-TS’s recovery. Obviously, in this interval, there will be at most one
mistake which might happen—the FDS does not detect the recovery of the CR-TS.
When Xc ≥ η + timeout (the analysis of the relationship of the crash duration, η and
timeout is given in the proof of Lemma 3.6.9), a crash failure will be detected before
the CR-TS’s next recovery, which means the FDS will be in the Suspect state before
the CR-TS’s recovery. Then if the CR-TS recovers from the Crash state, a mistake
will happen. Since we start observing the CR-TS from a regeneration point (in steady
state), we can say this mistake must happen under the condition Xc ≥ η + timeout. If
Xc < η+ timeout (we assume MTTF >> η+ timeout to avoid infinite crash-recovery
loops within detection time), then at the time of the CR-TS’s recovery, the FDS might
still be in a false Trust state (see Table 3.1). When the CR-TS recovers, the FDS’s false
state fortunately becomes a correct state without detecting an occurred failure. Thus,
there is no mistake happening within [t0, t1), i.e. the number of mistakes within [t0, t1)
is zero. Let N
′
be a random variable that represents the number of mistakes within
[t0, t1), then the upper bound and the lower bound of E(N
′
) can be simply estimated
as:
IF Xc > η+ timeout, E(N
′
)≤ 1;




Step II: Let N ′′ be a random variable that represents the number of mistakes on [t1, t2).
[t1, t2) is a fail-free duration from the time when the FDS detects the CR-TS’s re-
covery until the time when the CR-TS crashes. On [t1, t2), the average duration of
t2− t1 is MTTF− E(TDR), then the average number of freshness point is less than
bMTTF−E(TDR)
η
c+1. In order to simplify the estimation procedure, we use Lemma 3.6.1,
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then the mean number of mistakes, which are occurring within the fail-free duration












c+1) · pis. (3.6.7)
Step III: [t2, t3) starts from the time of the CR-TS’s crash until the time of the CR-TS’s
next recovery. In this period, if Xc > η+ timeout, on average there are at most dE(D)η e
liveness messages which have been sent out successfully before the CR-TS crashes
but which might still be on the way to the FDS (e.g., E(D) = 0.2, η = 1 then there
might be one message still in transmission even after the CR-TS crashes). These might
generate false positive mistakes. If Xc < η+ timeout, in the minimum, there can be no
mistake within [t2, t3). Thus, the number of mistakes that might happen within [t2, t3)
is discussed in the following circumstances:
• Minimum: the FDS has already been in the Suspect state and there is no heartbeat
message received throughout [t2, t3), thus no mistake will occur.
• Maximum: if the FDS is in the Trust state, when the CR-TS crashes, then there is
one mistake caused by the crash (see Fig 3.5(c)). In addition, from the discussion
above, we know that there are dE(D)
η
e heartbeat messages still in transmission.
If all of them are not lost and for each of them the delay is timeout < D <
timeout + η (e.g., message mi arrives between (τi,τi+1), consequently dE(D)η e
number of S-transitions will occur at each decision time (τi) and a T-transition
will occur when the message is received). Thus there will be at most dE(D)
η
e+1
mistakes that will occur within [t2, t3).
Let N
′′′
be a random variable which represents the number of mistakes within [t2, t3).






In general, E(D) is smaller than η, as in the simulations in [9, 24, 36, 81]. Thus for
E(D)≤ η, on average there might be one message still on its way to the FDS. Then at
most there will be two mistakes which could happen within [t2, t3):
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• One mistake:
– If Xc < η + timeout, the FDS could possibly trust the CR-TS throughout
[t2, t3), then there will be one mistake occurring within [t2, t3).
– If Xc > η+timeout, let σ f ( f ≥ 1) be a heartbeat message sending time (see
Fig. 3.7). In the following circumstances, there will be only one mistake
occurring within [t2, t3).
∗ The FDS is in the Trust state and the CR-TS crashes after σ f but before
σ f +1 and the FDS receives the heartbeat message m f before τ f .
∗ The FDS is in the Trust state and the CR-TS crashes after σ f but before
σ f +1 and the heartbeat message m f is lost or arrives after τ f +1.
∗ The FDS is in the Suspect state and CR-TS crashes after σ f but before
σ f +1 and the FDS receives the heartbeat message m f before τ f +1.
• Two mistakes:
When the FDS is in the Trust state and the CR-TS crashes after σ f but before
σ f +1and the FDS receives the m f after τ f but before τ f +1 (MTTR >> η), there
will be two mistakes within [t2, t3). The first mistake is caused by the state
change of the CR-TS and the second one is caused by the delayed heartbeat
message m f arriving after τ f but before τ f +1. For the NFD-S algorithm, in a
fail-free run, if a heartbeat message’s delay D > timeout +η, it will be discarded
and the FDS will suspect the target service permanently. This is because Pr(D >
timeout +η) should be small enough to satisfy the QoS requirement of the T LMR.
However there is a possibility that a heartbeat message’s delay is bigger than
timeout +η, and it might be received by the FDS. In a crash-recovery run, there
is no permanent suspect and termination. When a fresh liveness message is
received the FDS will trust the CR-TS again.
Step IV: Combining inequalities 3.6.6, 3.6.7 and 3.6.8, the upper bound of the mean
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number of mistakes that will happen within [t0, t3) is given by:
E(N∗)≤ 1 [t0, t1)
+(bMTTF−E(TDR)
η










For the lower bound of the mean number of mistakes that will happen within [t0, t3),
obviously, if there is no mistake within [t0, t1), there must be at least one mistake
occurring within [t2, t3). If there is no mistake within [t2, t3), there must be at least
one mistake occurring within [t0, t1). Thus,
E(N∗)≥ (1 or 0) [t0, t1)
+(bMTTF−E(TDR)
η
c+1) · pis [t1, t2)
+(0 or 1) [t2, t3)
≥ (bMTTF−E(TDR)
η
c+1) · pis +1.
The proof is completed.










Proof. In a crash-recovery run, the CR-TS reaching steady state means that the CR-TS
crashes and recovers every MTBF on average, rather than that it never fails. Therefore,
the mean time of mistake recurrence (E(TMR)) is the observation duration (MTBF)





















Chapter 3. Stochastic Modeling of A Crash-Recovery Service and Its FDS 73
Lemma 3.6.4. For a crash-recovery FDS,
E(TMR)≤MTBF.
Proof. For a crash-recovery FDS, as the CR-TS crashes or recovers, the probability
that the output of the FDS changes simultaneously with the state change of the CR-
TS is zero. If the FDS always trusts the CR-TS or always suspects the CR-TS, then
there will be at least one mistake when the CR-TS crashes or recovers, thus E(TMR)≤
MTBF.
Lemma 3.6.5. For a crash-recovery FDS, if a crash failure is detected before the CR-





Proof. According to Lemma 3.6.3, if there is no mistake caused by message delays
or losses, then at least there will be one mistake caused by the CR-TS’s crash and
one mistake caused by the CR-TS’s recovery when the failure is detected before the
CR-TS’s recovery. If the FDS has already suspected the CR-TS before it crashes, it
means there is at least one mistake caused by message delay or loss. If the FDS has
already trusted the CR-TS before it recovers, it means there is at least one false positive
mistake caused by delayed message arrival. So there will be at least two mistakes for
each MTBF. Thus if Xc > η+ timeout, E(TMR)≤ MTBF2 . The proof is completed.









c+1) · pis +1
.
Proof. In order to estimate the total duration of mistakes within the time interval







M be the mistake durations within [t0, t1), [t1, t2), [t2, t3)







M ) can be derived as follows:
Chapter 3. Stochastic Modeling of A Crash-Recovery Service and Its FDS 74
• Estimate E(T ′M): On [t0, t1), obviously, the average mistake duration is equal to
the average time to detect the recovery of the CR-TS. Since there is only one
mistake within this duration, the average total mistake duration within [t0, t1) is
equal to E(TDR) as well. Therefore E(T
′




• Estimate E(T ′′M): On [t1, t2), since the duration of [t1, t2) is the time which
elapses from when a recovery of the CR-TS is detected to the time of the CR-
TS’s next crash, then the average duration of [t1, t2) is MTTF− E(TDR) and
[t1, t2) can be regarded as a fail-free duration. Thus E(T
′′
M) can be estimated
by using PA = 1−E(TM)/E(TMR). Since the probability of the accuracy of the








i(x)dx (see Lemma 15 in [24]).
On [t1, t2), if there will be E(N′′) mistakes on average, E(TMR) within [t1, t2)





. Therefore combined with
inequality 3.6.7, E(T
′′


























Then the total duration of a FDS in the mistake state within [t1, t2) can be esti-
mated by the following method. Let T 1M, T
2
M, · · · , T iM, · · · , T nM be the mistake
durations that occur within [t1, t2) and assume that the total number of mistakes
within [t1, t2), n, is finite. Thus ∑ni=1 T
i



















• Estimate E(T ′′′M ): On [t2, t3), if the occurred failure is detectable (Xc > η+ timeout),
the average total mistake duration within [t2, t3) should be less than the average
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detection time E(TD), because after a failure is detected, the FDS terminates a
mistaken trust. If the occurred failure is undetectable (Xc < η+ timeout), the av-
erage total mistake duration within [t2, t3) should be less than MTTR. This is be-
cause after the CR-TS’s recovery, the mistaken trust will become a correct trust.
In addition, when the occurred failure is undetectable, we will know that Xc is
less than η+timeout, then MTTR (E(Xc)) will be less than E(TD) (η+timeout).





From the above analysis, we know that the total mistake duration on [t0, t1) is E(TDR);









mistake duration on [t2, t3) is less than E(TD). Thus the average mistake duration in a







From Lemma 3.6.2, we know that E(N∗) ≥ (bMTTF−E(TDR)
η
c+ 1) · pis + 1. Thus if
we substitute ∑ni=1 T
i
M by equation 3.6.10 and substitute E(N
∗) by the above analysis











c+1) · pis +1
.
Hence the proof is completed.











Proof. In a crash-recovery run, the probability of a FDS’s accuracy means the proba-
bility that the output of the FDS expresses the correct state of the CR-TS (see Fig. 3.4(b)
and Table 3.1). This can be either the FDS in the Trust state and the CR-TS in the
Alive state or the FDS in the Suspect state and the CR-TS in the Crash state (See
Chapter 3. Stochastic Modeling of A Crash-Recovery Service and Its FDS 76
Fig 3.1). Therefore, for each MTBF duration, PA can be derived from the proportion
of the total time duration that the FDS is in Accurate state over the total observation
time (MTBF).7 For each MTBF duration, the durations of the FDS in Mistake state are
known as E(TDR) within [t0, t1), ∑ni=1 T
i
M within [t1, t2) and E(TD) within [t2, t3). Thus

















The proof is completed.
Lemma 3.6.8. For a crash-recovery FDS, if the crash is detectable and the liveness
message restarts simultaneously when the CR-TS recovers, then
E(TDR) = E(D)+η ·E(XL).
Proof. Let tr be the recovery time of the CR-TS and assume that the message ms is the
first liveness message sent by the CR-TS after a recovery and the message mi is the
first successful liveness message, which is received by the FDS, where s and i are the
sequence numbers of the messages, 0 ≤ s ≤ i. From the definition of XL, we notice
that i− s = XL. Thus, the sending time of the mi can be estimated by tr + ηE(XL)
and the receiving time of the mi can be estimated by tr + η ·E(XL)+ E(D). Thus the
mean time of discovering the CR-TS’s recovery can be estimated by η ·E(XL)+E(D),
where η ·E(XL) represents the elapsed time from the most recent recovery (tr) until the
sending time of message i. Therefore we obtain E(TDR) = E(D)+ η ·E(XL), which
proves the lemma.
Lemma 3.6.9. For a crash-recovery FDS, if the crash is detectable and the liveness
message restarts simultaneously when the CR-TS recovers, then




is used to estimate PA in [24], but our test results show that if the monitoring runtime
is reasonably long, then both estimation methods of PA will get very similar results.
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Proof. Intuitively, if the CR-TS’s crash duration (Xc) is shorter than the failure detec-
tion duration (η + timeout), then the occurred crash failure might not be detectable,
since after the CR-TS’s recovery, it will restart sending liveness messages. If such
messages are received before the current timeout threshold time, then the occurred
crash failure will remain undetected.
Figure 3.8: The Analysis of RDF
Fig. 3.8 shows the relationship of the crash duration and the failure detection duration
and how they can impact RDF. The following is a detailed analysis: assume the CR-TS
crashes at time σi + x, where σi is the last liveness message sent by the CR-TS before
it crashes and x is the time duration elapsed from σi to the CR-TS’s crash time (for
0 ≤ x ≤ η). Let τi be the freshness point of σi, τi+1 be the freshness point next to τi,
σs be a heartbeat sending time after the CR-TS’s recovery. From the definition of the
NFD-S algorithm, we know that τi−σi = timeout and τi+1− τi = η. Notice that from
Fig. 3.8, it is shown that if x + Xc < timeout + η, then an occurred crash might not be
detectable. Therefore, in order to detect an occurred crash failure, x+Xc > timeout +η
is needed. In the worst case, the CR-TS crashes just after σi (x = 0), then we can see
that Xc > timeout +η is the condition that the failure is detectable. Assuming that there






c (1 < i < n < +∞). Let
NF be a random variable presenting the number of the occurred failures; let NDF be
a random variable presenting the number of the detected failures among the occurred
failures. From the definition of RDF in Section 3.6.3, we know that RDF = NDFNF and
E(RDF)= E(NDFNF ). Since Xcs are random variables which follow a distribution, then the
proportion of X ic greater than timeout +η can be represented by Pr(Xc > η+ timeout).
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From the above analysis, we know that the average proportion (expectation of ratio)
of the detected failures (E(RDF)) in such a situation is equal to the proportion of X ic
greater than timeout + η. Therefore we obtain that E(RDF) ≥ Pr(Xc > η + timeout),
which proves the lemma.
From Lemma 3.6.3-3.6.9, we can conclude that for the NFD-S algorithm, the basic
QoS metrics proposed in [24] and the extended QoS metrics are constrained by the
following theorem:











































c+1) · pis +1
. (3.6.14)
E(TDR) = E(D)+η ·E(XL). (3.6.15)
E(RDF)≥ Pr(Xc > η+ timeout). (3.6.16)
Proof. The proof of Theorem 3.6.2 follows immediately from the application of
Lemma 3.6.3-Lemma 3.6.9.
When the monitoring target is fail-free or crash-stop8, for the basic QoS metrics in





8The pre-crash duration of the crash-stop process is a long run.



















As MTTF→ +∞, Pr(Xa > τi + x− tmr ) approaches one. Therefore, pis, ui(x) and qi0
in the Definition 3.6.1 are reduced to ps, u(x) and q0 in Definition 1 in [24]. Thus
E(TMR), E(TM) and PA are exactly reduced to the QoS analysis results in [24]. We
can conclude that in terms of failure detection, a fail-free run or a crash-stop run with
MTTF→ +∞ is a particular case of a crash-recovery run. If the monitored target’s
MTTF is not sufficiently long and the target is recoverable, then the impact of its
dependability should be taken into consideration.
3.7 The Configuration of the NFD-S Algorithm in a Crash-
Recovery Run
For the NFD-S algorithm in a crash-recovery run, the assumption that the sequence
numbers of the heartbeat messages are continually increasing after every recovery of
the CR-TS is needed to ensure that the NFD-S algorithm is still valid after each re-
covery. However, without persistent storage to snapshot the runtime information fre-
quently, when a crash failure occurs, all of the current runtime information might be
lost. Thus continuously increasing the heartbeat sequence number cannot be guaran-
teed in such a situation. Since for the NFD-S algorithm, the local clocks of the FDS
and the CR-TS are synchronized, we can use the comparison of the sending time of
each heartbeat message instead of the comparison of the heartbeat sequence number in
the NFD-S algorithm. Then, for a crash-recovery FDS, if the QoS requirements of the
FDS are given, the configuration procedure is illustrated in Fig. 3.9.
Initially, we can assume that the QoS of message communication is perfect (e.g.,
pL = 0, E(D) is small and E(XL) = 0), and the CR-TS is fail-free. As the monitor-
ing procedure continues, the estimation of the QoS of message communication and the
dependability metrics of the CR-TS will become more and more accurate. Thus the
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Figure 3.9: The Extended NFD-S Algorithm Configuration in a Crash-Recovery Run
FDS can be reconfigured to adapt to the change of input parameters, which can help
estimate better η and timeout. Then for given QoS requirements, expressed as bounds,
the following inequalities need to be satisfied:
TD ≤ T UD , E(TMR)≥ T LMR, PA ≥ PLA ,
E(TM)≤ T UM , E(TDR)≤ TUDR, E(RDF)≥ RLDF.
(3.7.20)
From Theorem 3.6.2, we can estimate the parameters (η and timeout) of the NFD-S
algorithm according to the following inequalities:




























c+1) · pis +1
≤TUM . (3.7.24)
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E(D)+ηE(XL)≤TUDR. (3.7.25)
Pr(Xc > η+ timeout)≥RLDF. (3.7.26)
Then the configuration of the NFD-S algorithm becomes the problem to find the largest
η satisfying inequalities (3.7.22)-(3.7.25) and if such η exists, find the largest timeout
that satisfies η + timeout ≤ T UD and Pr(Xc > η + timeout) ≥ RLDF. The configuration
procedure can be done in the following steps:
Step I If T LMR < MTBF, continue; else the QoS of the FDS cannot be achieved.
Step II Find the largest η that satisfies the inequalities (3.7.22)-(3.7.25), otherwise
cannot find an appropriate η (QoS cannot be achieved).
Step III If η > 0, find the largest timeout ≤ T UD −η and Pr(Xc > η+ timeout)≥ RLDF.
From the above steps, the estimation of η and timeout for a crash-recovery FDS based
on the NFD-S algorithm amounts to finding a numerical solution for the inequali-
ties (3.7.21)-(3.7.26). This can be done using binary search similarly to [24]. But the
estimation of the input parameters of the configuration becomes more difficult because
parameters, such as E(XL), MTTF, MTTR etc., are needed for such a FDS. We will
introduce input parameter estimation shortly in Chapter 4. Note that for this configura-
tion procedure, choosing a different message transmission protocol (e.g., TCP, UDP)
can achieve different QoS for message communication. Thus, this new configuration
can be more adaptive to the message transmission. For example, if the message loss
probability or message delay is high for a certain protocol, then the FDS can switch to
a more reliable protocol to achieve a better QoS without increasing the communication
frequency or the timeout length.
3.8 Discussion
In previous sections, we introduced how to estimate the QoS bounds for a crash-
recovery FDS based on the NFD-S algorithm. However, there are several facts which
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need to be taken into consideration.
In reality, MTTF and MTTR are non-deterministic values, governed by random distri-
butions. The proportion of detected failures is dependent on the probability distribution
of Xc, the length of η and timeout. If it is required to detect most failures before recov-
ery, in practice η+timeout (the failure detection time TD) should be much smaller than
MTTR. For example, for exponentially distributed Xc, if η + timeout = MTTR, then
E(RDF) ≥ 36.8%. If η + timeout = MTTR2 , then E(RDF) ≥ 60.7%. If η + timeout =
MTTR
10 , E(RDF)≥ 90.5%.
Theorem 3.6.2 gives the bounds of E(TMR) and E(TM). However, from Fig. 3.7 we can
see that the characteristics of E(TMR) and E(TM) in the durations of [t0, t1) (E(T ′MR),








M )) are quite different. Esti-
mating η and timeout using the mean of the dependability measurements might not
satisfy the QoS requirement all the time. A stricter bound can be achieved by using
the maximum value in the set {E(T ′M), E(T ′′M), E(T ′′′M )}, which must be smaller than
T UM and the minimum value in {E(T ′MR), E(T ′′MR), E(T ′′′MR)}, which must be larger than
T LMR.
For TM, E(T ′M) is E(TDR); E(T
′′′
M ) is less than E(TD); the E(T
′′
M), which is the fail-












≤ T UM . (3.8.27)
More strictly, E(TDR) can be substituted by the max recovery detection time that has
been recorded and E(TD) can be substituted by T UD .
For TMR, the possible mistake recurrence of the FDS is affected by the message delays,
losses, the CR-TS’s crashes and recoveries. The impact of the CR-TS’s crash and
recovery is governed by MTTF and MTTR, which mainly occur during [t0, t1) and
[t2, t3). The impact of message delays and losses on TMR mainly happen within [t1, t2)
represented as E(T
′′
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Therefore, E(TMR) can be estimated by using the minimum value in the set









≥ T LMR. (3.8.31)
Inequality (3.8.31) gives a stricter constraint for the QoS estimation. However, the
drawback of this method is obvious. For a highly consistent CR-TS, due to small
MTTR, TMR could be too small to satisfy a given QoS requirement. In this situation,
using E(TMR) instead could be a reasonable solution because the recovery of the CR-
TS only happens once per MTBF period. Furthermore, if timeout is scaled up or even
becomes larger than MTTR, from Theorem 3.6.2 we can know that the E(TMR) can
increase, but more failures will become undetectable. For such highly consistent CR-
TS, some new algorithm is needed to tackle this problem. Thus, in Chapter 4, the
recovery detection protocols are presented to discover a failure after the recovery and
estimate the recovery time, which can improve the E(RDF) without reducing other QoS
aspects.
3.9 The Impact of Service Dependability Metrics on the
QoS of the FDS
In order to assess the impact of the dependability metrics on the FDS’s QoS, some
distinct cases are distinguished as follows. When MTTF→+∞ (or MTTF >> 0), the
CR-TS stays in the Alive state for a very long time. This indicates that the CR-TS is
highly reliable. In this situation, regardless the value of MTTR, the service seldom
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crashes and remains in the Alive state for long periods. Such a service can be regarded
as a fail-free run and the impact of the service dependability is so low that it can be
ignored. When MTTF >> MTTR, the CR-TS is highly available. But the CR-TS
might not be highly reliable, e.g., MTTF >> MTTR does not indicate MTTF→ +∞.
If MTTF is not large enough then the behavior of the CR-TS will influence the QoS
of the FDS. We will discuss this in the following part. When MTTR→ 0, the CR-TS
is highly consistent. When MTTR >> 0, the CR-TS can be regarded as a crash-stop
service. When MTTF > MTTR or MTTF < MTTR, but MTTR is not large enough,
then the impact of failure and recovery on the QoS of a FDS has to be considered.
When MTTF << MTTR, it means that in most time the CR-TS is in the Crash state.
In this situation, the CR-TS can rarely send heartbeat messages or answer the query.
Such a service is too poor to be useful, so we do not consider this case. In the following
sections, we will discuss the impact of the reliability, availability and consistency on
each QoS metric respectively.
3.9.1 The Impact on TM and TD
Generally, for a timeout based push or pull algorithm (see Fig. 3.7), the timeout length
governs the failure detection speed. This is simply because the FDS makes its decision
at the timeout point. If the timeout time is small, the FDS will make faster, but less
accurate, decisions. If timeout increases, TD slows down but the FDS can tolerate more
message (heartbeat or query-reply) delays or losses (see Fig. 3.10), which can improve
the detection accuracy to some extent. Note that if the service is not fail-free or crash-
stop, continually increasing the timeout length, a failure might become undetectable,
because its recovery duration could be shorter than TD. In this situation, E(TM) will
not increase more than the recovery duration.
3.9.2 The Impact on TMR
For a fail-free run, mistakes of a FDS only happen when messages are delayed or lost
and TMR is governed by such message behaviors. Previous research work [24] showed
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that when TD (timeout) increases linearly, TMR increases exponentially (Fig. 12 in [24]).
This implies that in a fail-free run, if the timeout length is increased continually, an
arbitrary level of TMR can be achieved. In Fig. 3.10, P = Pr(Delay > timeout) =
pL + (1− pL) ·Pr(timeout < Delay < +∞), where pL is the probability of message
loss. Roughly speaking, in a fail-free run, when timeout increases to n× η (n is a
non-negative integer and n ≥ 1), the FDS can tolerate around n consecutive commu-
nication message losses. The mistake recurrence which is caused by message latency
or loss decreases 1Pn rapidly. This also makes the TMR increase
1
Pn faster in a fail-free
run. For a crash-recovery run, mistakes can also happen when the CR-TS crashes
Figure 3.10: The Analysis of E(TMR)
or recovers (see Fig. 3.4(b)). This is because for any communication-based FDS (in
either a synchronous or asynchronous distributed system), the message transmission
latency will delay the detection of the CR-TS’s state change. This mistake is inevitable
even when the prediction is available, because the probability that a predictor predicts
the exact time of a state transition of the CR-TS is zero. So a mistake in the FDS
will certainly occur when a state transition of the CR-TS happens. This means that
the upper bound on TMR is governed by MTTF and MTTR (see inequalities (3.6.11)-
(3.6.12) in Theorem 3.6.2). Even if all message delays and losses can be tolerated,
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E(TMR) cannot increase to an arbitrary level when MTTF is not +∞ and MTTR is not
+∞ or 0. Fig. 3.10 shows that if the failure is detectable, E(TMR) cannot exceed MTBF2
since for each MTBF duration there will be two mistakes, caused by the CR-TS’s crash
and recovery. When the failure is undetectable, mistakes may happen at the CR-TS’s
crash or recovery time. Then E(TMR) cannot exceed MTBF. Fig. 3.10 shows the maxi-
mum boundary of E(TMR) when timeout (TD) is increased for deterministic MTTF and
MTTR. For the CR-TS with the non-deterministic failure and recovery duration, as
the timeout length increases, the proportion of the detectable failures decreases. For
detectable failures, TMR ≤ MTBF2 . For undetectable failures, TMR ≤MTBF. Thus after
E(TMR) reaches MTBF2 , the overall E(TMR) approaches MTBF gradually.
3.9.3 The Impact on PA
Both TM and TMR are absolute measurements, with strict bounds. But PA is different.
It is the proportion of time that the FDS is not in a mistake state which will depend
on the ratio of E(TM) and E(TMR) (PA = 1− E(TM)E(TMR) in [24]). If a service is fail-free,
from Section 3.9.1 and 3.9.2, we know that when timeout is increased, E(TM) increases
linearly and E(TMR) increases exponentially. Thus PA can rapidly approach 1. But in a
crash-recovery run, when the timeout length is increased, both E(TM) and E(TMR) will
eventually reach their upper bounds. Generally, as timeout increases, less failures will
be detected and the mistake caused by the CR-TS’s crash (see T 3M in Fig. 3.5(c)) will
have more impact on E(TM), thus E(TM) will approach MTTR9, since the maximum
length of E(T 3M) is MTTR. When the timeout length become more and more larger
than E(Xc) (MTTR), more crashes become not detectable. Thus E(TM) will approach
MTTR gradually. For instance, for an exponentially distributed Xc, the probability that
a crash is not detected can be calculated by Pr(Xc < TD) = 1− eTD/MTTR (see proof
of Lemma 3.6.9). When TD = MTTR, the probability that a crash is not detected
approaches Pr(Xc < MTTR). As Xc is an exponential distributed random variable,
Pr(Xc < MTTR) = 1− e−1 ≈ 0.6321. When TD = 2MTTR, Pr(Xc < 2MTTR) =
1−e−2≈ 0.8647. When TD = 3MTTR, Pr(Xc < 3MTTR) = 1−e−3≈ 0.9502. We can
9Under the assumption that the probability of message loss and delay are not very high and
MTTR >> η.
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see that as TD increases, more and more crashes will become undetectable. Therefore,
if all crashes become undetectable, E(TM) will approach MTTR.
The speed of increase of TMR will depend on when TMR reaches MTBF2 . Before this
bound is reached, as the timeout length increases, TMR can increase exponentially fast,
when more message losses can be tolerated. After TMR exceeds MTBF2 , it cannot in-
crease exponentially any more, but can only increase gradually to MTBF. This is be-
cause, when TMR does not reach MTBF2 , as the timeout length increases, more message





L fast, where timeout is the power of pL (see Fig. 3.10). But when TMR
exceeds MTBF2 , even more message delays and losses are tolerated, the mistakes still
occur which are caused by the CR-TS’s crash and recovery. If a crash is detectable,
within each MTBF period there will be at least two mistakes; if a crash is undetectable,
within each MTBF duration there will be at least one mistake which is caused by the
crash or the recovery (see Lemma 3.6.4 and 3.6.5). As timeout increases, more and
more crashes become undetectable, therefore, TMR increases gradually, approaching
MTBF rather than increasing exponentially fast. Thus, when TMR reaches its upper
bound but TM has not reached its upper bound yet, PA will decrease with continually
increasing timeout. When both TM and TMR reach their upper bound, PA will approach
MTTF
MTBF , which is equal to the availability of the CR-TS.
3.10 Summary and Conclusions
3.10.1 Summary
In this chapter, we model the channel-based QoS of message transmission. The crash-
recovery service and its failure detector are modeled as stochastic processes. We rede-
fined the previous proposed QoS metrics for the crash-recovery failure detection and
extend some new metrics to measure the recovery detection speed and the complete-
ness property of a failure detector. In addition to the QoS of message transmission,
the dependability of the crash-recovery service is considered for the failure detector’s
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QoS bounds analysis. We show how to configure the FDS to satisfy a given set of re-
quirements in a crash-recovery run based on the NFD-S algorithm. We also discussed
the impact of the target service’s crash-recovery behavior on each QoS metric of the
failure detector specifically. Our analysis also shows that the QoS analysis in [24] is a
particular case of a crash-recovery run. Finally, according to the analysis work in Sec-
tion 3.6 and the discussion in Section 3.9, the QoS of failure detectors is influenced by
the dependability of the crash-recovery service when the target service is not fail-free
or crash-stop.
3.10.2 Conclusions about Crash-Recovery Failure Detectors
The crash-recovery failure detector is an important building block for fault-tolerant
systems. This is especially the case for large-scale distributed systems, which have
a large number of monitored targets and require the monitoring procedure to be au-
tonomously when the monitored services or processes can be resilient and recover. As
far as we know, the previous work focused on the QoS of failure detectors is based on
fail-free or crash-stop model. The corresponding failure detection algorithms only fo-
cus on measuring the QoS of message transmission and ignore the dependability of the
monitored service. Although there are some studies of crash-recovery failure detectors
for consensus or group membership problems, they are not from the QoS perspective.
In our model, we have considered QoS metrics of failure detectors under crash-recovery,
showing that the dependability metrics of the target service should be taken into con-
sideration. When MTTF and MTTR do not approach infinity, in another words, if the
target service is not fail-free or crash-stop, the dependability of the target service will
influence the QoS of failure detectors. If an accurate failure detector’s parameters are
to be estimated, the dependability metrics must be used as inputs as well rather than
only considering the impact of the liveness message transmission measurements (see
Fig. 3.11).
Note that this crash-recovery failure detection model is suitable for failure detection of
most software or hardware components that can be repaired to restart and can be more
widely adopted by any fault-tolerant systems, which require crash-recovery detection.
Chapter 3. Stochastic Modeling of A Crash-Recovery Service and Its FDS 89
Figure 3.11: The QoS Relationship Between Communication, CR-TS and FDS
Furthermore, our failure detection model focuses on just one failure detection pair.
However, in a large distributed system, there might be many services which need to
be monitored. For such a system, a failure detector can monitor many targets based
on one target per monitoring channel module. The failure detector maintains a list of
channel modules’ state, each of which presents the liveness status of a monitored tar-
get. The parameter calculations and the configuration should be independently based
on each channel module. In order to avoid a single point failure of a failure detector,
a target service can be monitored by more than one failure detector and a failure de-
tector can be monitored as a target service by other failure detectors as well. Overall,
redundancy and diversity can make a failure detection system more robust and depend-
able. However, the costs of resource consumption for such redundancy will be higher
as well.
In next chapter, we will discuss how to estimate the QoS of message transmission and
the dependability metrics of the CR-TS. The recovery detection protocols are intro-
duced for estimating the recovery time of the CR-TS, improving the detected failure
proportion and improve the adaptation of the FDS in a crash-recovery run.
Chapter 4
Parameter Estimation and Recovery
Detection Protocol
4.1 Introduction
The results of the previous chapter assume that various parameters characterizing the
behavior of the system are available. In this chapter, we explain how such parameters
can be estimated. In Section 4.2, we discuss how to estimate the QoS of the liveness
message communication in a crash-recovery run. Then, we describe how to estimate
the dependability metrics of the crash-recovery service by using the failure detector
itself. In Section 4.3, two types of recovery detection protocols are proposed. The first
one is a reliable recovery detection protocol, which requires persistent storage and can
detect every recovery. The second one is a lightweight recovery detection protocol,
which does not guarantee to detect every recovery but has a lower system overhead.
4.2 QoS of Message Transmission Estimation
In the previous chapter (Section 3.5.1), the message delay, the probability of message
loss and message loss-length are defined as the QoS provided by a communication
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channel between the FDS and the CR-TS. Some previous work, such as [24, 36, 51, 68,
81], proposes various estimation methods of the message delays and message losses.
However all of them are based on the fail-free or crash-stop assumption and none
of them consider how to estimate the message behavior within a crash-recovery run.
In this section, we discuss the QoS of message communication estimation methods
in a crash-recovery run and show how the parameter estimation adapts to the crash-
recovery of the CR-TS.
4.2.1 Estimating E(D) for Each MTBF
Let Ai be the arrival time of the ith heartbeat message sent by the CR-TS according the
FDS’s local clock. Let σi be the sending time of the ith heartbeat message according to
the CR-TS’s local clock. Let Di be the delay of the ith heartbeat message, thus E(D)
can be estimated as follows:
• For the system with synchronous clocks, since the clocks on both of the FDS and
the CR-TS’s sides are the same, then Ai = σi +Di and E(D) can be estimated by

















• For the system with unsynchronized clocks, it could be difficult to estimate the
average message delay at an arbitrary time. This is because the heartbeat mes-
sages start from a recovery time rather than from time zero1 as in a crash-stop
run and the heartbeat sending time might be unknown due to the fact that the
recovery time recorded by the CR-TS’s clock might be invalid at the FDS side.
We assume that E(D) from the previous crash-recovery period is recorded and
available. At the initiation of the failure detection pair, let us assume that the
FDS and the CR-TS start at the same time and the heartbeat messages restart
1In [24, 36] as in a crash-stop run, the authors assume that their failure detectors and the heartbeat
generation of the monitored processes start at time zero.
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immediately after the CR-TS’s recovery. Let s be the starting sequence number
of the heartbeat message. Then the sending time of the ith heartbeat message
according to the FDS’s local clock σi +C can be represented by tr + (i− s)η,
where C is a constant representing the drift between the FDS and the CR-TS’s
clocks2 and tr is the recovery time according to the FDS’s local clock; the arrival
time of the ith heartbeat message Ai can be represented by σi +C + Di, where
Di is the delay of the ith heartbeat message. Thus for each crash-recovery pe-
riod the delay of the ith heartbeat message can be estimated using the following
equations:
Ai = σi +C +Di = tr +(i− s) ·η+Di;
Ai− tr = (i− s) ·η+Di;
Di = Ai− tr− (i− s) ·η.
(4.2.2)
Since the FDS and the CR-TS start simultaneously for the first MTBF period,
the first start time tr according to the FDS’s local clock is known. Thus E(D)














(Ai− tr− (i− s) ·η).
(4.2.3)
From the equation (4.2.3), we can get E(D) for the first crash-recovery period,
thus the previous period’s E(D) can be used subsequently. Be aware that this
method might result in inaccurate estimation of E(D) after a long time running.
One possible compensation solution could be: for each crash-recovery period,
after the CR-TS’s recovery has been detected, the FDS triggers some query mes-
sages (using the same message protocol as the heartbeat) to the CR-TS and the
CR-TS answers the query. Then, the FDS estimates the roundtrip message delay
according to the received answer messages and computes the up-to-date E(D)
using its local clock.
2We assume that both the FDS and the CR-TS’s clocks are accurate.
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4.2.2 Estimating pL for Each MTBF
The parameter pL can be estimated by using the proportion of messages lost
through a communication channel (see Section 3.5.1) based on each MTBF pe-
riod. For the first MTBF period, initially pL can be regarded as zero. For the
following MTBF periods, initially the previous period’s pL can be used. Within
each MTBF period, after the FDS has received some liveness messages, pL can





where Nr is the number of messages received by the FDS until the estimation
time within current MTBF period and Ns is the total number of messages that
the CR-TS has sent until the estimation time. Ns can be computed by using
b tnow−tr
η
c+ 1, where tnow is the current time and tr is the recovery time of this








The above estimation of pL can be used for the systems with both synchronized
clocks and unsynchronized clocks. For the system with unsynchronized clocks,
the estimate of the recovery time tr is less accurate than for the clock synchro-
nized system. But as the number of liveness messages increases, the bias of pL
estimation caused by recovery time estimation becomes negligible.
4.2.3 Estimating Expected Arrival Time For Each MTBF
In a fail-free run, Chen et al. [24] give an estimation method for the expected









which is based on an exponential message delay assumption. In a crash-recovery
run, the above method is not valid any more. This is because after a recovery of
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the CR-TS, the expected message arrival time needs to be recomputed, depend-
ing on the recovery time of the current MTBF period. Therefore, in a crash-
recovery run, the (` + 1)th heartbeat message’s sending time can be estimated
by using tr +(`+1− s)η, and the jth message delay can be computed by using
A j− tr−η( j− s). Thus the (`+ 1)th heartbeat message’s expected arrival time
EA`+1 can be estimated as below:






A j− tr−η( j− s)
)
+(`+1− s)η,
for s≤ j ≤ (`+1),
(4.2.6)
where j is the heartbeat sequence number, A j is the arrival time of the jth heartbeat
message according to the FDS’s local clock, tr is the recovery time of the current
MTBF period and s is the starting heartbeat sequence number of the current MTBF
period.
4.2.4 Message Loss-Length Estimation
In addition to E(D) and pL, the consecutive message loss number XL is also involved
as one QoS aspect of the channel-based communication to capture the bursty message
loss behavior. In this section, we propose a basic estimation method to estimate XL
with the independent message transmission assumption.
Lemma 4.2.1. If each message’s transmission and loss behavior is independent, then





m is the maximum number of consecutive messages lost and pL is the probability that
each message is lost during the transmission.
Proof. From the definition of expectation and Lemma 3.5.1, we know that
E(XL) =1× pL · (1− pL)+2× p2L · (1− pL)+3× p3L · (1− pL)+ · · ·
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where n is the number of consecutive message losses and pL is the probability that
each message is lost. Then,
pL×E(XL) =1× p2L · (1− pL)+2× p3L · (1− pL)+3× p4L · (1− pL)+ · · ·
+m× pm+1L · (1− pL).
(4.2.8)
From equations 4.2.7 and 4.2.8, we can obtain that
E(XL)− pL×E(XL) = (1− pL)× (pL + p2L + p3L + p4L + · · ·+ pmL −mpm+1L ).
Hence after simple arithmetic manipulation, recognizing that there is a geometry dis-





The proof is completed.






From the above lemma we see that if each liveness message’s transmission is indepen-
dent, E(XL) is only related to pL and it can be computed straightforwardly.
4.2.5 Dependability Metrics Estimation for the Crash-Recovery Ser-
vice
From the crash-recovery service modeling in Section 3.4, we see that there is an in-
timate relationship between the MTTF, MTTR and MTBF. In order to estimate these
dependability metrics of a crash-recovery service, we only need to estimate the crash
and recovery time of the crash-recovery service. Assuming that the clocks between the
FDS and the CR-TS’s sides are synchronized. Let t1r be the CR-TS’s first start time,
then for m ≥ 1, tmr represents the mth recovery time; tmdr represents the mth recovery
detection time; tmc represents the mth crash time; t
m
d presents the mth crash detection
time (see Fig. 4.1). tmr can be recorded by the CR-TS after a recovery finished (see
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Section 4.3). tmd can be recorded by the FDS when a failure is detected, E(TD) can be






c ) when t
m
c is known. Actually, t
m
c can be estimated
by recording the latest successful message sending time σl and can be saved in the
persistent storage. If a crash event happens uniformly distributed on [σl, σl +η), then
after a recovery finished, the average tmc can be roughly estimated by t
m
c = σl +
η
2 . No-
tice that a smaller message inter-sending time unit (η) can result in a more accurate tmc
estimate. Then the CR-TS’s MTBF, MTTF, MTTR and the probability that the CR-TS
has not crashed up to time τi + x since its last recovery Pr(Xa > τi + x− tmr ) can be
estimated as follows:
Figure 4.1: Dependability Metrics Estimation
• Estimate MTBF: from the definition of MTBF, we know that MTBF is only
related to the CR-TS’s recovery times tmr (s). These t
m
r (s) can be obtained by
adopting the recovery time estimation methods proposed in Section 4.3. Thus
MTBF can be estimated as below:






(tm+1r − tmr ). (4.2.9)
• Estimate MTTF: MTTF can be estimated by using the recovery time (tmr ) and
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the crash detection time (tmd ) with the following equation:
E(tmd − t
m
r ) = MTTF+E(TD), then













• Estimate MTTR: MTTR can be estimated by using MTBF and MTTF directly
for MTTR = MTBF−MTTF or by using tm+1r and tmd . Hence the MTTR can be
estimated as below:
E(tm+1r − tmd ) = MTTR−E(TD), then







(tm+1r − tmd )+E(TD).
(4.2.11)
• Estimate Pr(Xa > τi + x− tmr ): when the probability density function fa(x) or
the probability distribution function Fa(x) of Xa are known, the probability that
the CR-TS does not crash until τi + x after its last recovery can be estimated as
follows:









When x = 0, we obtain that









When the probability density function fa(x) and the probability distribution func-
tion Fa(x) of Xa are unknown, an empirical distribution function (EDF) estima-
tion method can be adopted to estimate fa(x) or Fa(x). In addition,
Pr(Xa > τi + x− tmr ) is used for estimating the probability that a S-transition
happens on [t1, t2) (see Proposition 3.6.1), which is used for counting the av-
erage number of mistakes on that duration (see Lemma 3.6.1). If we maximize
Pr(Xa > τi + x− tmr ), then a maximal average number of mistakes on [t1, t2) will
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be obtained. Therefore we will get more strict QoS bound estimates for PA,
TM and TMR. Thus we can adopt i = 1 and x = 0 to simplify the estimation of
Pr(Xa > τi + x− tmr ). Notice that the above method is only for the strict bound
estimation rather than an optimized estimation.
In this section we discussed how to estimate the input parameters of a FDS. The esti-
mation methods are heavily dependent on the recovery time of the CR-TS within each
MTBF period. In the next section, we will introduce how to obtain the recovery time
for each MTBF period with the proposed recovery detection protocols.
4.3 Recovery Detection and Recovery Time Estimation
In this section, two types of recovery detection protocols are introduced. The first is
a reliable protocol which guarantees to detect every recovery of the CR-TS, and the
second is a lightweight protocol which does not guarantee to detect every recovery but
reduces the system overhead. Both of the two protocols can be adopted to estimate the
recovery time of the CR-TS and improve the proportion of detected failures.
4.3.1 A Reliable Recovery Detection Protocol
For the system in which clocks between the FDS side and the CR-TS side are syn-
chronized, the easiest way to detect a recovery and get the recovery time is to send
a reliable notification together with the CR-TS’s recorded recovery time to the FDS.
Then the FDS can detect this recovery and extract this recovery time directly from each
received notification message. Thus each recovery can be detected and the recovery
time can be recorded. However, if reliable communication is not available, this method
will not guarantee to detect every recovery. If a notification message is lost then the
recovery time will not be known by the FDS. Consequently, it will result in inaccurate
parameter estimation and the failure detection algorithm might not work properly in a
crash-recovery run. Therefore, in order to detect each occurred recovery and estimate
the recovery time accurately, we propose a protocol to track the recovery time by pig-
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gybacking some additional information within heartbeat messages and using persistent
storage to store the recovery time and the recovery count (see Algorithm 1). For such
a recovery detection protocol, the following conditions are needed for recovery time
estimation:
• Rm is a positive integer number starting from 0, which represents a count of how
many times the CR-TS has recovered.
• The CR-TS has a persistent storage RECOV ERY [N] with the length N suffi-
ciently large. Each RECOV ERY [N] element can store a set SETm := {Rm, tmr },
which contains two values: the recovery count Rm and the recovery time tmr .
Thus, RECOV ERY [N] can contain many SETms to store multiple recovery time
information and initially RECOV ERY [N] is empty .
• On each recovery, SETm is refreshed with current Rm, tmr and is stored into
RECOV ERY [N].
At the CR-TS’s side, when the CR-TS finishes its recovery, the CR-TS will add SETm
to RECOV ERY [N]. Then, all SETms in the persistent storage RECOV ERY [N] will be
piggybacked within the heartbeat message before it is sent to the FDS. When the FDS
receives a heartbeat message, it will check whether there is such recovery information
available within this heartbeat message. If there are SETms within a heartbeat mes-
sage, the FDS will retrieve and record all Rms and tmr s if they have not been recorded
yet. Then the FDS will send an acknowledgement message (mack) with all of the
retrieved Rms to the CR-TS. If there is no Rm and tmr information in the received heart-
beat message and the acknowledgement message has already been launched, then the
FDS will stop sending the acknowledgement message to the CR-TS. For the CR-TS,
if an acknowledgement message is received, according to the Rms in the acknowl-
edgement message, the CR-TS will retrieve and delete the corresponding SETms in
RECOV ERY [N]. If there is no SETms in RECOV ERY [N], then the CR-TS will stop
piggybacking recovery information. By using this protocol, all tmr s will be discovered
by the FDS, since if the recovery information is not recorded by the FDS, it will remain
in the persistent storage for the next piggyback round. Consequently, each occurred
failure will be detected. Therefore a strong completeness requirement can be satisfied.
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For the system with unsynchronized clocks, two more conditions must hold:
• After the CR-TS’s recovery, the heartbeat message will be restarted immediately.
• On each recovery of the CR-TS, the starting heartbeat sequence number s is reset
as 1 (s = 1).
Since the clocks between the FDS and the CR-TS are not synchronized, the tmr at the
CR-TS side is not accurate from the FDS’s perspective. Thus instead of piggybacking
tmr in SETm, SETm contains Rm, the sending time of the mi according to the CR-TS’s
local clock (σi) and heartbeat message mi’s sequence number i to estimate the recovery
time. Thus SETm := {Rm, σi, i}.
Figure 4.2: Recovery Time Estimation for the System with Unsynchronized Clocks
For the Rmth round recovery time estimation, suppose the current local time of the FDS
is tnow, then
tmr ≈ tnow− (i− s)η−E(D). (4.3.14)
If there are more than one SETm element within the received heartbeat message, each
of the previous MTBF period’s recovery time can be estimated as follows:
tm−xr ≈ tnow− (σ j−σi)− (i− s) ·η−E(D), x≥ 1. (4.3.15)
For example, the heartbeat message m j received by the FDS contains SETm and SETm−x
due to the fact that Rm−x was not received by the FDS and the corresponding recovery
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information (i, σi, Rm−x) is still stored in the RECOV ERY [N] at the CR-TS side. Al-
though both of σ j and σi are the sending time of the heartbeat messages according to
the CR-TS’s local clock, σ j−σi is an interval independent of the CR-TS’s local time
(see Fig. 4.2). If the drift of the CR-TS’s local time is small enough to be ignored, then
tnow−(σ j−σi)−E(D) can present the heartbeat message mi’s sending time according
to the FDS’s local clock. Therefore, the equation (4.3.15) can be used to estimate the
Rm−xth recovery time.
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2: RECOV ERY [N]=null; Rm = 0;
3: for all i ≥ 1, every η interval send heartbeat mi to FDS; {if CR-TS crashes, the
heartbeat will be stopped as well}
4: when CR-TS’s recovery finishes, record tmr and Rm ++;
5: SETm := {Rm, tmr } → RECOV ERY [N] {record recovery information in the per-
sistent storage}
6: when heartbeat mi is sent:
7: if (Recovery[N]!=null) then
8: attach all of the elements in Recovery[N] to heartbeat mi.
9: end if
10: when mack is received:
11: search and delete SETms in RECOVERY[N] according to the Rms attached in
mack;
At FDS Side:
12: when heartbeat mi is received:
13: if (SETms exist within heartbeat mi) then
14: record the unrecorded tmr s and Rms.
15: send acknowledgement mack attached with the received Rms to CR-TS;
16: else
17: if (no SETms within heartbeat mi ‖ a crash failure is detected) then
18: stop sending mack;
19: end if
20: end if
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4.3.2 A Lightweight Recovery Detection Protocol
Since the recovery time estimation methods in Section 4.3.1 require persistent storage
to guarantee the strong completeness property, the overhead generated by storage ac-
cess could be high. In order to solve this problem, we propose a lightweight recovery
detection protocol which does not use persistent storage is proposed. This protocol
does not guarantee to detect every recovery, especially when MTTF is very short,
this protocol might not detect some recoveries. But when MTTF >> 3E(TDR), this
protocol should perform reasonably well. This is because if the CR-TS’s can send a
reasonable number of liveness messages without crashing, the probability that the FDS
receives at least one liveness message with recovery information is quite high. Actu-
ally, when the CR-TS crashes frequently, it can be regarded as an unstable period (as
in [1]) and can be ignored as noise. The details of this lightweight recovery detection
protocol for the system with synchronized clocks and unsynchronized clocks are given
as below.
For the system with synchronized clocks, when the CR-TS recovers, the recovery time
will be recorded and a heartbeat message will be sent to the FDS. In order to notify
the FDS about the occurrence of the CR-TS’s recovery, a recovery signal r-signal will
be attached to the heartbeat message together with the heartbeat sending time σi and
the heartbeat sequence number i. When the FDS receives a heartbeat message with
r-signal, the FDS will record the recovery information within the message and send an
acknowledgement message (mack) with the estimated tmr to the CR-TS. If the CR-TS
receives this mack, the attached tmr will be retrieved and compared with the recorded




r , the message mack is for
the current MTBF period. Then it will stop attaching r-signal to heartbeat messages.
If tmr < t
c
r , then discard the message mack, because this acknowledgement message
comes from a previous period. If the heartbeat message, received by the FDS, does not
contain r-signal, then the FDS will stop sending mack and the conversation of recovery
detection terminates.
In practice, even for clock synchronized systems the clocks might have small drifts and
due to the different accuracy between host machines, using condition such as tmr = t
c
r
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might generate mistakes. In order to tolerate such drifts or accuracy problems, a value
ξ, can be defined (a positive real number, which is small enough but larger than the
clocks drift and the difference of accuracy between machines). Then the condition
tmr = t
c
r can be substituted by |tmr − tcr |< ξ, tmr < tcr can be replaced by |tcr − tmr | > ξ.
Since the message communication is not reliable, both of the heartbeat messages and
the acknowledgement mack might be lost during transmission. If MTTF is long enough
the above protocol can tolerate these message losses. This is because after the CR-TS
recovers and continues sending its heartbeat without a failure, the FDS will receive a
heartbeat message with r-signal and send mack to the CR-TS. Even if the mack might get
lost as well, after some time, the CR-TS will receive a mack and stop attaching r-signal
to the heartbeat message. Eventually, the FDS will receive a heartbeat message without
r-signal and stop sending the mack. For the mth MTBF period, the equation (4.3.16)
can be adopted for the recovery time estimation.
tmr = σi− (i− s)η, (4.3.16)
where σi is the sending time of the message mi; mi is the first message received by the
FDS after the CR-TS’s mth recovery; s is the starting message sequence number of the
mth MTBF period.
Figure 4.3: The Lightweight Recovery Detection Protocol
On average, E(XL) messages are needed for one-way message transmission. Therefore




is needed for this handshake protocol.
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If the local clocks between the FDS and the CR-TS are unsynchronized, then the equa-
tion (4.3.14) can be adopted for recovery time estimation. But in order to make the
recovery time comparable at the CR-TS’s side (e.g., |tmr − tcr |< ξ), the estimation of tmr
according to the CR-TS’s local clock (using the equation (4.3.16)) should be attached
in the acknowledgement message as the estimated recovery time. This is because the
equation (4.3.16) only needs the CR-TS’s local clock for recovery time estimation.
Overall, this lightweight protocol can improve the completeness property of the FDS,
estimate the recovery time of the CR-TS and reduce the system overhead.
4.3.3 Discussion
One of the most useful aspects for such recovery detection protocols is that recovery
detection protocols can be combined with failure detection algorithms to satisfy the
autonomy requirement for crash-recovery failure detectors. Previous failure detection
algorithms, such as [9, 24, 37, 51, 68, 81], cannot adapt to the crash-recovery be-
haviour of the monitored target. When a crash failure is detected, these algorithms will
either terminate or still keep listening to the monitored target. If the FDS terminates
after a failure is detected, then it cannot detect the recovery of the monitored target and
restart the monitoring procedure again. If the FDS keeps listening, when it receives a
message, it cannot separate whether the received message is generated by a recently
recovered target or it is a delayed message. The recovery detection protocol enables
the monitoring procedure to operate autonomously and have a consistent view of a re-
coverable target rather than making the fail-free or crash-stop assumption. Especially
for a highly consistent crash-recovery service, if an existing failure detection algo-
rithm is adopted, it cannot solve the undetectable failure problem. If all failures need
to be detected, the detection time might be too small to ensure accuracy and mistake
recurrence requirements. With the recovery detection protocol, these problems can be
solved reasonably well. The occurrence of a failure can be implied by detecting the
occurrence of a recovery. For a highly consistent crash-recovery service, the detection
time can be scaled up within the restricted upper bound without being restricted by
the required proportion of detected failures. This is because the completeness require-
ments are ensured by the recovery detection protocol rather than the failure detection
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algorithm, which brings more flexibility for the failure detection algorithm adoption
and more adaptivity for the highly dynamic failure detection environment.
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Algorithm 2 A Lightweight Recovery Detection Protocol
At CR-TS Side:
1: Initialization:
2: for all i ≥ 1, every η interval send heartbeat mi to FDS; {if CR-TS crashes, the
heartbeat will be stopped as well}
3: when CR-TS’s recovery is finished:
4: int i=1; send heartbeat mi with σi, i and r-signal to FDS; i++;
5: when an m jack is received:
6: if (|tmr − tcr |< ξ) then
7: stop attaching r-signal to mi;
8: else
9: if (|tcr − tmr |> ξ) then {the received m
j
ack is for the previous period}




13: when m j is received by FDS:
14: if (r-signal exists within m j) then
15: estimate the recovery time tmr ;
16: record recovery information;
17: send m jack attached with the estimated t
m
r to CR-TS;{tmr is estimated according
to the CR-TS’s local clock}
18: else
19: if (no r-signal within m j ‖ a crash failure is detected) then
20: stop sending mack;
21: end if
22: end if
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4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have introduced how to estimate the QoS of message communica-
tion and the target service’s dependability metrics as input parameters for the failure
detector’s configuration for the system with synchronized and unsynchronized clocks
in crash-recovery runs. Then we proposed a reliable recovery detection protocol adopt-
ing persistent storage, which guarantees to detect each recovery and a lightweight re-
covery detection protocol, which can reduce the system overhead. Both of these two
protocols can estimate the target service’s recovery time, improve the completeness
aspect and improve the autonomy of a failure detector. Compared with the fail-free
failure detector which assumes 100% availability and absolute reliability or the crash-
stop failure detector which can only measure the reliability of the monitored target, a
crash-recovery failure detector can measure all of the reliability, availability and the
consistency of the monitored target more realistically.
In the next chapter, the proposed crash-recovery failure detection pair and the designed
lightweight recovery detection protocol are simulated and evaluated under various con-




In this chapter, first, we present a failure detection simulation toolkit called FD-Simulator,
which has been designed for studying and evaluating general failure detection frame-
works and failure detection algorithms. Second, with this proposed simulator, some
simulation cases are planned and performed to evaluate the QoS of the crash-recovery
failure detector and the lightweight recovery detection protocol presented in Chap-
ter 3 and 4, respectively. Then, we plot both the analytical results derived from
Theorem 3.6.2 and the simulation results according to the proposed simulation cases.
Both the analytical results and the simulation results show that the dependability of
the monitored target has impact on the QoS of failure detectors, particularly when the
monitored target is highly consistent but not highly reliable. In addition, the proposed
lightweight recovery detection protocol can improve the completeness of a failure de-
tector without reducing other QoS aspects, which is useful for the highly consistent
but unreliable service monitoring and can enable the FDS to operate autonomously.
Finally, the chapter finishes with some conclusions.
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5.2 Failure Detection Simulator
5.2.1 Motivation for Implementing a Simulator
Originally, we tried to implement a service-oriented failure detection framework based
on the Globus Open Grid Service Architecture (OGSA) [55] and the OGSI 1.0 spec-
ification [83] as a subcomponent of the DIGS project. We adopted Globus Toolkit 3
[73] as our implementation platform. During the implementation, several problems
occurred:
• As emerging technologies, Web Service and Grid standards change dramatically.
Particularly for Grid standards, the OGSA framework and OGSI specification
expired in 2004 and to be substituted by WSRF and the consequent specifica-
tions. This makes the implementation work more difficult.
• As our final aim was to provide a failure detection framework solution for large-
scale distributed systems, deploying multiple failure detectors could be time-
consuming work. However, we could not yet know the performance of such
a failure detection framework and the corresponding algorithms before we im-
plement all of them. Thus implementing a failure detection framework without
empirical simulation is a potential risk from the design and implementation per-
spective.
• The performance evaluation of an implemented failure detection framework and
the corresponding algorithms could be difficult, since performance data, such
as the QoS of failure detection services or resource overheads, are not easily
collected within a large-scale distributed system.
• Injecting failures into monitored applications could be a difficult and
time-consuming task. Producing various types of failures and injecting them
into implementation code is complicated.
• Performance evaluation based on a test implementation might only evaluate the
QoS of a failure detection framework under a particular environment rather than
evaluate a more general solution, which cannot guarantee that a designed frame-
Chapter 5. Simulation and Evaluation 111
work or algorithm is a good solution for any circumstance.
Given the above problems, we decided to translate the implementation code into sim-
ulation code in order to study the failure detection problem in a flexible experimental
environment.
5.2.2 Related Work
In this section, we review the variety of simulators which are currently available and
highlight why none of them was suitable for our purpose. We group the simulators
according to their focus and introduce each of them briefly in terms of their design
aims as follows.
Network Simulators
There are a number of simulators, which can simulate large-scale networks, such as
• ns2 Network Simulator [66] is a C++/TCL based simulation tool, which pro-
vides a discrete event-based simulation environment. The main aim of ns2 is to
simulate network topology or transport level protocols. Although ns2 can con-
struct a large-scale network easily, it only focuses on simulating network level
problems rather than higher level application’s.
• GloMosim [6] is a simulation environment for scalable networks and provides
an application level API, but it is especially designed for wireless networks.
Grid Simulators
There are serval simulators for Grid systems simulation, but most of these tools focus
on resource usage and are used to study scheduling problems.
• GridSim [16] is a SimJava-based [52] simulation tool to evaluate scheduling
algorithms, which allows the user to model and simulate parallel or distributed
systems. GridSim provides a comprehensive API for creating different types
of resources such as parallel machines or clusters etc. GridSim is a convenient
tool to simulate how a resource broker aggregates Grid resources according to
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their availability to meet the user’s or applications requirements using scheduling
algorithms or policies.
• SimGrid [19] is a scalable, extensible discrete event simulation toolkit for eval-
uating the distributed and parallel application scheduling on distributed comput-
ing platforms, which is implemented in C. SimGrid enables the user to model
various types of resources such as CPU, machine etc. and allows one to model
more realistic Grid topologies and bandwidth sharing. SimGrid also provides
analysis of the performance of scheduling algorithms and the resource usage.
• Optorsim [8] is a Java-based simulator to evaluate a data Grid. Optorsim mainly
focuses on analyzing data management policies, various replication optimization
algorithms and evaluating the impact of the choice of replication algorithms on
the throughput of Grid jobs.
• VOGanglia [39] aims to provide a simulation platform for cluster scheduling
problems. The VOGanlia simulator provides support for the analysis of different
scheduling policies in a multiple virtual organization environment.
• MicroGrid [79] aims to provide a simulation environment to systematically study
and evaluate middleware applications, network services for the computational
Grid. MicroGrid is implemented in C++ and focuses on simulating Grid resource
management problems within a virtual organization, which requires a cluster-
level system environment and related software.
Dependability Simulators
In addition, there are also some dependability modeling and simulation assessment
tools such as:
• Möbius [30], is a system-level dependability and performance modeling toolkit
implemented in C to assess the system dependability. It provides a discrete event
simulator module to enable models to be simulated in a distributed way across
multiple machines to speed-up the simulation.
• Rainbow Net Simulator [74] is a Petri Net-based simulation tool, which com-
bines graphical and state variable-based specification for discrete event simula-
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tion. Rainbow enables the user to capture a realistic system behavior model.
• DEPEND [42] is a functional-based system-level simulation tool to simulate
realistic fault models for system dependability analysis.
Distributed Algorithm Simulator
• Neko [84] is a Java-based simulation platform, which is based on SimJava orig-
inally (now based on NekoSim). The main aims of Neko are to evaluate and an-
alyze the performance of distributed algorithms such as consensus, group mem-
bership, failure detection. A simulation constructed using Neko can be either
performed on a simulated network environment or a real network environment.
However, Neko focuses on the distributed algorithm level without considering
underlying resources and Neko is more suitable for flat distributed algorithm
simulation rather than hierarchical protocols or frameworks.
Although there are a number of simulators, as we described above, none of them fits
our aims and purpose. Thus, we implemented a simulation tool called FD-Simulator
which adopts SimJava as the simulation engine. The reason that we adopted Sim-
Java is that SimJava is flexible and provides the basic functions we need. It is also
adopted by both resource level Grid simulators such as GridSim and algorithm level
simulators such as Neko. This provides the possibility to connect our FD-Simulator
to GridSim and Neko to produce a more complicated resource-algorithm-architecture-
dependability simulation in the future. SimJava provides a simulation kennel for entity-
based discrete event simulation, an animation module to visualize the simulation as a
graphical applet, a statistical package which provides statistical functions and a graph-
ical tool for visualizing the statistical report. However, SimJava does not provide re-
source or application level abstractions to simplify the simulation. Further coding
work is necessary to develop a task specific simulation model. Thus FD-Simulator is
designed as a toolkit particularly for evaluating the distributed failure detection frame-
works and the failure detection algorithms in various environments.
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5.2.3 FD-Simulator Design Features
As we explained above, the existing simulation tools (see Section 5.2.2) did not pro-
vide all the expected functions, such as application architecture simulation, algorithm
simulation, resource simulation, dependability assessment etc., to study failure detec-
tion problems, a simulation tool called FD-Simulator was designed and implemented
specifically for studying the failure detection problems. Fig. 5.1 shows the architecture
Figure 5.1: The FD-Simulator Architecture
of the FD-Simulator, which aims to provide the following features:
• Evaluating the QoS of failure detection algorithms, protocols or frameworks.
• Assessing the reliability, availability, scalability, adaptivity etc. of the proposed
failure detection algorithms, protocols or frameworks.
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• Simulating hierarchical failure detectors as well as flat failure detectors.
• Simulating and tracking the resource usage such as network bandwidth and CPU
workload, to study the trade-off between the QoS and the system overhead.
• Minimizing the coding work and providing statistical functions for the QoS anal-
ysis of the proposed failure detectors.
Fig. 5.1 shows the architecture of the FD-Simulator, which contains predefined classes
such as Network, Host, Service etc., some predefined algorithms and statistical tools to
support the simulation. The FD-simulator is designed and implemented with the aim of
minimizing the coding work to conduct simulations. Each simulation can be described
by a programming language independent XML configuration file validated by a W3C
conformed schema [86] file (see Fig. 5.2). When an algorithm is tested with different
parameters or within a different framework, we only need to revise the configuration
file and restart the simulation. This avoids rewriting and recompiling the source code.
It is also simplifies the simulation procedure and makes the FD-Simulator much easier
to use. When the simulation starts, the simulation initializer will read the specified con-
figuration file to construct the network and the failure detection framework topology
automatically and configure each component according to specified parameters within
the configuration file.
Figure 5.2: The Schema of the Configuration File
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<xs:complexType name=′′EntityType′′>
<xs:attribute name=′′failurerate′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′failure variance′′ use=′′optional′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′mttr distribution′′ type=′′xs:string′′ use=′′optional′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′mttf distribution′′ type=′′xs:string′′ use=′′optional′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′type′′ type=′′xs:string′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′id′′ type=′′xs:string′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′name′′ type=′′xs:string′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′recoveryrate′′ type=′′xs:double′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′recovery variance′′ use=′′optional′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′statetrace′′ type=′′xs : boolean′′ use=′′optional′′/ >
< /xs : complexType>
Figure 5.3: The Schema of the EntityType
Fig. 5.2 shows the schema file’s structure, which is used to validate and constrain
the configuration files’ format. The root node of the configuration file is the Simu-
lation node, which contains simulation parameters and Network nodes. The Network
node contains Subnetworks and Hosts. The structure of the Subnetwork node is the
same as the Network node and the Host node can contain MonitoringService1 and the
monitored TargetService. Each MonitoringService contains a group of ChannelMod-
ules. Each ChannelModule contains one TargetService’s name and some correspond-
ing monitoring parameters (see Fig. 5.6). During the initialization procedure each
MonitoringService will create a number of channels specified in its configuration file
and initialize each channel with the specified parameters. If there is no channel in-
formation within the MonitoringService, the MonitoringService will not monitor any
target.
1Monitoring is used instead of failure detection to adapt to the potential future function extension.
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Within the configuration file, the EntityType (see Fig. 5.3) is the fundamental schema
element type. All of the other types such as Network, Host, Service inherit from the
EntityType element. The EntityType has some predefined attributes. For example, the
mttf distrbution attribute represents the probability distribution of MTTF; mttr distrbution
attribute represents the probability distribution of MTTR; the failurerate attribute rep-
resents 1MTTF ; the recoveryrate attribute represents
1
MTTR . If the failurerate of an entity
is zero, it means the entity is set as fail-free. If the recoveryrate of the entity is zero, it
means the entity is set as crash-stop. If a probability distribution is not specified, then
the FD-Simulator will regard the “rate” (e.g., failurerate) as a deterministic number
rather than a probabilistic one.
According to the structure of the configuration schema file, some important classes are
implemented as the default library of the FD-Simulator. In this thesis, we give a brief
introduction of the most important classes. The foundation class within this simulator
is the SimEntity class, which corresponds to the EntityType element within the schema
file. Other entity classes such as Network, Host, TargetService, MonitoringService,
ChannelModule etc. all inherit from the SimEntity class. The SimEntity contains the
basic functions used for the simulation. For example, the functions for simulating
a crash, recovery, sending a message, receiving a message etc. The subclasses that
inherit from the SimEntity class can use or extend these functions for their own pur-
poses. In our simulation, a crash is simulated as the crashed entity keeping silent and
not sending or replying to any message; a recovery is simulated as the recovered en-
tity coming back to life from a crashed state with the ability to send and reply to any
message. The crash or recovery can be scheduled as discrete events within the entity
with a given arrival rate and a specified random distribution. When the crash event
arrives, the crash function will be triggered and a recovery event will be scheduled;
when the recovery event arrives, the recovery function will be triggered and a crash
event will be scheduled. In this way, a crash-recovery model can be simulated. When
the crash arrival rate equals zero (MTTF→ ∞), a fail-free run can be simulated; when
the recovery arrival rate equals zero, a crash-stop run can be simulated.
Another key component for the failure detection simulation is the simulated network
entity. From the network perspective, each network entity can be regarded as a queue.
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Figure 5.4: The Simulation Network Queue Model
But a potential problem of using a single queue to simulate a network entity is that
when the message arrival rate (from multiple sources) is high, the queue might be-
come unstable and the arriving messages could possibly be congested in the queue. In
order to control such message congestion, we adopted multiple queues (see Fig. 5.4) to
simulate a network entity. In the FD-Simulator, a network entity contains two types of
queue. One type is the service queue (the SubQueue in Fig. 5.4), which will hold the
arriving message for a given time (deterministic or non-deterministic), then delivers it
to the destination. The other type is the control queue (the NetworkQueue in Fig. 5.4),
which will deliver the arriving message to a service queue and the service time of the
NetworkQueue is sufficiently small to be ignored. A Network can contain one control
queue and several service queues. The number of service queues can be specified, so
that the level of message congestion is controllable. For example, if each message’s
transmission is assumed to be independent, then a network should have a reasonable
number of service queues to satisfy the independence assumption. When a message
arrives at a network, it will be received by the control queue first, then the control
queue will deliver the message to the service queue next to the previous one, which
services the last arrived message, thus allowing parallel transmission of each message.
Then, after some service time, the message will be delivered to its next destination.
By adopting such a method, the message congestion and dependency can also be con-
trolled by the simulator to satisfy a given message transmission assumption. For other
entities, such as the Host entity, if necessary, they can also be designed in such a way
to satisfy the simulation requirements.
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Figure 5.5: A Sample Failure Detection Simulation Framework
Fig. 5.5 shows a sample simulation topology according to a configuration file and
how the simulation works. The root node of the XML-based simulation configura-
tion file is Simulation, which can contain one Network node and some simulation
parameters. A Network node can contain some other Network nodes as its subnet-
work or Host nodes. A Host node can contain some TargetService (TS) nodes or
MonitoringService nodes (MS). For the MonitoringService node, it contains Chan-
nelModules. Each ChannelModule can monitor a TargetService and detect its fail-
ure by adopting some algorithm. When the simulation is started, the FD-Simulator
will load the configuration information from the specified configuration file, generate
the system topology according to the structure of the configuration file, and config-
ure each node according to the given parameters in the configuration file. When a
MonitoringService is specified to monitor a TargetService, a ChannelModule should
be paired with the TargetService’s name. When the simulation starts, the TargetSer-
vice will be configured automatically to communicate with the paired ChannelModule
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<xs:attribute name=′′interval′′ type=′′xs:double′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′timeout′′ type=′′xs:double′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′algorithm′′ type=′′xs:string′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′protocol′′ type=′′xs:string′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′source′′use=′′xs:string′′/ >
<xs:attribute name=′′dest′′ type=′′xs:string′′/ >
Figure 5.6: Parameters for a ChannelModule
and the ChannelModule will monitor the TargetService by adopting a given algorithm
that can give an output decision of the TargetService’s status. For example, if a push-
style crash failure detector is simulated as in Fig. 5.5, the TS-1 is monitored by the
ChannelModule-1. When the simulation starts, TS-1 starts to send heartbeat messages
with the final destination as ChannelModule-1. The heartbeat message will route from
TS-1 to Host-1, SubNetwork-1, Network, SubNetwork-2, Host-4, MS-2, then finally
reaches ChannelModule-1. This routing method is implemented by adopting XPath
[27] query. When a message is routing, the current message hosting node will query
itself and all of its sub nodes whether the final destination of the message is within this
node or its sub nodes. If yes, it will deliver the message to the node which contains the
message’s destination; if not, the message will be delivered to the parent node of the
current node then the query procedure restarts. In such a way, a message can be de-
livered to any node in the simulated network system, complicated hierarchical failure
detection frameworks can be simulated and various algorithms can be designed and
injected into each ChannleModule for QoS evaluation.
The FD-Simulator also provides an animation feature (see Fig. 5.1). When the ani-
mation feature is enabled in the configuration file, the FD-Animator can initialize an
applet-based animation and construct the graphical network topology automatically
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rather than starting a non-graphical simulation. This animator can help with debug-
ging the simulation code, verifying the behaviors of a framework, an algorithm or
simulation results during development time. It can also demonstrate the monitoring
procedure and help understanding of the proposed failure detectors.
Moreover, the simulation parameters, such as the simulation runtime, which represent
the length of the simulation; the warmup duration, which represents the duration be-
fore the simulation reaches steady state; simulation replication numbers, confidence
interval, produce trace file etc., can be specified before the simulation starts in the
XML-based configuration file (see Fig.5.7). Additional parameters can easily be de-
fined and added, which brings more flexibility to the simulation configuration.
5.2.4 Simulator Summary
In the previous sections we introduced the design and implementation of our FD-
Simulator and gave a survey of the related work. The FD-Simulator can conduct and
configure a failure detection framework automatically according to a given XML-based
configuration file. The XML-based configuration presents the hierarchical architecture
of a simulated failure detection network effectively and simplifies the coding work of
evaluating the given failure detection framework and the failure detection algorithms.
The QoS data can be gathered after the simulation finishes and statistical functions are
provided to allow detailed analysis. Furthermore, the FD-Simulator also supports an
animation feature and can visualize the failure detection framework, which can help in
validating, verifying and understanding the implemented algorithm and the communi-
cation procedure between the failure detection pairs.
Using the FD-Simulator, some simulation cases have been planned and simulated to
evaluate the QoS of failure detectors with some algorithms under various conditions.
These are presented in the following sections.




<xs:element name=′′runtime′′ type=′′xs:double′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′warmuptime′′ type=′′xs:double′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′statistics′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′graphstatistics′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′animation′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′showmessage′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′trackfile′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′report′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′statetrace′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′reportdetail′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′includetransient′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′autotrace′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′generategraph′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′print to std′′ type=′′xs:boolean′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′replication number′′type=′′xs:int′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:element name=′′confidence interval′′type=′′xs:double′′minOccurs=′′0′′/ >
<xs:all>
<xs:complexType>
Figure 5.7: Simulation Parameters
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5.3 Simulation Planning
In the previous section the FD-Simulator was introduced for evaluating failure detec-
tion frameworks and failure detection algorithms. In the following sections, the sim-
ulation results will be introduced, which were produced using the FD-Simulator. The
simulations are made according to the system model described in Chapter 3, which
contains a failure detection pair (CR-TS and FDS), hosted by two hosting machines
respectively within a network (see Fig. 5.8).
Figure 5.8: The Planned Failure Detection Simulation Framework
The designed simulation plan has eight simulation cases (see Table 5.1). The planned
simulation cases are distinct from previous simulation studies such as in [24, 36, 68,
81], all of which focus on evaluating how well a failure detector can tolerate message
delay and loss behavior under the fail-free or crash-stop assumption. Our simulation
cases are focusing on the impact of the monitored target’s crash-recovery on the QoS
of a failure detector and how well a failure detector adapts to such unavoidable events.
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The simple heartbeat timeout algorithm, the NFD-S algorithm and the NFD-S algo-
rithm with the lightweight recovery detection protocol (NFD-S-LRD) are tested with
various values of MTTF and MTTR. Table 5.1 shows the simulation parameter settings
of the simulations.
FDS CR-TS Network
Algorithm Reliability Consistency Availability pL E(D)
Simple Time-
out





MTBF ≈ 0.9524 0.01 0.02





MTBF ≈ 0.9524 0.01 0.02





MTBF ≈ 0.9524 0.01 0.02





MTBF ≈ 0.9524 0.01 0.02





MTBF ≈ 0.9524 0.01 0.02





MTBF ≈ 0.9524 0.01 0.02





MTBF ≈ 0.9524 0.01 0.02





MTBF ≈ 0.9524 0.01 0.02
Table 5.1: The Simulation Plan
For simulation parameter settings, we fix the heartbeat interval η = 1 and increase the
timeout length gradually. The message transmission parameters are pL=0.01, E(D) =
0.02 as two exponentially distributed random variables respectively. The confidence
interval is set as 99% 2. All of these settings are similar to those in the simulations
in [24]. Furthermore, the CR-TS (TargetService) is defined as a recoverable process
with various MTTF and MTTR as deterministic and non-deterministic values. For
2The graphs are shown without confidence intervals to avoid obscuring the graphs.
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the non-deterministic MTTF and MTTR, the exponential distribution is adopted. We
choose the exponential distribution for the non-deterministic MTTF and MTTR for the
following reasons: first, exponential failures are widely adopted for reliability analysis
in many practical systems; second, unlike some heavy tail distributions such as log-
normal distribution, the crash and the recovery with exponential distribution will occur
with a reasonable inter-arrival time, which will not make the CR-TS behave like a fail-
free or crash-stop service. In addition, some reasonable durations of MTTF and MTTR
are provided as simulation cases, which are shown in Table 5.1. From Lemma 3.4.2,
we know that the availability of the CR-TS is MTTFMTBF ≈ 0.9524 and the reliability is 100
or 1000 time units. Such characteristics of the CR-TS are typical for a highly available
and consistent, but not highly reliable, service. The simulations with MTTF = 100
and MTTR = 5 are simulated with 100,000 time units, with the first 2,000 time units
removed as the transient period. In order to generate enough crashes and recoveries,
the simulations with MTTF = 1000 and MTTR = 50 are simulated with 300,000 time
units, with the first 60,000 time units as the transient period. Furthermore, in order to
improve the accuracy of the simulation, for each simulation case, three independence
simulation replications are performed simultaneously and the average simulation re-
sults of all simulation replications are taken as the final results. The timeout length
is varied from 1 to 20 for the simple timeout algorithm and from 0 to 20 for both the
NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD algorithms, respectively. Finally, we gather the following
QoS measurements: the average mistake duration, the probability of accuracy3 and
the mistake recurrence for the simple algorithm. For the NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD al-
gorithms, we also obtain the average failure detection time and the proportion of the
detected failures. In addition, we plot the average recovery detection time for the NFD-
S-LRD. For the other QoS metrics, since they can be derived directly from the above
metrics, we do not plot them in this chapter.
3We use the total proportion of the time that the FDS is in Accurate state (see Fig.3.4(b) and Ta-
ble 3.1) instead of PA = 1− E(TM)E(TMR) to obtain PA. Our tests show that the result of both kinds of calcula-
tions are very similar, when the runtime is long enough.
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5.4 Simulation Evaluation and Analysis
5.4.1 Evaluation of the Simple Timeout Algorithm
In order to assess the impact of the CR-TS’s dependability on the QoS of the FDS,
first of all we have conducted simulation case 1 in the Table 5.1: a heartbeat algo-
rithm which, whenever a heartbeat is received or a timeout is reached, resets the next
timeout period. We choose exponentially distributed MTTF and MTTR of 100 and 5
respectively, a typical CR-TS, which is highly available and consistent but not highly
reliable. The simulation results in MTTF = 105.962 and MTTR = 4.937. Then From
Proposition 3.4.1 and Lemma 3.4.2 we calculate that the MTBF = 110.899 and the
availability of this CR-TS: Pa = MTTFMTBF = 0.95548.
4
Fig. 5.9 shows the E(TM), E(TMR), PA changes when the timeout period is increased to
four times MTTR. These simulation results corroborate our discussion in Section 3.9.
E(TM) approaches MTTR = 4.7803; E(TMR) approaches MTBF = 108.9127; PA in-
creases a little but then decreases to MTTFMTBF = 0.9563. Note that if MTTR were in-
creased, PA will increase for longer and decrease more slowly (see Fig.5.13).
Then according to the simulation plan in Table 5.1, we also simulated and plotted the
simulation cases 2-4. We varied the timeout from 1 to 20, and then observed the QoS
metrics of the FDS. Figs. 5.10, Fig. 5.12 and Fig. 5.13 show the performance of E(TM),
E(TMR) and PA of the simulation cases 1-4.
Fig. 5.10 demonstrates the E(TM) of the simple timeout algorithm. The simulation
cases 1 and 3 (MTTR = 5) show that for both deterministic and exponential MTTR, as
the timeout length increases, eventually E(TM) will be become MTTR, which means
that E(TM) is bounded by MTTR. But the deterministic and non-deterministic simu-
lation cases exhibit different characteristics. When timeout < MTTR, for the simple
timeout algorithm, E(TM) of the deterministic and exponential MTTR are similar.
When timeout > MTTR, E(TM) of the deterministic MTTR increases faster than in
4We set MTTF=100, MTTR=5 for the simulation. Since the crash and recovery durations are gen-
erated as exponentially distributed random numbers, the discrepancy exists between the set values and
the result values.
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(a) E(TM) (b) E(TMR)
(c) PA
Figure 5.9: QoS of the Crash-Recovery FDS
the exponential one. This is because, after timeout exceeds MTTR (TUD > MTTR), all
crashes will become undetectable in the deterministic case. Thus E(TM) will approach
MTTR rapidly. But for exponential MTTR, the proportion of the detectable crashes
will decrease more gradually. Thus E(TM) approaches MTTR more slowly than in the
deterministic case.
Simulation cases 2 and 4 (MTTR = 50) show that if MTTR becomes large, as the
timeout length increases, E(TM) can also become larger as well. This is because the
upper bound of E(TM) increases. Note that compared with the simulation cases 1 and
3, the simulation cases 2 and 4 in Fig. 5.10 only show the linear part rather than the
complete characteristics. If the timeout length increases to 200, the simulation cases
2 and 4 will exhibit the same shape as the simulation cases 1 and 3. We can observe
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Figure 5.10: The Simple Timeout Algorithm: E(TM)
that, for all of the simulation cases 1-4, E(TM) decreases (or increases slower) from
1.5−2.1 and then increases again. We analyze this phenomenon in detail as follows.
As we discussed in Section 3.6.2, in a crash-recovery run, mistakes caused by the
CR-TS’s crash and recovery will be taken into consideration. Therefore, for the same
timeout length, there are four aspects which have impact on TM: the message delay and
loss, the CR-TS’s crash and recovery (see Fig. 5.11). TM caused by a message delay is
governed by the ratio between E(D) and TD. For the same E(D), as timeout increases,
more and more delayed messages can be tolerated. Thus TM caused by a message
delay (T 1M) will decrease and occur less frequently. TM caused by a message loss (T
2
M)
is related to η, pL, E(D) and the timeout length. For constant message communication
QoS (i.e. the same pL and E(D)), TM caused by message loss is governed by the ratio
between η and TD. Since as the timeout length increases, more and more message
losses can be tolerated, the average duration of T 2M will decrease and T
2
M will occur
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less frequently (see Fig. 3.10). TM caused by a crash (T 3M) is mainly governed by TD
(see Fig. 5.11(c)), because if a crash occurs, a false positive mistake will last until
the timeout time or until the CR-TS recovers. For detectable crashes, as the timeout
length increases, T 3M will increase. TM caused by a recovery (T
4
M) is mainly governed
by pL and E(D) (see Fig. 5.11(d)), since after the CR-TS’s recovery, a recovery can be
detected when a liveness message is received.
(a) T 1M (b) T
2
M
(c) T 3M (d) T
4
M
Figure 5.11: The Analysis of Possible TM in a Crash-Recovery Run
From the above analysis we know that for the same η, pL, E(D), MTTF and MTTR,
when the timeout length increases, the average mistake duration caused by message de-
lays and the average mistake duration caused by message losses will decrease (T 1M  and
T 2M ), the average mistake duration caused by the CR-TS’s crash will increase (T
3
M ),
and the average mistake caused by the CR-TS’s recovery from a detectable crash is not
affected by the timeout length (T 4M) but fewer crashes and recoveries will be detected.
In the simulation cases 1 and 2 pL=0.01 and MTBF = 105, when timeout is small, T 2M
and T 3M occur with similar frequency. When timeout increases from 1.5 to 2.0, (the
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FDS can tolerate zero message loss and most message delays), E(TM) increases slow




M  and T
4
M and their impacts counterbalance. Overall E(TM)
is stable within this period. As the timeout length increases, T 2M will occur less fre-
quently. But T 3M occurs every MTBF period. Thus, as the timeout increases, T
3
M will
become dominant and E(TM) will increase gradually.
In the simulation cases 3 and 4, pL=0.01 and MTBF = 1050. When the timeout length




M occurs more frequently than
the crash and recovery. Therefore, as the timeout length increases, the average duration
of T 2M decreases and T
2
M occurs less frequently; E(TM) will increase slower or even
decrease since more message losses are tolerated. But if timeout continually increases,
T 3M will become dominant, and E(TM) will later increase gradually.
Overall, Fig. 5.10 shows that in a crash-recovery run, E(TM) exhibits quite different
characteristics from a fail-free run. If the message delay and the probability of message
loss are not very large, E(TM) is bounded by MTTR. From Fig. 5.10, we also observe
that E(TM) can possibly be decreased when some timeout value is chosen. In a crash-
recovery run, continually increasing the timeout length cannot achieve a better (TM) as
in a fail-free run.
Fig. 5.12 demonstrates E(TMR) of the simple timeout algorithm with exponential or de-
terministic MTTF and MTTR with various values. We can see that as MTBF increases,
for the same timeout length, E(TMR) increases as well. This implies that E(TMR) is
greatly impacted by the dependability of the CR-TS. We can also see that, for all of
these four simulation cases, E(TMR) increases exponentially fast at the beginning but
after E(TMR) reaches MTBF2 , it will stop increasing exponentially. For the CR-TS with
deterministic MTTR, E(TMR) will stop at MTBF2 when failures are detectable. This is
because for the deterministic MTTR, when the timeout length is smaller than MTTR,
all crashes are still detectable. Even if all of the message delays and losses are toler-
ated, for every MTBF period there are still two mistakes (T 3M, T
4
M) which will certainly
occur. Thus E(TMR) ≤ MTBF2 within this duration (see Lemma 3.6.5). If TD is larger
than the recovery duration, all crashes might become undetectable (see the proof of
Lemma 3.6.9). When more and more message delays and losses are tolerated, E(TMR)
will become stable at MTBF (see Lemma 3.6.4). For the CR-TS with exponential
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Figure 5.12: The Simple Timeout Algorithm: E(TMR)
MTTR, E(TMR) will increase gradually and approach MTBF rather than stopping at
MTBF
2 , until all crashes become undetectable. This is because for non-deterministic
MTTR, as the timeout length increases, the proportion of the detectable crashes de-
creases. Therefore, for the detectable crashes TMR ≤ MTBF2 and for the undetectable
crashes TMR ≤MTBF. Thus E(TMR) will increase gradually between [MTBF2 , MTBF]
and finally stabilize at MTBF. All of these results match our analysis in Chapter 3 well
and indicate that if a CR-TS is not fail-free (MTTF→ ∞) or crash-stop (MTTR→ ∞),
E(TMR) will be bounded by MTBF when failures are undetectable and MTBF2 when
failures are detectable.
Fig. 5.13 shows for the same QoS of message communication, when MTBF increases,
PA will be improved. This is because as MTBF increases, E(TMR) increases as well.
Thus from the equation PA = 1− E(TM)E(TMR) (as in [24]), we can know that for the same
timeout length, when MTBF increases, a better PA can be achieved. However, from
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Figure 5.13: The Simple Timeout Algorithm: PA
the Fig. 5.13, we can also see that as the timeout length increases, PA is not always
increasing as in a fail-free or crash-stop run. Continually increasing timeout could
decrease PA. This is because TMR is bounded by MTBF2 or MTBF. After E(TMR) reaches
MTBF
2 , it increases slowly rather than exponentially fast but E(TM) increases linearly
and faster than E(TMR). Thus PA decreases and finally PA will approach MTTFMTBF , which
equals the availability of the CR-TS.
All of the above results indicate that for a highly available CR-TS, even if the FDS
always trusts the CR-TS without detecting a crash, in terms of the QoS metrics in [24],
a quite good QoS of the FDS can still be achieved. Especially for a highly available
and highly consistent but not highly reliable CR-TS, this QoS (as in [24]) might be the
best one for such a CR-TS. But the completeness property (see Section 3.6.3) of the
FDS is not satisfied, since no failure is detected. Consequently, these simulation results
demonstrate the necessity of the additional QoS metrics we proposed in Section 3.6.3
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to measure the completeness aspects and the speed of the recovery detection of a crash-
recovery FDS. Furthermore, these results also demonstrate the necessity of adopting
the recovery detection protocols we presented in Chapter 4, which can improve the
proportion of detected failures without reducing other QoS aspects. We will introduce
the simulation results of how well the NFD-S algorithm with the lightweight recovery
detection protocol can improve the QoS of the FDS in the following sections.
5.4.2 Evaluation of the NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD Algorithms
5.4.2.1 Analysis for the Basic QoS Metrics
We implemented the NFD-S algorithm presented in [24] and the NFD-S-LRD algo-
rithm (see Section 4.3.2) to evaluate the QoS of both algorithms and compared them
with the analytical results derived from Theorem 3.6.2 (see simulation cases 5-8 in
Table 5.1). Figs. 5.14-5.19 compare the QoS of the two algorithms (simulation results)
and the corresponding analytical results from different perspectives. For the analyti-
cal results, in a crash-recovery run, some of the inequalities (such as TM, TMR, PA) in
Theorem 3.6.2 are related to Pr(Xa > τi− tr) (see Proposition 3.6.1). Therefore the
QoS bound estimation will be changing dynamically as Pr(Xa > τi− tr) is changing
according to the current CR-TS’s alive duration. This will bring more difficulty to the
QoS estimation. However, since we only estimate the bounds of each QoS metric, we
can maximize Pr(Xa > τi− tr), which can be done by setting the heartbeat sequence
number i to be a small number. This is because when the maximum Pr(Xa > τi− tr) is
adopted, pis will be maximized, which means the maximum mistake number and mis-
take duration within the fail-free duration will be obtained. (See the proof of Proposi-
tion 3.6.1 and Fig. 3.7). Thus we can estimate the upper bound of the average mistake
duration (E(TUM )) and the lower bound of average mistake recurrence time (E(T
L
MR))
and the lower bound query accuracy probability (PLA ). In our analytical results compu-
tation, we set the heartbeat sequence number i = 1. Note that if a large i is adopted,
the analytical results might still be valid and closer to the simulation results. However,
the possibility that the average number and duration of the mistakes within the fail-free
duration are underestimated will increase, which means that the QoS of the FDS might
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not satisfy the given QoS requirements.
Figure 5.14: The NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD Algorithms: E(TM)
Figs. 5.14-5.16 show the comparison in terms of E(TM), E(TMR) and PA, which are
the QoS metrics proposed in [24]. From these three figures, we have the following
observations:
1. With the same dependability and the same QoS of message transmission, the
QoS of the NFD-S algorithm and the NFD-S-LRD algorithm are quite similar to
the simple timeout algorithm. The NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD algorithms perform
slightly better than the simple one. Since the detailed analysis of the shapes of
the QoS metrics is presented in Section 5.4.1, we do not repeat that analysis here.
As we can observe from Figs. 5.10, Fig. 5.12, Fig. 5.13 and Figs. 5.14-5.16, the
dependability of a CR-TS can influence the QoS of the FDS. Particularly, for a
highly available but not highly reliable CR-TS, the dependability of the CR-TS
can have more impact than the performance of the algorithm and the QoS of
Chapter 5. Simulation and Evaluation 135
Figure 5.15: The NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD Algorithms: E(TMR)
message transmission. In such situations, the dependability of the CR-TS must
be taken into account for the FDS design and implementation.
2. With the same dependability and QoS of message transmission, the NFD-S al-
gorithm and the NFD-S-LRD algorithm perform equally well in terms of E(TM),
E(TMR), PA. This is because the lightweight recovery detection protocol is de-
signed for improving the completeness (RDF and RDR) without affecting the other
QoS aspects of the FDS. Based on Figs. 5.14-5.16, we can conclude that the
NFD-S-LRD algorithm achieves our goals.
3. From Figs. 5.10, Fig. 5.12, Fig. 5.13 and Figs. 5.14-5.16, we can see that PA,
E(TMR) and E(TM) have bounds. Continually increasing the timeout length
might not be a reasonable way to achieve better PA, E(TMR) and E(TM). A
potential trade-off exists between the QoS metrics. For instance, for both the
NFD-S algorithm and the NFD-S-LRD algorithm, timeout ∈ [1, 1.1] (TUD =
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Figure 5.16: The NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD Algorithms: PA
timeout +η ∈ [2, 2.1]) might achieve the best overall QoS. For the simple time-
out algorithm timeout ∈ (2, 2.1) (TUD ∈ [2, 2.1]) might achieve the best over all
QoS.
4. Compared with a fail-free or crash-stop run, E(TM) in a crash-recovery run ex-
hibits quite different characteristics. This is because in a crash-recovery run, the
mistakes caused by the crash and recovery are taken into consideration, which
means continually increasing the timeout length will not always decrease E(TM)
as in a fail-free or a crash-stop run. It is possible to increase false positive mis-
takes (T 3M, see Fig. 5.11(c)) as well. As the timeout length increases, mistakes
caused by message delays and losses will occur less frequently, thus false posi-
tive mistakes will start to dominate the QoS of the FDS, which statistically have
not been involved in the previous work focusing on the QoS of the crash-stop
failure detectors.
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5. From Figs. 5.14-5.16, we can observe that, the simulation results of E(TM) are
smaller than the analytical results, the simulation results of E(TMR) are larger
than the analytical results and the simulation results of PA are larger than the an-
alytical results, which indicate that the bound analysis of the basic QoS metrics
in Theorem 3.6.2 are valid and the simulation results satisfy the QoS require-
ments according to the analysis.
6. From Figs. 5.14-5.16, we can also observe an obvious gap between the analytical
results and the simulation results. This is caused by the overestimated or under-
estimated analytical results within a crash-recovery run but the simulation results
are the statistics of the average results. Recall that in the proof of Lemma 3.6.6,
E(TM) is overestimated as an upper bound by using the total mistake duration
over the underestimated average number of mistakes that might occur within a
crash-recovery duration. Thus the analytical results of E(TM) will be larger than
the simulation results. For E(TMR), in the proof of Lemma 3.6.3, it is estimated
as a lower bound by using the observation duration (MTBF) over an overesti-
mated number of mistakes that might occur within a crash-recovery duration.
For instance, the number of mistakes within the crash duration is estimated as
dE(D)
η
e+1 (see the proof of Lemma 3.6.2), which is an upper bound rather than
the average number. Thus if such an estimation is adopted, E(TMR) of the an-
alytical results will be smaller than the simulation results. For PA, in the proof
of Lemma 3.6.5, it is estimated as a lower bound by using one minus an overes-
timated total mistake duration over the observation duration (MTBF). Thus PA
of the analytical results will be smaller than the simulation results. All of these
results satisfy the QoS requirements E(TM) < TUM , PA > P
L
A and E(TMR) > T
L
MR.
Notice that if the analytical results can be estimated closer to the actual average
results, the analytical results will approach to the simulation results more closely
as well.
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5.4.2.2 Analysis for the Extended QoS Metrics
In order to compare the differences between the NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD algorithms,
we also plot E(RDF), E(TD) and E(TDR) in Figs. 5.17-5.19 to demonstrate the perfor-
mance comparison.
Figure 5.17: The NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD Algorithms: E(RDF)
Fig. 5.17 shows the proportion of the detected failures of the NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD
algorithm with different dependability of the CR-TS for both simulation and analytical
results. Recall that PA is the probability of the FDS which can output an accurate result
at an arbitrary time whereas RDF is the proportion of the detected failures among the
occurred failures (see the definition of PA in Section 3.6.2 and the definition of RDF
in Section 3.6.3). Therefore RDF is differ from PA. As the timeout length increases,
E(RDF) of the NFD-S algorithm decreases. When MTTR becomes shorter, E(RDF)
will decrease faster. This is because the smaller MTTR is, the faster timeout + η
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crosses MTTR (TUD > MTTR). Therefore, more crashes remain undetected when
the NFD-S algorithm is adopted. From the Fig. 5.17, we can also see that the simu-
lation results of E(RDF) are larger than the analytical results, which means the bound
analysis of E(RDF) is valid and the simulation results satisfy the QoS requirements in
terms of RLDF . In addition, for the NFD-S-LRD algorithm, from Fig 5.17 we can see
that E(RDF) is not affected by the length of timeout and MTTR. E(RDF) of the NFD-S-
LRD algorithm remains stable and approaches 1.0, which means almost all crashes are
detected. Thus we can conclude that in terms of the completeness property, the NFD-
S-LRD algorithm performs better than the NFD-S algorithm in a crash-recovery run.
From Fig. 5.17, we can also see a gap between the analytical results and the simulation
results. This is caused by the worst case estimation. In the proof of Lemma 3.6.9,
we assume the CR-TS crashes just after a liveness message is sent as the worst case
and in order to detect an occurred crash failure, Xc greater than timeout +η is needed
(see Fig. 3.8). However, many failures do not occur just after a liveness message is
sent. Therefore the proportion of the detected failure is underestimated and the analyt-
ical results are smaller than the simulation results, which satisfies the QoS requirement
E(RDF) > RLDF.
From Fig. 5.18, we can observe that with the same QoS of message communication
and the CR-TS’s dependability, E(TD) of the NFD-S-LRD algorithm is smaller than
the NFD-S algorithm and the upper bound of E(TD) of the NFD-S-LRD algorithm is
MTTR+E(TDR). This is because when a recovery detection protocol is adopted, after
the recovery of the CR-TS, the FDS takes E(TDR) time units to detect the recovery on
average, which means that from the crash time, the FDS takes MTTR + E(TDR) time
units to detect the occurred crash. This result shows that the recovery detection pro-
tocol could be particularly useful to detect a crash failure for a highly consistent CR-
TS. Since all of the existing failure detection algorithms adopt increasing the timeout
length to tolerate more message losses and delays, if a CR-TS is recoverable and re-
covers fast, it could be difficult for these algorithms to achieve the QoS in [24] and
satisfy the completeness property at the same time. By adopting the recovery detec-
tion protocol, this problem can be solved reasonably well. In addition, according to
the NFD-S algorithm, TD is bounded by η + timeout regardless the correctness of the
detection, thus TD < TUD must be satisfied. In Fig. 5.18, we do not plot η + timeout
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Figure 5.18: The NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD Algorithms: E(TD)
which can be observed directly from the horizonal axis.
Fig. 5.19 shows the E(TDR) of the NFD-S-LRD algorithm with the same QoS for the
message communications. We observe that E(TDR) is not affected by MTTF, MTTR
and the timeout length. It stays stable around 0.03 (see Fig. 5.19)5. According to
Lemma 4.2.1 and Remark 4.2.1 in Chapter 4, we know that TDR is only affected by
the heartbeat interval η, the consecutive message loss length XL and the message de-
lay D. Thus E(TDR) can be estimated by E(TDR) = η ·E(XL) + E(D). Since each
message’s transmission in our simulation is independent and theoretically the possi-
ble consecutive message loss number could be +∞. From Remark 4.2.1, we can get
E(TDR) = η× pL1−pL +E(D)≈ 0.03. Therefore, the simulation results demonstrate the
Lemma 4.2.1 and Remark 4.2.1 quite well. In addition, Figs. 5.17-5.19 also demon-
5The bias between the two simulation results is caused by the different simulation length for each
simulation (see Section 5.3), which will result in a little different pL, E(D) and E(XL)
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Figure 5.19: The NFD-S and NFD-S-LRD Algorithms: E(TDR)
strate the lightweight recovery detection protocol can adapt to the crash-recovery be-
havior of the CR-TS well. It also allows the FDS to have a consistent view of the
CR-TS and let the FDS know about all state changes of the CR-TS. This means that
recovery detection protocols can improve the adaptivity of a FDS and enable it operate
autonomously. Especially for the highly consistent crash-recovery CR-TS, this feature
is particularly useful.
5.5 Conclusions
In this Chapter, we introduced the design and implementation of our FD-Simulator,
which aims to simplify complex failure detection frameworks and algorithms simula-
tion. The FD-Simulator can construct the simulation framework automatically accord-
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ing to the XML-based configuration file and gather all of the QoS performance data in
a file after the simulation for further analysis.
By using the FD-Simulator, we also designed some simulation cases directed to assess-
ing the QoS of the crash-recovery FDS and the lightweight recovery detection protocol
based on the NFD-S algorithm. We compared the simulation results with the derived
analytical results and analyzed them in detail. Our analysis in Section 5.4 shows that
due to the crash-recovery of a CR-TS, a FDS cannot achieve 100% accuracy. The de-
pendability of a recoverable monitored target can impact the QoS of failure detectors.
For a crash-recovery FDS, E(TMR) is bounded by MTBF, PA is bounded by MTTFMTBF and
E(TM) is bounded by MTTR. All of the simulation results imply that when a failure
detector is designed and implemented, the dependability of the CR-TS needs to be
considered. In addition, the plotted Figures in Section 5.4.2 demonstrate that our QoS
bound analysis in Chapter 3 is valid and can be used as an approximate solution for the
computation of FDS’s parameters or the QoS bounds estimation if the FDS’s parame-
ters are given. The simulation results also show that the NFD-S-LRD algorithm could
be a good solution for a highly consistent monitored target with reasonable MTTF
length. Compared with the NFD-S algorithm, the NFD-S-LRD algorithm exhibits
a better QoS in terms of the completeness of a crash-recovery failure detector, and
performs equally well for other QoS aspects. The NFD-S-LRD algorithm is more flex-
ible and adaptive to the highly dynamic distributed system and satisfies the autonomy
requirement (see Section 2.7) of a failure detection task. Especially within a large-
scale distributed network, self-management of a failure detection framework, which
can adapt to the monitored target’s crash-recovery behavior can reduce the complexity
of monitoring procedures.
Finally, the recovery protocols we proposed should also work well with other failure
detection algorithms. The NFD-S is just one possible option. Other algorithms can
certainly be combined with a recovery detection protocol to achieve a better QoS from
different perspectives.
Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Directions
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the main results of this thesis are summarized in Section 6.2. Some
possible future directions are introduced in Section 6.3.
6.2 Conclusions
Dependability is an important issue for any applications or systems. Various attributes
are proposed to measure the system dependability and different fault-tolerance mecha-
nisms are adopted to achieve such a goal. Failure detectors are critical building blocks
for fault-tolerant computing. In this thesis, crash failure detection has been investigated
as the most fundamental problem. Previously, the study of crash failure detectors and
their QoS has been based on the crash-stop or fail-free assumption, only considering
the impact of message transmission. The impact of the system dependability on the
QoS of crash failure detectors is not considered. In this thesis, we have shown that the
crash-stop run and fail-free run are particular cases of the crash-recovery run and that
dependability measurements, such as reliability, availability, consistency, should be in-
volved for the QoS analysis of the crash-recovery failure detection. We have extended
the existing QoS metrics of crash-stop failure detectors to adapt to the crash-recovery
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behaviour of a monitored target and shown how to configure a failure detector in a
crash-recovery run. We analyzed the approximate QoS bounds in depth, showed the
configuration procedure to satisfy a given set of QoS requirements and discussed how
to estimate the failure detector’s input parameters in crash-recovery runs. In addition,
two types of recovery detection protocol were proposed to enable the failure detector to
be more adaptive to the recovery of the monitored target and improve the completeness
of the QoS of failure detectors. The first protocol is the recovery detection protocol
with persistent storage, which can guarantee the detection of each crash failure and re-
covery, estimate each recovery time and satisfy the strong completeness requirement.
The second one is the lightweight recovery detection protocol without using persistent
storage, which is designed to reduce the system overhead and can detect most recover-
ies of the monitored target. Both of these two protocols can improve the QoS of failure
detectors and enable the crash-recovery failure detection as an autonomous monitoring
procedure.
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the QoS of a failure detector in a crash-recovery run,
we have developed the FD-Simulator, which can construct a failure detection frame-
work according to an XML-based configuration file. By using the FD-Simulator, the
simple timeout algorithm, the NFD-S algorithm and the NFD-S algorithm with the
lightweight recovery detection protocol have been assessed with various MTTF and
MTTR. The simulation results have been analyzed in detail and show that in a crash-
recovery run, the QoS of failure detectors exhibit quite different characteristics com-
pared with a crash-stop or fail-free run, which matches our analysis in Chapter 3. The
simulation results also demonstrate that the dependability of the monitored target has
significant impact on the QoS of crash failure detectors, particularly when the moni-
tored target is not reliable and highly consistent. Finally, we showed that the proposed
lightweight recovery detection protocol works well when the monitored target has a
reasonable alive time and it can improve the proportion of the detected failures and
recoveries.
Overall, this thesis is only one step towards solving failure detection problems for
distributed systems. More investigations are certainly needed in future research and
some possible future directions are given in the following section.
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6.3 Future Directions
In this thesis, we focus on two-process systems: one failure detector and one mon-
itored target. In practice, there might be one failure detector which monitors many
targets, or many failure detectors monitoring many targets. In such cases, introduc-
ing redundancy into the system to avoid a single point failure of the failure detector
and analyzing the dependability of the failure detection system are interesting topics.
For such systems, adopting multicast, group membership and gossip protocols to pro-
vide probabilistic QoS coverage and balance the system overhead could be a challeng-
ing problem for more scalable failure detectors. Particularly for a hierarchical failure
detection framework, providing a QoS guarantee and balancing the system overhead
could be a potential direction for future research.
For both of flat and hierarchical failure detection systems, designing communication
protocols to reduce the communication overhead and promote the QoS of communica-
tion will be an interesting topic to investigate. Topics to consider include the trade-off
between the QoS of failure detectors and the system overhead by adopting unreliable
lightweight communication protocols or reliable heavyweight communication proto-
cols; or designing local level communication protocols or global level communication
protocols in hierarchical failure detection systems.
Recent statistical work [75] shows that probabilistic failure behaviours within dis-
tributed systems are complicated. The exponential distribution does not faithfully
represent the failure behaviours. MTTF depends more on the size of the system and
MTTR depends more on the type of the system. Therefore, involving more failure in-
formation and adopting more complicated failure analysis mechanisms to improve the
QoS of failure detectors is a promising direction for the future failure detection study.
From long term monitoring, system failure and recovery behaviours could be track-
able more accurately. Thus, collecting and analyzing this failure information using
statistical methods such as Bayesian machine learning to improve the QoS of failure
detection can be a possible way to analyze the failure detector and the monitored target
more precisely.
For any failure detection system, the performance of the network will greatly influ-
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ence the QoS of failure detectors. Sometimes, network traffic might be bursty (as in
[81]). For example, the message delay and loss rate might be higher during peak times.
Adopting more complicated network performance analysis and forecasting mecha-
nisms, such as using Markov models or Bayesian methods to predict the message
transmission more accurately, is still an important issue.
For service-oriented failure detection, any failure might cause a service composition
failure. Considering more general failure modes such as QoS failure in Section 2.6
and using verification mechanisms to identify such failures could be particularly help-
ful in a service-oriented environment. In addition, dependencies exist between many
components within distributed systems. For such systems, failures will have chained
behaviours. For instance, a component failure might cause a composed service to fail
as well; a memory leak or a hard disk failure will cause a machine failure and such
machine failure will cause service failure. Therefore injecting many different types of
sensor could possibly improve the accuracy of failure detectors and reduce the costs
of dealing with occurred failures and recoveries. For example, if the service A fails
and keeps silence caused by the crash of the service B, it would be better to recover
both of them rather than just recover the service A; if both the hosting environment
and the hosted service have crashed, it will be useless to try service replications on
the same host machine. For a system which requires high availability, such diagno-
sis could be particularly useful. Overall, tracking the root cause of a service failure
and figuring out the dependency between different components can be implemented
by multiple types of sensor deployment and fault-tree based failure diagnosis, which
are interesting topics for future study.
Some recent research work in [5, 72] shows that probabilistic checkpointing, rejuvena-
tion and recovery can achieve better performance and improve the application’s relia-
bility and availability. Combining probabilistic failure analysis, failure detection with
probabilistic checkpointing, rejuvenation and recovery mechanism could be a way to
achieve better performance and balance the overhead of checkpointing and recovery,
which might be a direction worth investigating.
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Appendix A
Failure Detection Algorithms
Algorithm 3 NFD-S Algorithm
Process p
1: for some constant η, send to q heartbeat messages m1,m2,m3, · · · at regular time
points η,2η,3η, · · · respectively;
Process q
2: Initialization:
3: for all i≥ 1, set τi = σi +δ; do {σi = iη is the sending time of mi}
4: output = S; { suspect p initially }
5: end for
6: at every freshness point τi:
7: if no message m j with j ≥ i has been received then
8: output← S; { suspect p if no fresh messages received is received }
9: end if
10: upon receive message m j at time t ∈ [τi,τi+1):
11: if j ≥ i then {trust p when some fresh message is received}
12: output← T ;
13: end if
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Algorithm 4 NFD-U Algorithm
Process p: { using p’s local clock time}
1: for some constant η, send to q heartbeat messages m1,m2,m3, · · · at regular time
points η,2η,3η, · · · respectively;
Process q: { using q’s local clock time}
2: Initialization:
3: for all i≥ 1, set τi = EAi +α; do {EAi is the expected arrival time of mi}
4: output = S; { suspect p initially }
5: end for
6: at every freshness point τ:
7: if no message m j with j ≥ i has been received then
8: output← S; { suspect p if no fresh messages received is received }
9: end if
10: upon receive message m j at time t ∈ [τi,τi+1):
11: if j ≥ i then {trust p when some fresh message is received}
12: output← T ;
13: end if
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Algorithm 5 NFD-E Algorithm
Process p: { using p’s local clock time}
1: for some constant η, send to q heartbeat messages m1,m2,m3, · · · at regular time
points η,2η,3η, · · · respectively;
Process q: { using q’s local clock time}
2: Initialization:
3: τ0 = 0;
4: ` =−1; { ` keeps the largest sequence number in all messages q received so far }
5: upon τ`+1 = the current time: { if the current time reaches τ`+1, then all messages
received are stale}
6: output← S; { suspect p since all messages received are stale at this time }
7: upon receive message m j at time t:
8: if j > ` then {received a message with a higher sequence number}
9: `← j;







11: τ`+1← ÊA`+1 +α;
12: if t < τ`+1 then
13: output← T ; { trust p since m` is still fresh at time t }
14: end if
15: end if
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Algorithm 6 Lazy Failure Detection Protocol
1: when SEND M to p j is invoked:
2: m.content←M; m.st←− hci;
3: pending msg sti[ j]← pending msg sti[ j]∪{m.st}
4: send appl(m) to pi
5: when type(m) is received from p j:
6: case type = appl then transmit M = m.content to the upper layer; % RECEIVE
M %
7: send ack(m) to p j % m.st keeps its value %
8: type= ack then rt← hci;
9: max rtdi[ j]← max(max rtdi[ j],rt−m.st);
10: pending msg sti[ j]← pending msg sti[ j]−{m.st}
11: type =ping then send ack(m) to p j % m.st keeps its value %
12: endcase
13: when QUERY(j) is invoked;
14: if pending msg sti[ j] = /0 then
15: creat a control message m;
16: m.content← null; m.st← hci;
17: send ping(m) to p j;
18: pending msg sti[ j]←{m.st};
19: return (no suspect)
20: else {rt← hci;}
21: if rt− min(pending msg sti[ j]) > max rtdi[ j] then
22: return (suspect)
23: else
24: return (no suspect)
25: end if
26: end if
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Algorithm 7 ϕ-Failure Detector
Initialization:
1: sp :=−1 {keep the largest sequence number}
2: WS := α constant {the window size is a constant}
3: LAp := 0 {the arrival time in the previous receipt}
4: ∆H ip := 0 {inter-arrival time}
5: sump := sqrp := 0 {summation and std. deviation of ∆H ip}
Task 1: {Sampling data}
6: upon receive heartbeat H ip
7: if i > sp then
8: ∆H ip := A
i
p−LAp
9: LAp := Aip
10: sp := i
11: sump := ∑ij=i−(WS−1) ∆H ip













Task 2: {Calculation for ϕ}
16: upon receive request from p about q at time t
17: ϕp := ϕ(t)
18: return ϕp
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Algorithm 8 Bertier et al.’s Algorithm
Every process p ∈Π executes:
Initialization:
suspectp← /0
for all q ∈Π−{p} do
∆P(q)= 0 {∆p(q) belongs to the second layer and allows to moderate the detection}
τ0(q) = 0 {Initially, all process q will be suspected by process p}
EA(0)(q) = U0(q) = 0, delay0(q) = initial value
α0(q) = var0(q) = error0(q) = 0, A(0)(q) = 0




at time i,η, sends heartbeat mi to Π−{p} {η is the detection interval}
Task 2:
upon receive message m j at time t from q:






if j < n then
U(k+1) = tk+1 ∗
k




EA(k+1) = EA(k) + 1k .(t−A(k−n−1)(q))
end if
A(k)(q)← t {A(q) is an array which contains the n last message arrival dates from q}
τ(k+1)(q)← τk(q)+EA(k+1)(q)+α(k+1)(q) {set the next freshness point τ`+1(q)}
if q ∈ suspectp then
suspectp← suspectp−{q} {trust q since mk(q) is still fresh at time i}




Upon τk+1(q) = the current time: {if the current time reaches τk+1, then none of the
messages received is still fresh}
wait during ∆p(q) and if no message receive from q {detection moderation}
suspectp← suspectp∪{q} {suspect q since no received message is still fresh at this time}
